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Article overview 
 
Article 1: Synthetic Biology and the Moral Significance of Artificial Life 
I  discuss  the  moral  significance  of  artificial  life  within  synthetic  biology  via  a  discussion  of  
Douglas,  Powell  and  Savulescu'ʹs  paper  'ʹIs  the  creation  of  artificial  life  morally  significant?’  I  
argue  that  Douglas,  Powell  and  Savulescu’s  definitions  of  'ʹartificial  life’  and  of  'ʹmoral  signif-­‐‑
icance’  are  too  narrow.  Their  definition  of  artificial  life  does  not  capture  all  core  projects  of  
synthetic  biology  or  the  ethical  concerns  that  have  been  voiced,  and  their  definition  of  moral  
significance  fails  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  that  creating  artificial  life  is  conditional-­‐‑
ly   acceptable.   Finally,   I   show   how   several   important   objections   to   synthetic   biology   are  
plausibly  understood   as   arguing   that   creating   artificial   life   in   a  wide   sense   is   only   condi-­‐‑
tionally  acceptable.  
[Appears  in  Bioethics,  30(5),  372-­‐‑379]  
  
Article 2: Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate 
In  the  ethical  debate  on  genetic  modification  (GM),  it  is  common  to  encounter  the  claim  that  
some  objection  to  GM  would  also  apply  an  established,  ethically  accepted  technology,  and  
that  this  is  a  problem  for  the  objection.  I  discuss  how  and  to  what  extent  this  argumentative  
strategy,  which  I  call  a  similarity  argument,  is  useful.  I  construct  a  generic  form  of  the  simi-­‐‑
larity   argument   and   show   that   it   leaves   some   room   open   for   the   GM   critic   to   avoid   the  
seeming   inconsistency   that   the   similarity   argument   identifies.   I   then   show   how   the   GM  
critic   can   avail   herself   of   this   argumentative   space   in   two   specific   cases,   concerning   two  
versions  of  the  'ʹunnaturalness  objection'ʹ  to  GM.  Finally,  I  discuss  the  usefulness  of  similari-­‐‑
ty  arguments  in  general.  
[Accepted  for  publication  in  Ethical  Theory  and  Moral  Practice]  
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Article 3: Rationality, Thresholds and the Precautionary Principle 
The  paper   defends   the   precautionary   principle   from   the   charge   of   being   irrational.   Three  
irrationality-­‐‑based  objections  are  identified.  The  core  of  these  objections  is  that  the  precau-­‐‑
tionary  principle’s  use  of  thresholds  of  value  and  likelihood  is  unjustified,  and  that  expected  
utility  maximization   is   a  preferable  normative  principle   for   risky   choice.  Against   this,   the  
paper  argues  (i)  that  thresholds  of  value  are  part  of  plausible  and  influential  normative  the-­‐‑
ories,  and   (ii)   that   the  precautionary  principle  does  not  diverge  more   from   ideal  expected  
utility  maximization   than  non-­‐‑ideal   expected  utility  maximizing  procedures,   and  may  do  
better  in  real-­‐‑world  choices.  
[Under  revision  for  Ethics,  Policy  and  Environment]  
  
Article 4: On the Cognitive Argument for Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cass  Sunstein  has  argued  that  the  presence  of  a  number  of  cognitive  biases  in  our  thinking  
about  risks  provide  the  basis  of  a  ‘Cognitive  Argument’  for  the  use  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  
in  risk  regulation  as  a  corrective  to  the  biases.  I  argue  that  one  aspect  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analy-­‐‑
sis,  namely  a  scientific  accounting  of  likely  effects  of  regulation,  can  be  justified  as  a  correc-­‐‑
tive   to   cognitive  biases,   but   that   this   aspect   is  not  unique   to   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis.  The   as-­‐‑
pects  of  costs-­‐‑benefit  analysis  that  go  beyond  this  depend  for  their  justification  on  the  desir-­‐‑
ability  of  ‘coherence’  in  valuations  of  risks  (i.e.  that  all  risks  of  premature  death  are  given  a  
similar  value).  I  argue  that  although  there  are  methodological,  instrumental  and  moral  rea-­‐‑
sons  to  think  that  some  form  of  coherence  should  be  an  uncontroversial  goal  of  policy,  cost-­‐‑
benefit   analysis   does   not   realize   those   forms   of   coherence.   The   use   of   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis  
remains  dependent  on  controversial  moral  ideas,  and  it  cannot  be  justified  as  an  a  correction  
of  cognitive  biases.  
    





Synthetic  biologists  are  currently  working  to  make  it  possible  to  routinely  engineer  organ-­‐‑
isms  in  order  to  endow  them  with  qualities  that  their  human  designers  wish  them  to  have.  
Synthetic   biology   thus  means   harnessing   the   powers   of   biology   to   a  much   greater   extent  
than  we  have  previously  been  able  to  by  designing  and  fabricating  artificial  life  forms  that  
do   things   that   are   useful   to   us.   Synthetic   biology   offers   plenty   of   attractive   possibilities,  
including  contributing   to  developing  solutions   to  some  of   the  major  challenges   facing  hu-­‐‑
manity   in   areas   such  as  health,   food,   energy  and  environmental   sustainability.  But   it   also  
raises  ethical  questions.  As  I  see  it,  two  overarching  questions  have  defined  the  discussion  
of  synthetic  biology  from  an  ethical  and  societal  perspective:  
(I)  Should  we  be  engaged  in  the  design  and  fabrication  of  organisms  at  all?  
(II)  How  should  synthetic  biology  be  developed  and  regulated  from  a  societal  
point  of  view?  
The   four  articles   that  make  up   the  core  of   this  dissertation  address  aspects  of   these  broad  
questions.  Articles  1  and  2  concern  question  (I).  Article  1  directly   takes  up  the  question  of  
whether   the   creation   of   artificial   life,   as   that   activity   is   realized   in   synthetic   biology,   is   a  
morally  significant  act.  Article  2  discusses  a  common  argument  that  aims  to  show  that  ob-­‐‑
jections  to  designing  and  fabricating  organisms  (in  synthetic  biology  as  well  as  ‘traditional’  
genetic  engineering)  should  be  rejected.  Together,  articles  1  and  2  provide  an  argument  that  
the  answer  to  question  (I)  should  not  be  taken  to  be  a  simple  yes,  as  many  philosophers  seem  
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to  believe.  I  argue  that  many  so-­‐‑called  intrinsic  objections  –  objections  to  the  activity  of  syn-­‐‑
thetic  biology  per  se  –  make  valid  points  if  they  are  not  interpreted  as  all-­‐‑out  rejections  of  the  
technology.   Furthermore,   I   suggest   that   the   relationship   between   intrinsic   objections   and  
questions  of  how  society  uses  synthetic  biology  –  i.e.  between  questions  (I)  and  (II)  –  is  clos-­‐‑
er  and  more  complex  than  often  thought.  
Articles  3  and  4  concern  one  of  the  central   issues  falling  under  the  heading  of  ques-­‐‑
tion  (II),  namely  how  the  risks  and  uncertainties  that  characterise  synthetic  biology  should  
be  regulated.  They  deal  with  two  of  the  most  prominent  approaches  to  risk  management  in  
environmental  and  health  policy,  namely  the  precautionary  principle  and  cost-­‐‑benefit  anal-­‐‑
ysis.  Article  3  defends  a  moderate  version  of  the  precautionary  principle  from  the  charge  of  
irrationality.  Article  4  criticises  an  intriguing  argument  for  the  use  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis,  
namely  that  it  is  a  necessary  corrective  to  the  cognitive  biases  that  mar  our  thinking  about  
risk  and  uncertainty.  Articles  3  and  4  thus  collectively  provide  a  tentative  defence  of  the  use  
of  the  precautionary  principle  and  related  strategies  from  criticisms  mounted  by  proponents  
of  expected  utility  maximization  and  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis.  
In  this  introduction,  my  main  aim  is  to  elaborate  upon  what  I  take  the  contribution  of  
the  four  articles  to  be,  especially  with  respect  to  providing  answers  to  questions  (I)  and  (II).  
This  especially  entails  situating  them  in  the  general  literature  on  the  ethics  of  synthetic  biol-­‐‑
ogy,  and  in  aspects  of  the  literature  on  environmental  ethics  and  on  the  social  management  
of  risk  and  uncertainty.  In  addition,  I  will  try  to  draw  out  some  of  the  connections  between  
the  articles  more  clearly,  and  elucidate  some  of  the  methodological,  theoretical  and  strategic  
choices  that  underlie  my  selection  of  the  precise  focus  of  each  of  the  articles.  
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2. Synthetic biology and its reception 
Synthetic  biology  is  a  very  broad  and  diverse  field  of  research.  In  a  report  prepared  by  three  
scientific  committees  under  the  European  Commission,  synthetic  biology  is  defined  as  “the  
application  of  science,  technology  and  engineering  to  facilitate  and  accelerate  the  manufac-­‐‑
ture  and/or  modification  of  genetic  materials  in  living  organisms”  (European  Commission,  
2014).  This  very  broad  definition  emphasizes  the  technological  aspect  of  synthetic  biology,  
and  this  aspect  is  also  the  focus  of  this  dissertation.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  at  least  
some  researchers  within  the  synthetic  biology  community  have  more  purely  scientific  aims  
in  mind,   in  particular  a  better  understanding  of   the  basic  nature  of   life  and  how   life  may  
have  originated  (Holm  2013).  The  breadth  of  the  field  of  synthetic  biology  has  led  to  some  
discussion  about  whether  there  is  a  unified  field  at  all,  and  to  several  competing  classifica-­‐‑
tions   of   the   diverse   projects   that   are   going   on   under   the   heading   of   synthetic   biology  
(Acevedo-­‐‑Rocha,  2016;  Bedau,  Parke,  Tangen  &  Hantsche-­‐‑Tangen,  2009;  Benner  &  Sismour,  
2005;  O’Malley,   Powell,  Davies  &  Calvert,   2008).   I   do   not   offer   or   endorse   any  particular  
classification,   but   instead   provide   some   examples   of   projects   and   applications   that   have  
drawn  attention   from   the  public   and/or   exemplify   important   ethical   issues   raised  by   syn-­‐‑
thetic  biology.  
  
2.1 Synthetic biology research 
The  most  broadly  publicised  event  within  synthetic  biology  was  the  creation  of  a  “synthetic  
cell”   by   scientists   working   at   the   J.   Craig   Venter   Institute   (JCVI)   in   20101  (Gibson   et   al.,  
2010).  The  synthetic  cell  consisted  of  a  chemically  synthesized  genome  –  a  copy  of  a  bacteri-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
1  A  study  of   synthetic  biology  coverage   in   the  media   in  Sweden  and   Italy   from  2009   to  2013,   found  
that  around  1/3  of  all  articles  with  a  ”medium  or  strong  connection”  to  synthetic  biology  were  pub-­‐‑
lished  in  the  three  days  following  the  JCVI’s  announcement  of  the  creation  of  the  synthetic  cell  (An-­‐‑
cilotti  &  Eriksson,  2016).  
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al  genome  with  the  names  of  its  inventors,  among  other  information,  added  in  a  DNA  code  
language  –  that  was  transplanted  into  an  ‘empty’  cell  of  another  bacterial  species.  The  goal  
of  this   line  of  research  is  to  be  able  to  design  and  synthesize  whole  genomes  and  to  insert  
them  into  empty  cell  ‘chassis’.  Another  important  partial  goal  within  this  project  is  to  create  
a  minimal  cell,  i.e.  a  cell  which  has  no  genes  except  those  that  are  essential  for  staying  alive  
and   reproducing.   In   2016,   the   JCVI   announced   that   this   goal   had   also   been   reached  
(Hutchison  et  al.,  2016).  
Another  important  strand  of  research  aims  at  introducing  concepts  of  rational  design  
taken   from   non-­‐‑biological   engineering   domains   into   biotechnology   (Endy,   2005).   This   in-­‐‑
cludes   the   creation  of   an   inventory  of   standardized  biological  parts,   sometimes  known  as  
BioBricks,  and  efforts  to  make  the  design  and  creation  of  new  biological  systems  less  com-­‐‑
plex  and  divisible  into  smaller  tasks.  The  aim  is  to  make  the  design  and  production  of  bio-­‐‑
logical   systems   easier   and  more   efficient.   This   includes   both   construction   of   entire   novel  
genomes  –  e.g.  combining  a  minimal  genome  with  all  and  only   those   ‘extra’   functions   the  
designer  wants  –  and  the  re-­‐‑engineering  of  existing  organisms,  such  as  bacteria,  yeast  and  
algae.    
The   basic   long-­‐‑term   aim   of   synthetic   biology,   including   both   of   the   strands   of   re-­‐‑
search  just  described,  is  to  construct  biological  systems  that  have  useful  functions.  Possibly  
the   best-­‐‑developed   type   of   application   is   metabolic   engineering   (Keasling,   2010;   Møller,  
2014).  Metabolic  engineers  modify  organisms’  metabolic  pathways   in  order   to  make   them  
produce  chemicals  that  have  value  for  humans.  The  best-­‐‑known  example  is  the  production  
of  artemisic  acid,  a  precursor  to  the  antimalarial  drug  artemisinin,  in  yeast.  Other  examples  
(current  and  envisaged)  include  flavourings  and  fragrances  (e.g.  vanillin,  the  main  flavour  
compound   in  vanilla,   and   the   sweetener   steviol),  biofuels,   rubber,   and  oils   (e.g.   as   substi-­‐‑
tutes   for   environmentally-­‐‑damaging   palm   oil   in   soaps).   Using   metabolically   engineered  
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organisms,  chemicals  can  be  produced  using  only  sugar  or  (in  the  case  of  algae  and  plants)  
sunlight  as  input.    
Outside  of  chemicals  production,  engineered  microorganisms  are  being  developed  to  
work   in   environmental   protection   and   medical   treatment   (Khalil   &   Collins,   2010).   With  
respect  to  environmental  protection,  organisms  can  be  engineered  to  function  as  biosensors,  
i.e.  to  detect  the  presence  of  pollutants  and  toxic  chemicals  in  the  environment,  such  as  ar-­‐‑
senic  in  drinking  water  (French  et  al.,  2011).  Furthermore,  they  can  be  designed  to  ‘clean  up’  
such  pollutants  and  toxic  chemicals  by  metabolizing  them  into  harmless  compounds.  Ideal-­‐‑
ly,   these   two   functions   can  be   combined,   yielding   a  biological   search-­‐‑and-­‐‑destroy  mecha-­‐‑
nism  for  pollutants.  The  use  of  engineered  organisms  in  medical  treatments  follows  a  simi-­‐‑
lar  pattern:  They  can  be  designed  to  be  used  as  diagnostics  tools,  detecting  pathogens  and  
other   diseases,   as   treatments,   providing   targeted   delivery   of   drugs,   or   as   both   at   once  
(Jermy,  2011;  Slomovic,  Pardee  &  Collins,  2015).  
The   final   application   that   I  will  mention   is   the  use  of   synthetic  biology  as   a   tool   in  
medical   research   and   pharmaceuticals   development.   An   example   of   the   latter   is   vaccina-­‐‑
tions:  the  time  required  for  developing  a  vaccine  in  response  to  an  influenza  pandemic  can  
be  cut  from  6  months  to  less  than  a  week  (Dormitzer  et  al.,  2013;  Perkel,  2015).  With  respect  
to   the   former,   synthetic   biology   can   be   used   to   better   understand   potentially   dangerous  
pathogens,   e.g.   by   synthesizing   otherwise   extinct   pathogens,   such   as  polio   (Cello,   Paul  &  
Wimmer,  2002)  and  the  H1N1  ‘Spanish’  influenza  (Tumpey  et  al.,  2005).  It  can  also  be  used  
to  generate  alterations  in  pathogens  that  would  make  them  more  dangerous,  e.g.  by  making  
H5N1  influenza  (‘Bird  flu’)  transmissible  between  humans  (Osterholm  &  Kelley,  2012).  This  
is  known  as   ‘gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research’,  and  has   the  aim  of  enabling  better  prediction  and  
monitoring  of  potential  developing  threat,  and  faster  development  of  vaccines  in  case  of  a  
pandemic  (Wimmer,  Mueller,  Tumpey  &  Taubenberger,  2009).  
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2.2 Reactions 
As  noted,  the  JCVI’s  announcement  of  the  creation  of  an  artificial  cell  generated  much  press  
coverage.  It  also  prompted  the  president  of  the  United  States  Barack  Obama  to  order  a  re-­‐‑
port  on  synthetic  biology  from  the  Presidential  Commission  for  the  Study  of  Bioethical  Is-­‐‑
sues  (PCSBI,  2010).  But  engagement  with  synthetic  biology  from  ethicists  and  policy  makers  
began  already  in  1999,  with  a  study  funded  by  JCVI  (Cho,  Magnus,  Caplan,  McGee  &  Ethics  
of  Genomics  Group,   1999).   Since   then,   a   number   of   reports   have   been  published   by   gov-­‐‑
ernment  agencies  and  bioethics  think  tanks  (e.g.  European  Commission  2014;  2015a;  2015b;  
European  Group  on  Ethics  in  Science  and  New  Technology, 2010; Nuffield  Council  on  Bio-­‐‑
ethics,   2012;   Parens,   Johnston  &  Moses,   2009).   The   ethical   aspects   of   the   technology  have  
also   been   debated   among   synthetic   biologists   themselves   through  workshops,   e.g.   at   the  
various  instalments  of  the  SBx.0  Conference  Series,2  and  through  the  production  of  govern-­‐‑
ance  proposals  (Church,  2004;  Garfinkel,  Endy,  Epstein  &  Friedman,  2007).  
   The   aspect   of   synthetic   biology   that   has   generated   the   most   extensive   reactions   is  
research   on   pathogens.   The   synthesis   of   poliovirus   was   subject   to   a   heated   debate,   with  
Craig  Venter  calling  it  “irresponsible”  and  “without  scientific   justification”  (Pollack,  2002).  
Similarly,  worries  were  voiced  over  the  resurrection  of  the  Spanish  flu.  Apart  from  the  risk  
of  accidental  release  –  described  by  one  expert  as  “almost  a  certainty”  –  the  main  discussion  
focussed   on   whether   the   genomic   sequences   potentially   extremely   dangerous   pathogens  
should  be  published  in  journals  or  databases  available  to  everyone  (Von  Bubnoff,  2005).  The  
US  National  Science  Advisory  Board  for  Biosecurity  (NSABB)  decided  to  allow  (ex  post  facto)  
the  publication  of  the  Spanish  flu  genome  in  2005,  but  when  researchers  created  a  version  of  
the  H5N1  Bird   flu   that   is   transmissible   between   ferrets   (and   therefore   likely   between  hu-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
2  https://biobricks.org/programs/sbx-­‐‑0-­‐‑conference-­‐‑series/  
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mans  as  well)  in  2011,  NSABB  intervened  and  the  findings  were  published  only  in  revised  
versions  omitting  crucial  details  (NSABB,  2012).  An  important  reason  for  this  difference  in  
policy   is   that  H5N1   is   potentially  much  more   dangerous   than   even   the   Spanish   flu.   The  
latter  killed  at  least  20  million  and  perhaps  as  many  as  100  million  people,  but  had  a  mortal-­‐‑
ity  rate  of  at  most  10%  (Johnson  &  Mueller,  2002),  while  the  former  so  far  shows  a  mortality  
rate  of  up  to  60%.  Furthermore,  the  Spanish  flu  would  likely  be  less  dangerous  than  in  the  
1918   outbreak   if   it   were   to   escape   today.3  A   voluntary   temporary   moratorium   followed,  
before   the  US  government  decided  (partly   in  response   to  a  near-­‐‑escape  of  H5N1  from  the  
Centers   for  Disease  Control   in  March  2014   (Butler,  2014))   to  halt   funding   for  all  pathogen  
gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research  until  safety  procedures  had  been  worked  out  (Reardon,  2014).  The  
NSABB  delivered   its   recommendations   for   such   procedures   in  May   2016,  with   an   aim   to  
implementing  them  fairly  soon  (Kaiser,  2016).    
   With  respect  to  the  public,  the  main  reactions  to  synthetic  biology  have  come  from  a  
number  of  civil  society  groups  that  campaign  for  environmental  protection  and  social   jus-­‐‑
tice.  A  consortium  of  these  groups  –  led  by  the  Friends  of  the  Earth  (FOE),  the  International  
Center   for  Technology  Assessment   (ICTA)  and   the  Action  Group  on  Erosion,  Technology  
and  Concentration   (ETC  Group)   –   has   published   a   set   of   “principles   for   the   oversight   of  
synthetic   biology”   (FOE,   ICTA  &  ETC  Group,   2012).   The  main   focus   has   been   the   use   of  
chemicals   derived   from   metabolically   engineered   microorganisms.   Pressure   campaigns  
have  been  organized  against  the  use  of  synthetic  biology  based  versions  of  vanillin4,  steviol  
(Ribeiro  &  Thomas,   2015),   artemisinin   (Thomas,   2013)   and  algal  oil   in   soaps   (ETC  Group,  
2014).  According  to  FOE,  the  vanillin  campaign  has  resulted  in  several  companies  pledging  
                                                                                                                        
3  A  succinct  statement  of  the  NSABB’s  rationale  was  given  by  a  member  of  the  board  in  response  to  a  
critical  blog  post:  http://www.virology.ws/2011/12/20/a-­‐‑bad-­‐‑day-­‐‑for-­‐‑science/    
4  http://www.foe.org/projects/food-­‐‑and-­‐‑technology/synthetic-­‐‑biology/no-­‐‑synbio-­‐‑vanilla    
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not   to   use   synthetic   biology   vanillin.5  In   fact,   the   relevant   companies   have   said   that   they  
would  not  use  any  artificial  vanillin  (the  bulk  of  which  is  not  produced  using  synthetic  biol-­‐‑
ogy)   –   and   in   some   cases   this   has   been   their   policy   all   along   (Watson,   2014).  Despite   in-­‐‑
creased  coverage  and  the  campaigns  just  described,  the  general  public  remains  largely  igno-­‐‑
rant  about  the  existence  of  synthetic  biology,  with  75%  having  heard  just  a  little  or  nothing  
at  all  about  synthetic  biology  according  to  a  2013  study  (Hart  Research  Associates,  2013).    
   The  worries   and   objections   that   philosophers,   civil   society   groups   and  members   of  
the  public  (when  informed  about  its  existence)  voice  concerning  synthetic  biology  fall   into  
three  main  groups:  (1)  Objections  concerning  the  human  relationship  to  life  and  nature;  (2)  
Objections   based   on   risk   and  uncertainty;   and   (3)  Objections   based   on   negative   socioeco-­‐‑
nomic  effects.  I  discuss  categories  (1)  and  (2)  in  the  Articles.  Discussion  of  those  two  catego-­‐‑
ries  is  therefore  assigned  to  the  introductions  to  the  Articles  in  the  sections  below.  I  do  not,  
however,  deal  in  any  detail  with  objections  falling  into  category  (3)  in  the  Articles.  I  there-­‐‑
fore  want  now  to  discuss  these  objections  briefly,  and  to  explain  how  some  of  the  content  of  
the  Articles  bear  on  the  socioeconomic  objections.  
     
2.3 Socioeconomic issues 
The  main  exponents  of  socioeconomic  objections  are  the  civil  society  groups.  They  repeated-­‐‑
ly   stress   the   potential   negative   effects   that   a  move   to   biotechnology-­‐‑based   production   of  
chemicals  may  have  for  those  who  currently  produce  these  chemicals.  In  the  case  of  vanil-­‐‑
lin,  steviol  and  artemisinin,  some  of  these  producers  are  relatively  poor  farmers  in  develop-­‐‑
ing   countries,   to   whom   loss   of   demand   may   be   very   harmful   (Pollack,   2013;   Ribeiro   &  
Thomas,   2015;   Thomas,   2013).   Arguably   these   cases   illustrate   a  more   general   problem   of  
technological  change  leading  to  capital  intensification  and  lower  demand  for  labour,  poten-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
5  http://www.foe.org/news/news-­‐‑releases/2014-­‐‑08-­‐‑haagen-­‐‑dazs-­‐‑says-­‐‑no-­‐‑to-­‐‑synbio    
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tially  harming  unskilled  workers  (Stiglitz  &  Greenwald,  2014).  Furthermore,  the  civil  society  
groups  raise  concerns  about  the  environmental  sustainability  of  a  possible  large-­‐‑scale  move  
to   sugar-­‐‑driven   production   of   chemicals.   Although   this   issue   is   high   on   anti-­‐‑
biotechnologists’  agenda,   it  has  not  been  discussed  much  in  the  philosophical   literature  or  
in  ethical  reflections  of  researchers.  Insofar  as  socioeconomic  issues  are  discussed,  the  main  
focus   is  on  unequal  access   to  new  technology  and  on  what   intellectual  property  regime   is  
desirable  (Hunter,  2013;  PCSBI,  2010,  pp.  113-­‐‑122  &  161-­‐‑166;  Schmidt  et  al.,  2009,  p.  5).    
   Paul  B.  Thompson  (2012;  2015)  argues  that  the  lack  of  engagement  with  socioeconom-­‐‑
ic  issues  of  the  kind  raised  by  the  civil  society  groups  is  a  serious  failing  in  synthetic  biology  
ethics  (and  bioethics  more  generally).  He  argues  that  synthetic  biology  should  primarily  be  
seen  as  a  “platform  technology”   that  enables  a   large  number  of  different  applications  and  
commercial  products.  The  field’s  primary  effect  on  the  world  will  thus  likely  be  felt   in  the  
domain  of   the  economy.  Thompson  suggests   that   this  has  already   led   to   large  speculative  
acquisitions  of  land  in  Africa  by  companies  hoping  to  use  it  for  biofuel  production  (Thomp-­‐‑
son,  2012,  pp.  10-­‐‑11).  He  hypothesises  that  neglect  of  socioeconomic  issues  is  due  to  the  fact  
that  they  are  less  ‘sexy’  than  questions  of  safety,  bioterrorism  and  boundary  transgressions,  
and  to  the  fact  that  the  ethics  of  emerging  technology  is  dominated  by  people  and  concerns  
that  have  their  roots  in  biomedical  ethics,  where  socioeconomic  issues  (excepting  the  issue  of  
equal  access)  are  not  central.    
I  largely  agree  with  Thompson,  and  my  own  neglect  of  the  issues  thus  do  not  reflect  a  
belief  that  they  are  unimportant.  And  some  of  the  things  I  discuss  in  the  Articles  do  pertain  
to  socioeconomic  issues.  First  of  all,  the  notion  of  conditional  acceptability  that  I  discuss  in  
Articles  1  and  2  can  be  applied  to  the  socioeconomic  conditions  in  which  synthetic  biology  
is  embedded  as  well  as  the  types  of  conditions  I  discuss  (I  will  explain  how  in  the  next  sec-­‐‑
tion  when  I  discuss  conditional  acceptability).  Second,  Article  4  touches  upon  the  distribu-­‐‑
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tion  of  benefits  and  risks,  and  engages  with  a  framework  for  risk  regulation  that  is  essential-­‐‑
ly   derived   from   economics.   Third,   risk   plays   an   important   role   in   normative   theorising  
about  economic   issues,  since  the  risk  that   individuals  will  be  harmed  economically   is  part  
and   parcel   of   a   dynamic   economy.   The   significant   role   of   public   insurance   in   normative  
arguments   for   the  welfare   state   reflects   this   fact   (see   e.g.  Heath,   2011;   Landes  &  Holtug,  
2015).  To  the  extent  that  my  discussion  concerns  risk  as  a  general  issue  (rather  than  only  an  
issue  in  synthetic  biology),  it  will  have  implications  for  socioeconomic  issues  as  well.  
  
3. Conditional acceptability, uniqueness and intrinsic objections 
My  first  two  Articles  engage  with  overarching  question  (I)  as  identified  above,  i.e.  whether  
we  should  be  engaged  in  the  design  and  fabrication  of  organisms  at  all.  My  Articles  reflect  
dissatisfaction  with  the  way  in  which  this  debate  has  been  conducted.  I  take  issue  with  two  
common  preconceptions  about  what  an  ethical  evaluation  of  synthetic  biology  (or  any  tech-­‐‑
nology)  amounts  to  –  namely  that  objections  to  and  worries  about  synthetic  biology  in  gen-­‐‑
eral   (1)  must  provide  reasons   to  reject  synthetic  biology  per  se  as  morally  wrong  or   to   im-­‐‑
pose  general  restrictions  on  the  field,  and  (2)  must  pertain  to   features  of  synthetic  biology  
that  are  unique  to  or  distinctive  of  the  field.    
   In  this  section  I  will  introduce  my  first  two  Articles  and  explain  how  they  challenge  
these  two  preconceptions.  I  will  begin  with  (1)  and  move  on  to  (2).  Since  objections  falling  
into  the  first  of  the  categories  I  identified  above  –  that  is,  objections  relating  to  our  relation-­‐‑
ship  to   life  and  nature  –  are   the  main  focus  both  for   those  who  discuss  question  (I)   in   the  
literature  and  for  my  two  Articles,  I  will  review  and  comment  on  those  objections  as  well.  
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3.1 Conditional acceptability 
In   the   introduction  to  a  collection  of  essays  on  synthetic  biology  and  morality,  Gregory  E.  
Kaebnick  and  Thomas  H.  Murray  suggest  that  an  ethical  evaluation  of  synthetic  biology  as  
such   –   as   distinct   from   its   possible   consequences   for   human  welfare   –   has   three   possible  
answers:  That  it  is  “morally  troubling”,  “attractive”  or  “morally  neutral”  (Kaebnick  &  Mur-­‐‑
ray,  2013,  p.  6).  Elsewhere,  Kaebnick  understands  critical  views  as  claiming   that   synthetic  
biology  is  “intrinsically  morally  undesirable”  or  that  it  commits  “intrinsic  wrongs”,  and  he  
suggests   that   the  ultimate  upshot  of  critical  views   is   that  synthetic  biology  merits  “special  
regulatory  constraints”  or  even  that   it  “should  be  banned”  (Kaebnick,  2009).  Bernhard  Ba-­‐‑
ertschi  (2012a)   interprets  similar  views  as  a  “condemnation”  of  synthetic  biology  and  syn-­‐‑
thetic  biologists.  My  main  claim  here   is   that   there   is   considerable   room  between   the  view  
that  synthetic  biology  is  morally  troubling  and  the  view  that  it  is  intrinsically  wrong  or  that  
it  should  be  banned  or  condemned.    
My  main  contribution  here  is  to  suggest  that  the  category  of  conditional  acceptability  is  
a  useful  possible  alternative  to  the  dichotomy  between  moral  neutrality  and  moral  wrong-­‐‑
ness  with  respect  to  general  attitudes  to  synthetic  biology.  I  Article  1,  I  discuss  an  argument  
made  by  Tom  Douglas,  Russell  Powell  and  Julian  Savulescu  (2013)  to  the  effect  that  creating  
artificial   life   is  not  “morally  significant”.   I  understand  this  argument  as  relating  to  exactly  
the  kind  of  general  ethical  evaluation  of  the  activity  of  creating  life  that  is  taken  up  by  my  
question  (I).  Douglas,  Powell  and  Savulescu  suggest  that  creating  life  is  morally  significant  
only  if  “there  are  moral  reasons  not  to  create  artificial  organisms,  or  factors  that  weaken  our  
moral  reasons  to  create  them”  (Douglas  et  al.,  2013,  p.  689).  I  suggest  that,  on  this  interpreta-­‐‑
tion,  creating  life  would  be  morally  significant  only  if  either  (i)  there  were  reasons  to  think  
that   the   fact   that   it   constitutes   creating   life   is   a  wrong-­‐‑making   feature  of   an  action,  or   (ii)  
there  were  reasons  to  think  that  the  whole  set  of  actions  falling  under  the  heading  of  ‘creat-­‐‑
   17  
ing   life’   are  wrong.   I   then  argue   that   conditional  acceptability   is  a  plausible  alternative   to  
(ii),  i.e.  that  creating  artificial  life  would  be  morally  significant  if  there  were  reasons  to  think  
that  the  activity  of  creating  artificial  life  is  conditionally  acceptable.    
In  Article  2,  I  argue  that  arguments  based  on  the  similarity  between  synthetic  biology  
(or  rather,  genetic  engineering  more  generally)  and  earlier  technologies  that  are  viewed  as  
morally  acceptable  depend  (among  other  things)  on  interpreting  objections  to  genetic  engi-­‐‑
neering  as  aiming  at  the  conclusion  that  the  technology  is  not  morally  acceptable.  Otherwise  
there  would  be  no  rational  pressure  on  the  critic  to  bring  her  judgment  concerning  genetic  
engineering  into  line  with  her  judgments  concerning  related  technologies,  such  as  selective  
breeding,  since  there  is  no  prima  facie  conflict.  But  there  are  good  reasons  to  think  that  crit-­‐‑
ics,   academic   as   well   as   non-­‐‑academic,   deem   genetic   engineering   to   be   conditionally   ac-­‐‑
ceptable   rather   than   simply  unacceptable   (or   at   least   that   the   internal   logic   of   their   argu-­‐‑
ments  support  conditional  acceptability  at  least  as  well  as  unacceptability).  
By  ‘conditional  acceptability’  I  have  two  closely  related  things  in  mind:  (a)  The  nega-­‐‑
tion   of  unconditional   acceptability,   and   (b)   the  willingness   to   allow   something   only   under  
certain  conditions.  In  sense  (a),  conditional  acceptability  denotes  the  view  that  creating  arti-­‐‑
ficial   life  is  not  a  type  of  action  that  falls  within  the  domain  of  freedom.  Read  in  this  way,  
objections  to  creating  artificial  life  provide  a  justification  for  limiting  the  liberty  of  would-­‐‑be  
creators.  At   the  very   least,   removing  the  creation  of  artificial   life   from  the  domain  of   free-­‐‑
dom  means  placing  those  who  want  create  artificial  life  under  a  standing  obligation  to  pro-­‐‑
vide  justification  for  doing  so  (Gaus,  2005,  p.  274).  I  believe  this  attitude  well  describes  some  
public  reactions  to  creating  life,  especially  aversion  to  the  frivolous  creation  of  artificial  life.  
For  example,  a  focus  group  participant  explained  his  view  that  we  do  not  “have  the  right  to  
genetically  modify  grains,  animals”  by  asking:  “if  people  don’t   like  a  certain  color  of  cats,  
are   they   going   to   do   that   too?”   (Hart   Research  Associates,   2014,   p.   13).   Similarly,  Arthur  
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Caplan  has  suggested  that  people  worry  about  “carefree,   lighthearted,  even  irresponsible”  
creation  rather  than  creation  per  se  –  i.e.  that  they  object  to  playing  God  rather  than  to  play-­‐‑
ing  God  (Caplan,  2009;  2010,  p.  6).    
In  sense   (b),  conditional  acceptability  means  accepting  synthetic  biology  only   if   it   is  
circumscribed  in  some  way  –  i.e.  accepting  it  only  if  certain  conditions  are  in  place.  A  stand-­‐‑
ing  demand  for  justification  could  count  as  a  condition  of  this  kind.  In  my  Articles,  I  suggest  
a  number  of  other  conditions  (some  concerning  genetic  engineering  more  broadly):    
-­‐‑  Ethics  education  for  researchers;    
-­‐‑   Continued   ethical   assessment   of   future   developments,   including   public   en-­‐‑
gagement;    
-­‐‑  Adequate  consideration  of  the  interests  of  designed  organisms;    
-­‐‑  Supplementing  technological  solutions  to  societal  problems  with  political  and  
economic  solutions;  
-­‐‑   Effective   risk  management   procedures,   including  precautionary   approaches  
to  some  applications;    
-­‐‑  Socioeconomic  background  conditions;  
-­‐‑   Procedures   that   facilitate   the   freedom   to   choose  whether   one  wants   to   con-­‐‑
sume  genetically  engineered  products,  such  as  labelling;    
-­‐‑  That  synthetic  organisms  are  not  used  as  replacements  for  natural  ones.  
The  conditional  acceptability  view,  and  several  of  the  conditions  listed  here,  has  been  iden-­‐‑
tified   in  qualitative  studies  of  public  opinion   (Steurer,  2016).   It   can  also  be   found   in  some  
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ethicists.  Hans-­‐‑Jürgen  Link  (2013)  argues  that  worries  based  on  the  human  relationship  to  
life  and  nature  would,  if  used  to  justify  strong  restrictions  on  synthetic  biology,  amount  to  
invalid  slippery-­‐‑slope  arguments,  but  that  they  do  warrant  continued  assessment  of  future  
developments   and   a   generally   cautious   approach.   Anna   Deplazes-­‐‑Zemp   (2012)   suggests  
that  objections  based  on  biocentric  views  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  creating  life  “should  be  
performed  under  certain  conditions  or  with  a  certain  attitude”.    
It  is  important  to  stress  the  difference  between  the  view  that  synthetic  biology  is  con-­‐‑
ditionally   acceptable   and   the   related   view   that   the   technology   per   se   is   morally   neutral,  
while   individual   applications  may   be  morally   problematic   (or  morally   obligatory,   for   that  
matter).  First  of  all,  not  all  of  the  conditional  acceptability  views  listed  have  a  close  relative  
that  says  that  some  applications  are  acceptable  and  others  not.  For  example,   the  view  that  
genetic  engineering  products  should  be  labelled  is  a  view  of  this  sort;  as  is  the  view  about  
continued  ethical  assessment  and  (arguably)  views  about  socioeconomic  background  condi-­‐‑
tions.  Second  of  all,  the  conditional  acceptability  view  is  a  view  about  what  to  think  and  do  
about  synthetic  biology  (or  another  technology)  given  that  some  applications  are  good,  some  
neutral  and  some  bad  from  a  moral  point  of  view.  While  it  is  enormously  valuable  to  pre-­‐‑
form  ethical  evaluation  of  each  possible  application,  this  gives  no  direct  answers  (except  in  
the   limit  cases  where  all  applications  are  bad  or  all  applications  are  good)   to   the  status  of  
the   technology   per   se   –   although   there   is   a   risk   that   an   illicit   jump   to  moral   neutrality   is  
made  (e.g.  Smith,  2013).  But  sometimes  we  do  need  to  decide  on  an  attitude  to  a  technology  
per   se.   For   example,  we   need   to   decide  whether   the   technology   should   be   funded   by   the  
public  purse.  In  such  cases,  we  need  to  be  able  to  decide  on  how  many  of  the  bad  aspects  of  
a  technology  we  will  accept  in  order  to  get  the  good  ones,  and  on  how  rigorous  attempts  to  
avoid  possible  bad  aspects  should  be.    
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I  do  not  mean  to  defend  the  application  of  all  of  the  listed  conditions  to  synthetic  biol-­‐‑
ogy.  Defending  (or  rejecting)  even  one  of  these  would  take  much  work,  since  each  touches  
upon  complicated  issues  such  as  the  personal  responsibility  of  scientists,  the  proper  role  of  
the   public   in   decision-­‐‑making   concerning   novel   technologies,   consumer   sovereignty   and  
socioeconomic  justice.  What  I  do  argue  is  that  each  of  these  conditions  merit  such  work,  and  
that  common  objections  to  synthetic  biology  are  more  plausibly  seen  as  arguments  for  the  
imposition  of  such  conditions.  Articles  3  and  4  can  be  seen  as  the  beginnings  of  an  adequate  
engagement  with   one   of   the   conditions,   namely  what   risk  management   regime   should   be  
implemented.    
A  final  quibble  about  conditional  acceptability  is  that  it  may  relatively  easily  be  mis-­‐‑
used,   and   arguably   is   misused   by   the   civil   society   groups  mentioned   above   (FOE   et   al.,  
2012).  These  groups  have  been  accused  of  two  types  of  misuse.  First,  that  they  dress  up  an  
“obstructionist”   view   to   synthetic   biology   as   a   more   moderate   conditional   acceptability  
view  by  letting  acceptability  depend  on  the  fulfilment  of  conditions  that  are  practically  im-­‐‑
possible  to  fulfil  (Kaebnick,  2012).  One  type  of  impossible  condition  is  an  extremely  strong  
version  of  the  precautionary  principle,  which  I  will  return  to  below.  Another  is  large-­‐‑scale  
change  to  the  basic  socioeconomic  organization  of  the  world;  as  Nathanael  Johnson  puts  it,  
the  groups  “say  people  should  be  allowed  to  work  with  synthetic  biology  …  but  only  after  
we   achieve   utopia”   (Johnson,   2014).   Second,   the   groups   have   been   accused   of   using   the  
issue  of  synthetic  biology  as  a  mere  foil  for  their  real  concern,  which  is  to  “challenge  present  
societies  by  making  generalized  demands  that  are  in  direct  contradiction  with  existing  eco-­‐‑
nomic  and  social  structures”  (Lewontin,  2014).  The  issue  of  synthetic  biology  is  thus  used  as  
leverage   in   a   political   campaign,   and   the   relevant   conditions   are   not   particularly   closely  
related  to  synthetic  biology’s  acceptability.  
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3.2 Uniqueness 
In  a  much-­‐‑discussed  short  article  Joachim  Boldt  and  Oliver  Müller  (2008)  argue  that  “certain  
ethical  implications  of  synthetic  biology  research  go  beyond  those  of  genetic  engineering”;  
in  particular,  they  argued  that  synthetic  biology  marks  the  transition  from  humans  manipu-­‐‑
lating  organisms  to  our  creating  them.  Christopher  Preston  (2008)  argues  that  the  organisms  
created  by  synthetic  biology  are  the  first  properly  unnatural  or  artificial  ones,  since  they  are  
not  part  of  the  great  chain  of  evolution.  On  the  other  side  of  the  debate,  Erik  Parens,  Jose-­‐‑
phine  Johnston  and  Jacob  Moses  (2008)  respond  to  Boldt  &  Müller,  arguing  that   the  ques-­‐‑
tions  that  synthetic  biology  raise  –  including  all   three  of  the  categories  mentioned  above  –  
are   familiar   from  debates  over  other  emerging   technologies.  Likewise,  David  Heyd   (2012)  
argues   that   there   is   “nothing   unique   from   an   ethical   point   of   view”   in   synthetic   biology.  
And  Beth  Preston  (2013)  counters  her  namesake’s  view  by  arguing  that  living  artefacts  have  
existed  since  the  dawn  of  agriculture  10,000  years  ago.  
   I  have  no  quarrel  with  this  discussion  as  such,  but  I  suggest  that  a  preoccupation  with  
the  question  of  novelty  has  led  to  an  excessive  focus  on  the  novel  aspects  of  synthetic  biolo-­‐‑
gy  –  i.e.  to  the  second  preconception.  The  core  of  that  preconception  is  the  idea  that  objec-­‐‑
tions  to  synthetic  biology  per  se  must  pertain  to  features  that  are  unique  to  or  definitive  of  
synthetic  biology.  This  uniqueness   thesis  has   the  unfortunate  consequence   that   it   leads   to  a  
understanding  of  the  essential  feature  of  synthetic  biology  that  is  closely  related  to  the  ways  
in  which  it  pushes  the  technological  and  scientific  boundaries.  In  effect,  this  means  under-­‐‑
standing   synthetic   biology   as   essentially   concerning   the   creation   of   organisms  de  novo   (as  
opposed  to  manipulating  existing  organisms).  Certainly,  creation  de  novo  is  part  of  the  pro-­‐‑
ject  of  synthetic  biology,  and  could  be  described  as  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  minimal  genome  
and  BioBricks  projects.  At  the  limit,  the  success  of  these  projects  would  mean  that  scientists  
would  have  the  ability  to  create  organisms  with  all  and  only  those  functions  they  want  (plus  
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the  minimal  genome  necessary   for   the  basic  processes   of   life).   But   this   is   not   the  only,   or  
even  the  main,  aspect  of  the  technology.  We  might   just  as  well  focus  on  the  way  in  which  
synthetic  biology  brings  engineering  concepts  into  the  biological  domain,  i.e.  how  it  enables  
manipulation   and   creation   of   organisms   that   is   easier,   faster,   cheaper,  more   efficient   and  
more  routinized.  Such  an  understanding  of  synthetic  biology  would  be  much  more  condu-­‐‑
cive   to  asking  questions   like   the   socioeconomic  ones  Thompson  wants  us   to  ask,  and   less  
conducive  to  the  more  ‘sexy’  questions  that  concern  humanity’s  relationship  to  life  and  na-­‐‑
ture.  The  engineering  aspects  of  synthetic  biology  and  the  ethical  issues  that  flow  from  them  
should  not  be  ignored  simply  because  they  are  not  sufficiently  unique.  
   In  Articles   1   and   2,   however,   I   largely   follow   the   focus   on   synthetic   biology   as   the  
creation  of  artificial  organisms.  But  I  challenge  a  narrower  variant  of  the  uniqueness  thesis,  
namely  that  objections  that  pertain  to  life  and  nature  need  to  target  features  that  are  distinc-­‐‑
tive  of  synthetic  biology,  especially  relative  to  other  biotechnologies.  In  Article  1,  I  criticise  
Douglas,  Powell  and  Savulescu’s  definition  of  what  constitutes  creating  artificial  life.  Much  
of  my  argument  consists  in  conceptual  analysis  of  ‘artificial  life’.  I  argue  that  Douglas,  Pow-­‐‑
ell  and  Savulescu’s  definition  misses  several  plausible  senses  of  ‘artificial  life’,  and  that  the-­‐‑
se   senses   are   very   much   relevant   in   synthetic   biology.   From   the   point   of   view   of   the  
uniqueness  issue,  however,  my  main  claim  is  that  those  aspects  of  the  creation  of  artificial  
life   that  critics  most  plausibly  object   to  are  aspects   that  are  also  present   in   (at   least)   tradi-­‐‑
tional  genetic  engineering,  but  that  are  merely  exacerbated  in  synthetic  biology.  
   In  Article  2,  I  target  a  widespread  argument  that  is  based  on,  and  further  motivates,  
the  uniqueness  thesis.  According  to  this  argument,  objections  to  genetic  engineering  based  
on  facts  such  as  that  genetic  engineering  is  unnatural  or  that  it  amounts  to  the  production  of  
living  artefacts  are  threatened  by  the  fact  that  earlier  and  universally  accepted  technologies  
also  possess  those  features  –  for  example,  as  it  is  exceedingly  often  observed,  that  domesti-­‐‑
   23  
cation  and  cultivation  of  animals  and  plants  also  alters  those  species  at  the  genomic  level.  I  
broaden   the   scope   from   synthetic   biology   to   genetic   engineering  more   generally   because  
that  is  the  context  in  which  the  argument  is  most  common.  Furthermore,  many  of  those  who  
are  critical  of  synthetic  biology  are  also  critical  of  genetic  engineering  more  broadly,  and  for  
the  same  reasons.  My  main  argument  is  that  there  is  room  for  maintaining  that  genetic  en-­‐‑
gineering   is  problematic   though   (for   example)  domestication   is  not,   even   if   the   feature   to  
which  one  objects  is  also  present  in  domestication;  and  that  subtle  differences  in  the  mean-­‐‑
ing  of  (for  example)  naturalness  matter.    
     
3.3 The human relationship to life and nature 
The  final  contribution  of  my  first  two  Articles  is  to  the  discussion  of  objections  to  synthetic  
biology  (and  genetic  engineering  more  generally)  that  are  based  on  the  human  relationship  
to  living  beings  and  the  natural  world.  In  my  Articles,  I  mainly  defend  such  objections  from  
certain  attempts  to  dismiss  them.  My  main  point  is  that  the  relevant  arguments  are  too  su-­‐‑
perficial  in  their  treatment  of  these  objections,  and  that  they  must  be  countered  individually  
and  with   attention   to   the   details   of   the   points  made.   I  will   return   to   how   the   arguments  
discussed   in   the  Articles  misinterpret   the   objections   at   the   end   of   this   section.   But   first   I  
want  to  practice  what  I  preach  and  engage  these  objections  in  a  little  more  detail.  I  will  sug-­‐‑
gest  that  none  of  them  provide  reasons  not  to  create  artificial  organisms.  
We  can  distinguish  three  rough  categories  of  objections  of  this  kind:  Those  concern-­‐‑
ing  the  moral  standing  of  artificial  living  beings;  those  concerning  the  intrinsic  value  of  artifi-­‐‑
cial  living  beings;  and  those  concerning  the  attitudes  to  life  and  nature  that  creating  artificial  
living  beings  implies.  
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3.3.1 Moral standing 
A  being  has  moral  standing  just  in  case  its  interests  matter  morally  and  it  can  (therefore)  be  
wronged.  The  creation  of  artificial  living  beings  raises  two  questions  with  respect  to  moral  
standing:   (i)   Does   artificiality   matter   for   whether   a   living   being   has   moral   standing?   (ii)  
Does   the  creation  of  artificial   living  beings  constitute  wronging   them?  With  respect   to   the  
first  question,  the  majority  view  is  that  artificiality  does  not  matter  for  the  moral  standing  of  
living   beings   (Attfield,   2012;   Baertschi,   2012b;   Deplazes-­‐‑Zemp,   2012;   Huesken,   2014;  
Sandler,  2012).  The  general  reason  is   that  moral  standing  is   thought  to  be  grounded  in   in-­‐‑
trinsic  properties  of  the  being,  such  as  sentience  or  its  ‘having  a  good  of  its  own’,  which  are  
not  affected  by  the  artificiality  of  the  organism.    
One  exception   to   this  general   consensus   is  Christopher  Preston   (2013a,  p.  122-­‐‑123).6  
Preston  gives  two  reasons  to  think  that  artificial  organisms  have  no,  or  only  a  diminished,  
moral  standing.  First,  he  argues   that   the   fact   that   the  products  of  synthetic  biology  are  or-­‐‑
ganisms  is  only  a  “concomitant”  or  “incidental”  attribute  of  them.  The  purpose  for  which  the  
organism  was  designed,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  necessary  feature  of  the  entity.  For  example,  
an  organism  designed  to  capture  and  bind  carbon  in  the  atmosphere  is,  on  Preston’s  view,  
necessarily   a   carbon-­‐‑capturing  device,   and  only   incidentally   an  organism.  Therefore,   “the  
sense   in  which   synthetic   bacteria   are   tools   serving   a   particular   purpose   takes   precedence  
over  the  sense  in  which  they  are  autonomous  organisms”  (Preston,  2013a,  p.123).  An  obvi-­‐‑
ous  objection  is  that  in  a  case  where  a  person  performs  some  function,  such  as  checking  tick-­‐‑
ets  in  the  subway,  we  may  not  treat  him  as  a  mere  tool.  Preston  counters  that  the  difference  
                                                                                                                        
6  Preston  argues  that  artificial  organisms  have  less  “intrinsic  value”  than  natural  ones,  but  he  does  not  
clearly   distinguish   between  moral   standing   and   intrinsic   value   in  my   sense.   The   reasons   described  
here  seem  to  me  to  pertain  mainly  to  moral  standing,  while  the  others  mainly  concern  intrinsic  value.  I  
return  to  the  latter  below.  
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can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  being  a  ticket  checker  is  incidental  to  the  very  existence  of  
the  person,  while  it  is  not  incidental  to  the  very  existence  carbon-­‐‑capturing  bacterium.    
Second,  Preston  argues  that  artificial  organisms  have  a  “bifurcated  teleology”.  On  the  
one  hand,  it  has  an  internal,  “organismal”  teleology  like  natural  organisms  do;  on  the  other  
hand  it  has  an  external,  “artefactual”  teleology  imposed  by  the  designer  and  defined  by  her  
goals  and  purposes  in  designing  the  organism.  Moral  standing  is  only  conferred  on  the  ba-­‐‑
sis  of  organismal  teleology  –  entities  that  possess  only  artefactual  teleology,  such  as  thermo-­‐‑
stats,  are  typically  not  thought  to  have  moral  standing.  Since  artefactual  teleology  is  prima-­‐‑
ry  in  artificial  organisms,  their  moral  standing  is  at  least  diminished  relative  to  natural  or-­‐‑
ganisms.  To  bolster  this  claim,  Preston  suggests  that  the  fact  that  people  are  willing  to  treat  
domesticated  animals  much  worse  than  wild  animals  suggests  that  they  take  domesticated  
animals  (i.e.  partially  artificial  organisms)  to  have  lower  moral  standing  than  wild  animals  
(i.e.  purely  natural  organisms).  
Neither  of   these  arguments  seems  to  me  plausible.  To   take   the  second  one   first,   the  
argument  relies  on  seeing  the  two  kinds  of   teleology  as  being   in  conflict,  so   that  an  entity  
cannot   be   simultaneously   fully   organismically-­‐‑teleological   and   fully   artefactually-­‐‑
teleological.  I  see  no  reason  to  accept  this  view.  Furthermore,  the  relevance  of  the  maltreat-­‐‑
ment  of  domestic  animals  is  questionable.  For  one  thing,  the  view  that  the  welfare  of  such  
animals  is  inconsequential  seems  to  me  to  be  very  much  a  minority  position  today.  For  an-­‐‑
other,  even  if  people  do  think  domestic  animals’  welfare  does  not  matter,  they  may  simply  
be  wrong.  Furthermore,  it  is  doubtful  if  those  who  do  deny  the  importance  of  domesticated  
animals’  welfare  also  think  that  wild  animals’  welfare  is  important.7    
                                                                                                                        
7  It  is  true  that  some  environmental  ethicists,  in  particular  J.  Baird  Callicott  (1980),  argue  that  domesti-­‐‑
cated   animals   have   less   value   than  wild   animals.   But   even   Callicott   does   not   defend   a   differential  
moral  standing  for  wild  and  domestic  animals,  since  he  (i)   initially  (in  the  1980  paper)  denies  moral  
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Concerning   the   first   of   Preston’s   arguments,   the   explanation   of   the   difference   be-­‐‑
tween  the  carbon-­‐‑capturing  bacterium  and  the  ticket-­‐‑checking  person  does  not  seem  to  me  
adequate.  Even  in  cases  where  a  person  is  (or  would  be)  created  for  a  purpose  –  and  hence  
that  purpose  would  be  essential  in  explain  why  the  person  exists  –  we  would  not  be  justi-­‐‑
fied  in  treating  that  person  as  a  mere  tool.  The  worry  that  such  persons  may  in  fact  end  up  
being  treated  as  mere  tools  underlies  well-­‐‑known  objections  to  ‘saviour  siblings’  –  children  
born  to  provide  biological  materials  that  could  save  an  ill  older  brother  or  sister  (see  Boyle  
&  Savulescu,   2001).   If   the   intuition   that   saviour   siblings  may  not  be   treated  as  mere   tools  
were  not  very   solid  and  very  widespread,   this  objection  would  not  have   the   considerable  
bite  that  it  does.  This  suggests  that  the  general  consensus  position  described  above,  accord-­‐‑
ing  to  which  intrinsic  features  of  entities  ground  moral  standing,  is  on  the  right  track.  
Even  if  artificiality  does  not  affect  moral  standing,  the  possibility  of  artificial  life  does  
present  a  puzzle  for  some  biocentrist  views.  If  moral  standing  is  grounded  in  the  fact  that  
an   entity   is   teleologically   organized,   as   some   argue,   then   either   it   follows   that   traditional  
artefacts  (such  as  Preston’s  thermostat)  have  moral  standing,  or  a  distinction  must  be  made  
between   the   kind  of   teleology  possessed  by   living   beings   and   that  possessed  by   artefacts.  
The  standard  way  of  trying  to  do  the  latter  is  to  appeal  to  a  specifically  biological  teleology  
that  is  grounded  in  the  process  of  evolutionary  selection.  But  at  least  potentially,  some  arti-­‐‑
ficial  organisms  will  lack  an  evolutionary  history,  and  hence  biocentrists  lack  the  resources  
for  arguing  that  living  beings,  but  not  balls  and  chairs,  have  moral  standing  (Holm,  2012b).  
Some  biocentrists  have  bitten  the  bullet  and  accepted  the  implication  that  ordinary  artefacts  
also  have  moral  standing  (Basl  &  Sandler,  2013).    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
considerability   to   individual  wild   animals   as  well,   and   (ii)   later   softens  his   position   considerably   on  
both  domestic  and  wild  animals  (see  Lo,  2010).  
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   The   second   issue   concerning  moral   standing   is  whether   the  act  of   creating  artificial  
life  constitutes  wronging  the  organism.  From  the  point  of  view  of  ‘mainstream’  biocentrism,  
the  answer  seems  to  be  that  it  depends  on  whether  the  quality  of  life  of  the  created  organ-­‐‑
isms  is  unacceptably  low.  Perhaps  the  ‘onco-­‐‑mouse’,  engineered  to  develop  cancer,  would  
count  as  a  being   that   is  wronged   in   this  way   (Attfield,  2012,  p.  86).  Even   in  cases   such  as  
this,  where   the  way  an  organism   is  designed   results   in  predictable   suffering,   some  might  
deny   that   the   organism   is   being  wronged.   A   version   of   the   non-­‐‑identity   problem   arises,  
since   the   individual   onco-­‐‑mice   could  not  have   existed  with   a  higher  quality   of   life.   I  will  
refrain  from  entering  this  complicated  debate.  For  current  applications  of  synthetic  biology,  
a  more  immediate  problem  is  that  microorganisms’  interests  are  so  rudimentary  –  perhaps  
restricted  to  self-­‐‑maintenance  only  –  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  designed  characteris-­‐‑
tic  could  conflict  with  them  (Link,  2013).  Furthermore,  current  applications  only  pertain  to  
microorganisms,  and  the  view  that  we  are  wronging  created  organisms  thus  requires  a  form  
of  biocentrism   that  only  a   small  minority  of  philosophers   (and  probably  even  smaller  mi-­‐‑
nority  of  lay  people)  would  accept.  
  Less  mainstream   biocentrists   do   suggest   that   the   very   act   of   creating   artificial   life  
constitutes  wronging  organisms.  The  main  proponent  of  such  a  view  in  the  context  of  syn-­‐‑
thetic  biology  is  Joachim  Boldt  (2013a;  2013b).  Boldt  argues  that  taking  an  engineering  ap-­‐‑
proach  to  life,  as  synthetic  biology  does,  necessarily  entails  viewing  living  beings  in  mecha-­‐‑
nistic  cause-­‐‑and-­‐‑effect  terms,  rather  than  as  purposeful  beings  striving  to  achieve  their  own  
good.  Taking  this  view,  in  turn,  precludes  seeing  created  organisms  as  having  moral  stand-­‐‑
ing.  Designing  and  creating  an  organism  thus  constitutes  denying  that   it  has  moral  stand-­‐‑
ing.  And  according  to  Boldt,   this  will  also  apply  when  created  organisms  are  sentient  ani-­‐‑
mals  or  even  human  beings  rather  than  mere  bacteria.    
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I   doubt   that   the   basic   premises   of   this   argument   are   true.   The  mechanistic   (‘reduc-­‐‑
tive’)   and   the   purposeful   (‘holistic’)   views   of   organisms   are   complementary   rather   than  
mutually  exclusive,  and  it  is  doubtful  that  synthetic  biology  takes  a  thoroughly  mechanistic  
view  of   life   (Lewens,  2013;  Powell,  2015)  Even   if   they  were  mutually  exclusive,   taking  the  
mechanistic  view  would  only  undermine  moral  standing  if  moral  standing  were  tied  to  the  
purposefulness   view.   At   least   some   bases   for   moral   standing,   such   as   sentience,   are   not  
dependent  on  that  view.  At  the  limit,  Boldt’s  line  of  thinking  seems  to  reduce  to  the  ques-­‐‑
tion  of  the  compatibility  between  freedom  (a  clear  basis  for  aspects  of  moral  standing)  and  
deterministic   explanation.  While   this   is   a  vexed  debate,   it   is   safe   to   say   that   it   is   an  open  
possibility  that  a  mechanistic  view  even  of  human  beings  is  compatible  with  seeing  them  in  
purposeful  terms  and  grounding  moral  conceptions  on  purposefulness.    
  
3.3.2 Intrinsic value 
The  second  category  of  objection  concerns  the  intrinsic  value  of  organisms.  Intrinsic  value,  as  
I  understand   the   term  here,   is  distinct   from  moral   standing   in   that   it  does  not  depend  on  
whether  the  entity  can  be  wronged.  A  great  work  of  art  can  have  intrinsic  value  –  it  can  be  
good  in  itself  that  it  exists  –  but  it  does  not  plausibly  have  moral  standing.  Several  authors  
have  argued  that  natural   living  beings  possess  a  value  that  artificial  living  beings  lack.  Per-­‐‑
haps  the  most  thoroughly  worked  out  version  of  this  view  is  Keekok  Lee’s  (1999).  On  Lee’s  
definition,   an   entity   is   an   artefact   if,   and   to   the   degree   that,   it   “embod[ies]   human   ends”  
(Lee,   1999,  p.   37).  Artificiality   is   thus  a  degree   term   for  Lee.  The  main  determinant  of   the  
degree  of  artificiality  is  the  ‘deepness’  of  the  technology  used,  which  for  Lee  increases  as  a  
technology  intervenes  at  more  fundamental  levels.  The  ultimate  artefact  would  be  one  that  
was  built  directly  from  fundamental  matter  (i.e.  atoms,  subatomic  particles,  strings  or  what-­‐‑
ever  turns  out  to  be  at  the  ground-­‐‑floor  of  physical  reality).  The  implication  for  the  domain  
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of   biotechnology   is   that   life   forms   that   are   the   product   of   human   interventions   can   be  
ranked  according  to  their  level  of  artificiality:  Traditional  trial-­‐‑and-­‐‑error  selection  produces  
organisms  that  are   less  artificial   than  those  resulting  from  scientifically  informed  breeding  
and   hybridization,   and   these   are   again   less   artificial   than   organisms   created   through   ge-­‐‑
nome-­‐‑level   interventions  –   including  both  traditional  GMOs  and  the  products  of  synthetic  
biology   (Lee,  1999,  p.   52).  Lee’s   claim   is  now   that  naturally  occurring  entities  have  “inde-­‐‑
pendent  value”  –  a  value  that  is  grounded  in  the  very  fact  that  natural  entities  are  independ-­‐‑
ent  of  humans  and  human  intentions8  (Lee,  1999,  p.  178).  Consequently,  organisms  created  
by  biotechnology,  and  especially  organisms  created  de  novo,  lack  a  value  that  natural  organ-­‐‑
isms  possess.  
Christopher  Preston  (2008;  2013a;  2013b)  has  adapted  Lee’s  argument  to  synthetic  bi-­‐‑
ology.  Initially  (in  the  2008  paper),  Preston  rejects  Lee’s  explanation  of  the  special  value  of  
natural  organisms  in  terms  of  independence  (largely  by  reference  to  the  similarity  between  
biotechnology   and   selective  breeding,   as  discussed   in  Article   2).   Instead,  he   suggests   that  
the  fact  that  artificial  organisms  are  not  connected  to  the  historical  process  of  evolution  robs  
them  of  a  value  possessed  by  natural,  evolved  organisms.  On  this  early  view  of  Preston’s,  
the   products   of   synthetic   biology  uniquely   lack   value,   since   other  manipulated   organisms  
(such   as   those   who   have   been   selectively   bred   or   genetically   modified   in   the   traditional  
way)  retain  their  connection  to  the  evolutionary  process.  Later  (especially  in  2013a),  Preston  
accepts  that  lack  of  independence  in  Lee’s  sense  can  also  at  least  diminish  the  intrinsic  value  
of  organisms  (Preston,  2013a,  pp.  119-­‐‑120).  He  also  seems  to  endorse  the  view  that  domesti-­‐‑
cated   animals   lack   part   of   the   intrinsic   value   that   natural   organisms   have,   although   it   is  
                                                                                                                        
8  It  is  worth  noting  that  this  idea  has  a  certain  paradoxical  flavour:  If  it  is  important  that  value  is  not  
anthropocentric,  then  it  seems  strange  to  suggest  entities’  relationship  to  human  being  is  of  such  great  
importance.   From   the   point   of   view   of   the   non-­‐‑humans   themselves,   it   presumably   matters   little  
whether  they  are  independent  (in  Lee’s  sense)  or  not.  
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unclear   whether   this   lack   pertains   to   intrinsic   value,   moral   standing,   or   both   (cf.   note   6  
above).  At  any  rate,  on  Lee’s  and  Preston’s  views,  artificial  organisms  lack  intrinsic  value,  or  
have  less  intrinsic  value  than  natural  organisms.  
Their   lack  of   intrinsic  value  may  mean   that  we   lack  one  kind  of   reason   for  creating  
new  life  forms  and  for  preserving  them  if  they  were  to  become  threatened  with  extinction  –  
artificial  life  forms,  in  other  words,  do  not  contribute  to  valuable  biodiversity  (Boldt,  2013c).  
Could   the   lack  of  value  also  be   a   reason   to   refrain   from  creating  artificial   life?  Lee   argues  
that  deep  technologies  are  “nature-­‐‑replacing”,  and  that  they  “transform  the  natural  into  the  
artefactual”   (Lee,   1999,   pp.   6-­‐‑7).   In   the  most   straightforward   reading  of   these   claims,   it   is  
easy   to  see  how  a  problem  might  arise.   If   synthetic  biologists   (and  other  biotechnologists)  
are   literally   replacing  valuable   natural   entities  with  non-­‐‑valuable   artificial   entities,   then   a  
loss  of  value  would  result.  But  this  interpretation  does  not  warrant  an  objection  to  creating  
artificial  organisms  per  se,  but  only  to  substituting  natural  for  artificial  organisms.  An  argu-­‐‑
ment  of  this  type  has  been  made  against  restoration  of  natural  ecosystems,  which  has  been  
denounced  as  “faking  nature”  (Elliot,  1982)  and  a  “big  lie”  (Katz,  1992).  But  at  least  current-­‐‑
ly,   synthetic   biology  does   not   lead   to   there   being   less   natural   organisms   in   the  world,   as  
Preston   concedes   in   his   later   paper   (2013a,   pp.   112).   This   interpretation   of   the   nature-­‐‑
replacing  objection  seems  at  best  to  concern  what  might  happen  in  the  far  future  (and  Lee’s  
book  is  strewn  with  expressions  such  as  “could  ultimately”,  “in  the  long  run”  and  “would  
eventually”).  Taking  this  to  be  an  objection  to  current  synthetic  biology  is  to  commit  a  slip-­‐‑
pery  slope  fallacy.  
  
3.3.3 Attitudes 
But  Lee   sometimes   seems   to   suggest   that   the  mere   fact   that   it   becomes  possible   to   replace  
natural  entities  with  artefacts  is  sufficient  (Lee,  1999,  pp.  117-­‐‑120).  On  this  interpretation,  the  
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possession   of   a   technology   that   allows   us   to   substitute   artefacts   for   natural   entities   puts  
humanity   in  a  position  of  dominance  over  nature,   in   the   sense   that   it   is  up   to  us   to  decide  
whether  there  should  exist  natural  entities.  This  takes  us  to  the  final  category  of  objection,  
those  concerning  the  attitudes  to  life  and  nature  that  creating  artificial  living  beings  implies.  
The  typical  attitude  that  synthetic  biology  (and  other   technology)   is  claimed  to  embody  is  
that  of  total  mastery  and  subordination  of  the  natural  world  to  the  desires  of  human  beings.  
Boldt  &  Müller   (2008,   p.   388)   suggest   that   creating   organisms   de   novo   amounts   to   seeing  
nature  as  “a  blank  space  to  be  filled  with  whatever  we  wish”.  A  weakness  for  views  of  this  
type  is  that  their  connection  to  action  is  less  than  obvious.  As  Boldt  (2013b,  p.  40)  concedes,  
this   view   is   less   about   acts   and   more   about   “goodwill,   attitudes   and   virtues”.   Hence   it  
would  be  wrong  to  assume  that  these  views  directly  provide  reasons  for  or  against  certain  
actions.  
Presumably,   however,   the   implication   is   that  we   should   not  want   to   be   the   kind   of  
people  who  dominate  nature  (and  that  we  should  want  to  avoid  creating  organisms,  at  least  
de  novo).  The  question  then  is  why  we  should  not  want  to  be  this  kind  of  people?  One  possi-­‐‑
bility  is  that  the  attitude  of  dominance  just  is  objectionable  or  undesirable.  Lee  argues  that  it  
amounts  to  narcissism  and  egomania,  and  therefore  “either  pathological  or  immature”  (Lee,  
1999,   p.   201).   A   second   possibility   is   to   argue   that   such   an   attitude   is   inconsistent   with  
granting  living  beings  moral  standing  or  intrinsic  value.  As  I  argued  above,  Boldt  seems  to  
hold  that  taking  a  certain  attitude  to  living  beings  –  the  mechanistic  view  –  precludes  seeing  
them  as   having  moral   standing.   Lee   analogously   suggests   that   the   attitude   of   dominance  
and  its  attendant  striving  for  control  “necessarily  involves  trampling  on  the  legitimate  ethi-­‐‑
cal  demands  of  nonhuman  others”  (Lee,  1999,  p.  202).  A  third  possibility  is  that  the  attitude  
is  detrimental  to  our  own  interests.  Lee  laments  the  prospect  of  a  world  where  “[w]herever  
one  turns,  one  only  sees  images  of  oneself;  wherever  one  shouts,  one  hears  only  one’s  own  
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echoes.”  In  such  a  world,  humanity  becomes  “lonesome”  and  “imprisoned  within  an  exis-­‐‑
tential  or  ontological  solipsism  of  its  own  making”  (Lee,  199,  p.  194).  G.A.  Cohen  (2011,  p.  
207)  takes  a  similar  view,  arguing  that  “the  attitude  that  goes  with  seeking  to  shape  every-­‐‑
thing  to  our  requirements  …  contradicts  our  own  spiritual  requirements”  and  is  “repugnant,  
and,  at   the   limit,   insane”.  A   fourth  possibility   is   that   the  attitude  of  mastery,   even   if  only  
taken  to  nonsentient  life,  may  lead  to  diminished  respect  for  human  or  sentient  life  (Boldt,  
2013b,  p.  44).  This  is  analogous  to  Kant’s  argument  against  animal  cruelty,  but  moved  one  
branch  down  the  phylogenetic  tree  (Link,  2013,  p.  441).  A  fifth  and  final  possibility,  similar  
to   the   fourth,   is   that   the  normative  attitude  of  mastery  may   lead  to  an  exaggerated   factual  
belief   in  our  ability   to  control  and  predict   the  result  of   interventions   in   the  natural  world.  
The  attitude-­‐‑based  objection  is  thus  linked  to  risk-­‐‑based  concerns  (Boldt  2013a,  pp.  400-­‐‑401;  
2013b,  pp.  44-­‐‑47).  
As  I  argue  in  Article  1,  I  do  not  think  investigating  the  internal  mental  states  of  syn-­‐‑
thetic  biologists  can  dispel  (or  confirm)  the  attitude-­‐‑based  objections.  The  objections  do  not  
(or  do  not  only)  concern  such  mental  states,  but  rather  what  Boldt,  borrowing  a  phrase  from  
Hans   Jonas,  calls  “the  basic  precepts  of  one’s  doing”   (Boldt,  2013b,  p.  40).  The  question   is  
whether  the  attitude  of  mastery  is  necessary  to  make  sense  of  the  action  of  creating  artificial  
life.  Even  if  we  take  this  view  of  attitudes,  however,  it  is  doubtful  whether  creating  artificial  
life   in   the  way  synthetic  biologists  currently  do  only  makes  sense   if   in   the   light  of  an  atti-­‐‑
tude  of  mastery  that  is  narcissistic,  or  that  is  inconsistent  with  granting  moral  status  or  in-­‐‑
trinsic   value   to   living   beings.   First   of   all,   the   attitude-­‐‑based   objections  mainly   target   the  
project  of  designing  and  creating  life  de  novo.  But  much  of  what  is  going  on  within  synthetic  
biology  does  not  amount   to   creating   life  de  novo,   and  as   such  does  not   (on   the  objection’s  
own  terms)  exhibit   the  attitude  of  mastery   (Thompson,  2012,  p.  5).  Second,  even   those  as-­‐‑
pects  of  synthetic  biology  that  best  fit  the  paradigm  that  Boldt,  Lee  and  others  have  in  mind  
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do  not  require  the  attitude  of  mastery.  Tim  Lewens  (2013)  argues  that  the  engineering  ap-­‐‑
proach  to  life  that  synthetic  biologists  undoubtedly  take  is  better  explained  as  a  set  of  prag-­‐‑
matic  ways  of  dealing  with  the  complexity  of  organisms  by  simplification  than  as  the  reflec-­‐‑
tion  of  a   thoroughgoing  rational-­‐‑design  view  of   life   (i.e.  Boldt  and  Müller’s  “blank  space”  
view  of  nature).  Similarly,  making  sense  of  a  person  that  designs  and  creates  novel  types  of  
microorganisms  does  not  require  ascribing  to  him  a  lack  of  recognition  of  any  intrinsic  val-­‐‑
ue  or  moral  standing  in  natural  life.  At  most  it  requires  ascribing  to  him  the  belief  that  ma-­‐‑
nipulating  non-­‐‑sentient  living  beings  does  not  violate  any  valid  moral  norms.  Much  of  the  
attitude-­‐‑based  objection  thus  reduces  to  the  question  of  whether  it  is  morally  objectionable  
for  other  reasons  to  do  what  synthetic  biologists  are  doing.  
A  second  problem  for  most  of  the  explanations  of  why  the  attitude  of  mastery  should  
be  avoided  is  that  they  rely  on  some  connection,  causal  or  otherwise,  between  the  attitude  
of  mastery  and  something  more  obviously  problematic.  But  the  existence  of  this  connection  
can  in  every  case  be  questioned,  at  the  very  least  when  the  attitude  is  appropriately  limited  
to  what   is   necessary   to  make   sense   of   creating   life   as   synthetic   biologists   are   now  doing.  
There   is  room  between  even  an  attitude  of  mastery,   if   this  concerns  only  non-­‐‑sentient   life,  
and  attitudes  that  are  narcissistic  and  egomaniacal.  Likewise  this  kind  of  mastery  falls  short  
of  “seeking  to  shape  everything  to  our  requirement”,  not  to  speak  of  achieving  anything  like  
the  situation  where  we  see  only  our  own  mirror-­‐‑image  in  the  outside  world.  With  respect  to  
the   two   final  possible   reasons  why   the   attitude  of  mastery   is  problematic,   it   seems   to  me  
unlikely  that  our  creating  artificial  life  at  the  microorganismic  level  will  lead  either  to  a  lack  
of  respect  for  higher  life-­‐‑forms  or  problematic  approaches  to  risk  assessment  and  risk  man-­‐‑
agement.  Those  who  put  forward  these  worries  have  done  little  to  argue  that  the  effects  are  
likely   (Link,  2013,  p.  445).  Boldt   (2013b,  p.  47)   in  effect  suggests   that  his  view  depends  on  
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seeing   the  desire   to   create  microorganisms  as  already  constituting   a  general   lack  of   respect  
(and  concedes  that  some  will  not  share  this  analysis)  
There   is   another,   more   pragmatic   variant   of   the   attitudes-­‐‑based   objection,   namely  
that  synthetic  biology  is  motivated  by  the  same  ideology  that  has  created  the  problems  syn-­‐‑
thetic  biology   is   supposed   to   solve.  This   idea   is   common   in   the   literature  on   the  ethics  of  
agricultural  biotechnology  (i.e.  the  use  of  genetically  modified  crops  in  agriculture).  Ronald  
Sandler  (2003,  2007)  has  argued  on  this  basis  that  there  is  a  presumption  against  the  use  of  
GM  crops.  The  general  claim  is  that  GM  agriculture  is  an  expression  of  an  attitude  to  nature  
based  on  a  desire  to  control  and  master  it,  rather  than  on  humility  and  respect.  Unlike  Lee  
and   Boldt,   he   attempts   to   define   this   attitude   more   precisely,   as   the   disposition   “not   to  
adapt   [our]   lifestyles   to   the   earth,   but   to   adapt   earth   to   [our]   lifestyles”   (Sandler,   2004,  p.  
310).  On  Sandler’s  view,  this  is  not  a  reason  to  be  against  GM  agriculture  tout  court,  but  only  
a  reason  to  object  to  relying  of  GM  as  a  quick  technological  fix  to  the  major  challenges  hu-­‐‑
manity  faces.  Instead,  we  should  at  least  also  look  to  solve  those  problems  through  political  
and  behavioural  reforms  (for  an  overview  of  the  ‘technological  fix’  critique  of  biotechnolo-­‐‑
gy,  see  Scott,  2011).    
This  line  of  argument  reveals  a  very  common,  but  often  overlooked,  aspect  of  critical  
views  on  biotechnology,  namely  that   they  call   for  consideration  of   (and  preference  for)  al-­‐‑
ternatives   to   biotechnological   solutions   (rather   than   rejection   of   biotechnology   altogether).  
Taken  in  one  way,  this  call  for  considerations  of  alternatives  seems  entirely  reasonable;  we  
should  consider  all  possibilities  when  it  comes  to  solving  complex  problems  such  as  ensur-­‐‑
ing  environmental  sustainability  or  creating  an  adequate  food  system  for  a  growing  global  
population,  and  we  should  avoid  framing  challenges  that  are  (also)  social  and  economic  as  
(solely)  technical  ones.  But  if  the  view  is  that  technological  solutions  should  only  be  consid-­‐‑
ered  when  all  else  fails,  then  it  must  rely  on  independent  arguments  to  show  that  we  have  
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even   a   pro   tanto   reason   to   avoid   using   biotechnologies.   It  would   thus   be   an   only   slightly  
more  moderate  version  of  an  anti-­‐‑technology  view.    
  
4. Risk, uncertainty and precaution 
I  now  turn  to  question  (II),   i.e.  how  synthetic  biology  should  be  developed  from  a  societal  
point   of   view.   The   notion   of   conditional   acceptability   suggests   that   the   gap   between   this  
and  question  (I)  is  less  marked  than  it  might  seem  –  the  conditional  acceptability  view,  in  a  
very   broad   variant,   says   that   the   acceptability   of   doing   synthetic   biology   depends   on  
whether  it  is  developed  in  certain  ways,  and  on  what  arrangements  are  necessary  to  secure  
such  a  development.  Articles  3  and  4  contribute  to  the  discussion  of  what  arrangements  we  
should  instate  in  order  to  secure  a  development  that  is  satisfactory  with  respect  to  the  po-­‐‑
tential  adverse  effects  of  synthetic  biology  on  human  health  and  the  environment,  i.e.  with  
respect   to   risk   and   uncertainty.9  My  Articles  mainly   deal   with   generic   principles   for   risk  
management   –   in  particular   the  precautionary  principle   and   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   –   rather  
than  with  the  specifics  of  what  risks  and  uncertainties  synthetic  biology  creates.  In  this  sec-­‐‑
tion,  I  therefore  first  want  to  give  an  overview  of  how  risk  issues  have  been  dealt  with  in  the  
synthetic  biology  literature,  and  to  explain  how  this  relates  to  my  choice  of  focus  in  the  two  
Articles.  I  will  then  introduce  each  Article  in  turn.  
   While  much  of   the  philosophical   literature  on   synthetic  biology   stresses   that   risk   is  
the  main  ethical   issue,   few  actually  say  anything  very  specific  about  what   the  risk-­‐‑related  
issues  are  and  how  they  should  be  handled.  The  typical  claim  is  merely  that  risk  is  not  suffi-­‐‑
cient  to  make  warrant  a  wholesale  rejection  of  synthetic  biology.  The  main  exception  to  this  
                                                                                                                        
9  Strictly   speaking,   risk   and   uncertainty   are   also   as   important  with   respect   to   adverse   socioeconomic  
effects.  However,  the  arrangements  that  may  be  needed  to  make  socioeconomic  risk  and  uncertainty  
acceptable  is  a  very  different  from  the  ones  that  are  relevant  in  the  case  of  health  and  environmental  
risks.  When  I  talk  about  risk  I  will  therefore  mean  risk  to  health  and  the  environment  only.  
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trend  is  the  dual-­‐‑use  issues  that  are  a  result  of  research  on  pathogens,  such  as  the  H5N1  and  
polio  research  discussed  above.  The  dual-­‐‑use  issue  arises  when  research  that  has  considera-­‐‑
ble  benefits  may  also  be  intentionally  misused.  By  far  the  most  discussed  issue  is  the  use  of  
synthetic  organisms  for  biological  warfare  or  terrorist  attacks,  but  more  mundane  dual-­‐‑use  
problems   exist   as   well.   For   example,   opioids   can   now   be   produced   in   engineered   yeast,  
which  makes  it  possible  to  produce  painkillers  such  as  morphine  in  an  easier  and  cheaper  
way  (DeLoache  et  al.,  2015;  Gelanie,  Thodey,  Trenchard,  Interrante  &  Smolke,  2015).  But  it  
also  makes   it  possible   to  produce  drugs  such  as  heroin  equally  easily  and  cheaply,  which  
has  led  to  some  debate  on  this  application,  including  a  self-­‐‑imposed  moratorium  from  one  
of  the  teams  working  on  this  (see  Ehrenberg,  2015;  Service,  2015;  Yang,  2015).    
Developments  in  synthetic  biology  –  significantly  aided  by  the  post-­‐‑9/11  anthrax  let-­‐‑
ters   incident  –  has   led   to  an   increased  attention  on   the  dual-­‐‑use  problem  in  general   terms  
(Miller  &  Selgelid,   2007;  National  Research  Council,   2004;  Rappert  &  Selgelid,   2013).   Syn-­‐‑
thetic  biology  creates  (or  exacerbates)  three  aspects  of  the  dual-­‐‑use  problem.10  First,  it  prom-­‐‑
ises  to  make  engineering  of  organisms  easier  and  cheaper,  thus  making  it  easier  and  cheap-­‐‑
er   to  produce  pathogens  and  (as   the  morphine  example  shows)  perhaps  easier   to  produce  
possibly   harmful   substances   via  metabolic   engineering.   The   rise   of   do-­‐‑it-­‐‑yourself   biology  
(or   garage   biology,   or   biohacking)   intensifies   the   worry   that   dual-­‐‑use   biotechnology   be-­‐‑
comes  available  to  people  who  are  less  reliable  and  surveillable  than  scientists  at  major  uni-­‐‑
versities   and   companies.   Second,   increased   proficiency   in   designing   organisms   raises   the  
possibility  of  ‘designer  pathogens’  that  are  intentionally  made  more  dangerous  or  useful  as  
weapons   than   similar   natural   pathogens.   This   prospect,   especially,   has   landed   synthetic  
biology  on  a   list  of  “12   risks   that   threaten  human  civilization”  prepared  by   researchers  at  
                                                                                                                        
10  The  factual  claim  that  synthetic  biology  does  create/exacerbate  dual-­‐‑use  problems  have  been  chal-­‐‑
lenged  by  Jefferson,  Lentzos  &  Marris  (2014).  
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the  Future  of  Humanity  Institute  and  Martin  School  at  Oxford  University  (Pamlin  &  Arm-­‐‑
strong,  2015,  p.  109).  Third,  as  discussed  above,   the  publication  of   the  genomes  of  known  
pathogens  place  the  blueprints  for  a  potentially  devastating  weapon  in  the  public  domain.  
The  third  issue  (often  in  combination  with  the  first)  has  been  the  most  prominent  syn-­‐‑
thetic  biology   risk   issue  discussed   in  mainstream  bioethics.  Douglas  and  Savulecsu   (2010)  
calls   for   the   development   of   an   “ethics   of   knowledge”   that   can   guide   us   in   determining  
whether   to  publish   information   that   significantly   increase   the   ability   of   evil-­‐‑doers   to  pro-­‐‑
duce  dangerous  pathogens.  It  is  at  least  a  possibility  that  such  an  ethics  of  knowledge  ends  
up  demanding   some   form  of  more   or   less   restrictive  pre-­‐‑censorship   of   sensitive   scientific  
publications.  Michael  Selgelid  (2007)  argues  for  a  similar  position,   in  particular  for  stricter  
formal  regulations  and  against  self-­‐‑regulation  as  a  solution.  The  idea  of  restricting  the  free-­‐‑
dom  to  publish  scientific   results  has  met  with  some  criticism.  Kevin  Smith   (2013,  pp.  461-­‐‑
462)   argues   that   restrictions   are   unjustifiable   on   consequentialist   grounds,   since   “it   is   not  
possible  a  priori  to  discern  those  pieces  of  scientific  knowledge  that  will  generate  disutility,  
cf.  those  that  are  either  neutral  or  generative  of  beneficial  consequences.”  And  Robin  Pierce  
(2012)   argues   that   any   censorship   scheme   raises   questions   of  who   decides  what   research  
should  be  censored  and  of  prioritizing  the  interests  of  those  who  want  to  feel  safe  over  those  
who  stand  to  benefit  from  the  relevant  research.  
     Outside   dual-­‐‑use,   the   risk-­‐‑related   problems   generated   by   synthetic   biology   have  
received  much   less  attention   from  philosophers.  A  minor  exception   is  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  re-­‐‑
search  more  generally,  which  has  been  subjected   to  an  ethical  analysis   in  connection  with  
the  NSABB’s   general   analysis   of   safety   that   followed   the  H5N1   studies   in   2014   (Selgelid,  
2016);  but  that  analysis  proceeded  from  the  assumption  that  “[gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research]  is  a  
subset  of  “dual-­‐‑use  research””.  In  fact  it  seems  to  me  that  the  opposite  is  true  –  dual-­‐‑use  is  
one  problem  that  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research  generates,  namely   that  of   intentional  misuse  of  
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‘enhanced’  pathogens.  The  other  major  problem  is  the  unintentional  release  of  such  patho-­‐‑
gens.  Most  of  what  has  been  written  about  dual-­‐‑use,  especially  for  and  against  censorship  of  
science,  has  no  bearing  on  the  problem  of  unintended  release.  Arguably  censorship,  which  
is  a  possible  solution  to  dual-­‐‑use,  is  counterproductive  with  respect  to  unintended  release,  
since  the  availability  of   information  about  the  escaped  pathogen  can  be  used  to  combat   it.  
Furthermore,  dual-­‐‑use  raises  some  unique  questions   that  do  not  apply   to  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  
research  generally  –  especially  questions  concerning  the  responsibility  of  scientists,  funding  
bodies   and   others   for   wrongs   that   others   perpetrate.   I   will   not   discuss   these   dual-­‐‑use-­‐‑
specific  questions,  but   instead  focus  on  more  generic  risk  management   issues.  Such   issues  
are  at  least  also  of  central  importance  in  the  context  of  dual  use.  Even  though  dual-­‐‑use  per-­‐‑
tains   only   to   cases  where   harm   is   due   to   some   intentional   (criminal)   action,   it   shares   the  
general  structure  of  other  choices  under  risk  and  uncertainty  when  analysed  from  the  point  
of  view  of   scientists,   funding  bodies   and   regulators  –   for   example,  Douglas   (2013)   argues  
that  expected-­‐‑value  theory  is  apt  for  handling  dual-­‐‑use  as  well  as  more  standard  cases.  Fur-­‐‑
thermore,   the   precautionary   principle   and   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   (and   their   relative  merits)  
have   been   discussed   in   the   context   of   dual-­‐‑use   (Clarke,   2013;   Kuhlau,  Höglund,   Evers  &  
Eriksson,  2011).    
   Even  though  philosophers  have  been  more  or  less  absent  from  the  debate,  the  ques-­‐‑
tion   of   how   synthetic   biology   should   be   regulated   with   respect   to   its   attendant   risks   to  
health  and  environment  has  been  discussed,  especially  by  practitioners  themselves  and  by  
lawyers.  The  main  issue  here  is  whether  synthetic  biology  warrants  or  requires  specific  regu-­‐‑
lation,  or  whether  it  can  instead  be  covered  by  existing  regulations  of  similar  products.  Civil  
society   groups   have   called   for   “synthetic   biology-­‐‑specific   regulations”,   and   argued   for   a  
moratorium  until  such  regulations  are  put  in  place  (FOE  et  al.,  2012,  p.  4).  On  the  other  side  
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are  those  who  argue  that  we  should  ‘regulate  the  product,  not  the  process’,  i.e.  that  synthet-­‐‑
ic  biology  products  should  be  subject  (only)  to  those  regulations  that  cover  similar  products.    
The  process/product  debate  with  respect  to  synthetic  biology  has  a  peculiar  second-­‐‑
order  nature  to  it,  since  it  piggybacks  on  a  similar  debate  relating  to  traditional  genetic  en-­‐‑
gineering.   The   European   Union   has   instated   process-­‐‑regulation   of   GMOs,   and   synthetic  
biology  is  regulated  by  those  regulations.  In  one  sense,  then,  synthetic  biology  is  regulated  
as   similar   products,   but   since   those   products   are   process-­‐‑regulated,   synthetic   biology   is  
ultimately  process-­‐‑regulated.  The  contrast  case   is  regulation   in   the  United  States,  which   is  
thoroughly  product-­‐‑based.  Products  of  genetic  engineering,  including  synthetic  biology,  are  
regulated  according  to  what  type  of  products  they  are.  Thus  synthetic  biology-­‐‑based  drugs  
are   regulated  by   the  Food  and  Drug  Administration’s  Federal   Food,  Drug  and  Cosmetics  
Act  (FDCA);  synthetic  organisms  used  as  pesticides  fall  under  the  Federal  Insecticide,  Fun-­‐‑
gicide   and  Rodenticide  Act   (FIFRA)  under   the  Environmental   Protection  Agency;   and   in-­‐‑
dustrial  use  (such  as  chemicals  production  using  metabolic  engineering)   is  covered  by  the  
Toxic  Substances  Control  Act,  also  under  EPA  administration  (for  an  overview  of  regulato-­‐‑
ry  regimes  see  Bar-­‐‑Yam  et  al.,  2012;  Bergeson  et  al.,  2015;  Rodemeyer,  2009).  
   I  am  generally  supportive  of   regulating  product   rather   than  process.  But   regulating  
product  rather  than  process  does  not  in  itself  mean  that  no  new  regulations  are  necessary,  
since  synthetic  biology  could  produce  products  that  are  relevantly  different  from  seemingly  
similar  products  of   traditional  genetic  engineering  and  other   technologies.  Two  aspects  of  
synthetic   biology   are   especially   interesting,   since   they   increase   the   level   of   uncertainty   of  
these   products   relative   to   existing   similar   products.   First,   synthetic   organisms   in   non-­‐‑
contained  use,   e.g.   as  pesticides  or   for  bioremediation,  may  be  able   to   survive,   reproduce  
and   evolve.   This   is   a   relevant   difference   from   chemical   and  mechanical  methods   that   are  
typically  used  for  similar  purposes,  since  their  effects  will  be  less  predictable,  and  any  nega-­‐‑
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tive  impact  may  be  more  persistent.  (However,  organisms  are  already  used  in  such  capaci-­‐‑
ties,  e.g.   the  use  of   the  Bacillus   thuringiensis   (of  GM  crop   fame)  as  a  pesticide,   so   there   is  
some  relevantly  similar  products  in  existence).  Second,  as  synthetic  organisms  become  more  
and  more  different  from  any  natural  counterpart,  risk  assessment  becomes  harder.  The  cur-­‐‑
rent  risk  assessment  procedure  of  GM  crops  in  the  US  relies  on  the  concept  of  “substantial  
equivalence”,  whereby  a  GM  crop  is  considered  safe  if  it  is  sufficiently  similar  to  an  existing  
crop.  This  concept  could  plausibly  be  extended  to  some  synthetic  biology  products,  such  as  
yeasts  that  produce  vanillin  rather  than  alcohol.  But  for  organisms  that  have  no  close  natu-­‐‑
ral  counterpart,  we  cannot  use  this  source  of  knowledge  in  risk  assessment.  Prima  facie  this  
strengthens   a   case   for   pre-­‐‑release   testing   of   synthetic   organisms   that   do   not   correspond  
closely   to   existing   organisms.   Furthermore,   the   substantial   equivalence   doctrine   is   itself  
controversial,  especially  with  regard  to  procedures  for  deciding  when  one  organism  is  sub-­‐‑
stantially  equivalent  to  another  (McGarity,  2002a).  
   The  focus  of  Articles  3  and  4  reflect  this  mix  of  novelty  and  familiarity  with  respect  to  
regulation  of  synthetic  biology.  Article  3  deals  with   issues   that  arise  when  there   is  signifi-­‐‑
cant  uncertainty  about  the  effects  an  application  might  have  and  how  likely  possible  nega-­‐‑
tive   effects   are.   The  Article   defends   the   use   of   the   precautionary   principle   in   such   cases,  
especially  against  challenges  from  proponents  of  expected  utility  maximization  procedures.    
Article  4  reflects   the  fact   that   the  risks  of  synthetic  biology  are   (and  in  many  cases  should  
be)  regulated  in  the  same  way  as  other  activities  that  create  risks  to  health  or  the  environ-­‐‑
ment.  A  common  tool  in  such  regulation  is  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis,  which  combines  scientific  
and  economic  analysis   to  arrive  at  an  assessment  of  overall   costs  and  benefits  of  different  
regulations   from  a  societal  point  of  view.   I  criticise  one  argument   in   favour  of  using  cost-­‐‑
benefit  analysis  in  this  context.  Common  to  both  Articles  is  a  focus  on  defences  of  expected  
utility   maximization   and   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   –   which   are   closely   related   and   underlies  
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what  might  be  described  as  mainstream  risk  management  –  that  attack  alternatives  for  be-­‐‑
ing  irrational.  
  
4.1 The precautionary principle 
The   debate   around   the   precautionary   principle   is   extensive   and   points   in  many   different  
directions.  It  has  aspects  that  fall  within  epistemology,  environmental  philosophy,  political  
philosophy,  ethics  and  the  philosophy  of  science.  In  Article  3,  I  deal  with  the  precautionary  
principle  as  a  principle   that   is   supposed   to  guide  actions   in  policy-­‐‑making  and   legal   con-­‐‑
texts.  My  point  of  departure  is  the  account  of  the  principle  defended  by  Daniel  Steel  (2014).  
The  basis  of  Steel’s  account  is  what  he  calls  the  ”tripod”.  This  interpretation  of  the  principle  
is  widely  adopted,  and  it  has  been  suggested  that  it  can  be  found  in  more  or  less  all  formu-­‐‑
lations   of   the   principle   that   exists   in   official   documents   (Randall,   2011;   Sandin,   1999;  
Trouwborst,  2006).  The  tripod  analysis  takes  the  principle  to  be  a  general  schema,  according  
to  which  the  existence  of  some  level  of  evidence  that  an  activity  may  lead  to  some  harm  trig-­‐‑
gers   the  demand   for   a   precautionary   action.   Steel   calls   these   three   elements   the   knowledge  
condition  (K),  the  harm  condition  (H)  and  the  recommended  precaution  (P).  K  and  H  set  thresh-­‐‑
olds  for  evidence  and  harm,  respectively:  If  both  thresholds  are  met,  the  demand  for  action  
is  triggered.  Fixing  the  variables  yields  a  version  of  the  precautionary  principle.  In  fact,  P  is  
rarely  specified  to  any  detail  in  official  statements  of  the  principle  –  although  it  is  subject  to  
some  generic  conditions  such  as  that  it  must  be  effective,  proportionate  and  consistent  with  
recognized   legal   principles   such   as   non-­‐‑discrimination   (European   Commission,   2000;  
Trouwborst,  2006,  Ch.  5).  This  suggests  that  the  relationship  between  H  and  K,  on  one  side,  
and  P,  on  the  other,  is  primarily  a  negative  one,  i.e.  that  policies  that  trigger  an  H-­‐‑K  combina-­‐‑
tion  are  prohibited  (with  other  criteria  needed  to  select  among  permissible  policies).  Such  an  
analysis  is  suggested  by  Sandin  (1999,  p.  894),  and  by  Martin  Peterson’s  interpretation  of  the  
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principle  as  a  “transformative  decision  rule”   that  removes  certain  options  from  considera-­‐‑
tion  (Peterson,  2003).  At  least  in  his  formal  appendix,  Steel  adopts  this  approach  as  well.    
The  argument  I  put  forward  in  Article  3  flows  from  engagement  with  Steel’s  discus-­‐‑
sion   of  Cass   Sunstein’s   objection   that   any  non-­‐‑trivial   precautionary  principle   is   incoherent  
(Steel  2013;  2014,  Ch.  2;  Sunstein,  2005,  Ch.  1).  Sunstein’s  argument  can  be  read  in  at   least  
two  ways  (Sandin,  2006,  pp.  176-­‐‑177).  On  one  reading,  the  charge  is  that  the  precautionary  
principle  (in  its  non-­‐‑trivial  forms)  is  absolutist,  i.e.  that  it  prohibits  any  policy  that  has  some  
chance  of  leading  to  some  harm.  Since  every  policy  has  a  chance  of  leading  to  harm,  every  
policy   is   strictly  speaking  prohibited.  The  precautionary  principle  only  seems   to  be  action-­‐‑
guiding,   according   to   Sunstein,   because   various   cognitive   biases   lead   people   to   focus   on  
some   risks   and   ignore  others   (Sunstein,   2005,  Ch.   2).  On   the  other   reading,  precautionary  
policies  sometimes  produce  risks  that  are  worse  than  the  ones  they  were  supposed  to  pre-­‐‑
vent.  In  such  cases,  it  would  be  inconsistent  to  implement  the  precautionary  policy,  since  it  
does  worse  than  the  alternative  according  to  the  very  criteria  used  to  justify  it.    
The   absolutist   challenge   can   be   solved   by   setting   thresholds   of   harm   and   evidence  
higher  than  mere  logical  possibility  that  any  harm  will  occur.  Christian  Munthe  (2011)  sug-­‐‑
gests  that  it  is  a  (minimal)  requirement  for  a  justifiable  version  of  the  precautionary  princi-­‐‑
ple  that  it  does  not  lead  to  paralysis,  which  seems  to  me  right.  However,  this  does  not  solve  
the   inconsistency   challenge.   Steel   solves   that   challenge  by  building   a   requirement   of   con-­‐‑
sistency  into  his  account  of  the  precautionary  principle.  Consistency  demands  that  the  pre-­‐‑
cautionary  measure  suggested  “should  not  be  precluded  by  the  same  version  of  [the  precau-­‐‑
tionary  principle]  used   to   justify   it”   (Steel,   2014,  p.   28).   In  other  words,   the  precautionary  
measures  must  not   itself   trigger   a  demand   for  precautionary   action,  using   the  harm-­‐‑   and  
evidence   thresholds   that   triggered  precautionary  action   in   the   first  place.  Consistency  an-­‐‑
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swers  Sunstein’s  challenge  (on  its  second  reading),  since  it  limits  eligible  precautionary  ac-­‐‑
tions  to  those  that  do  not  create  worse  risks  than  the  original  activity.  
While   I   agree  with  Steel   that  his  account  of   the  precautionary  principle   solves  Sun-­‐‑
stein’s  challenges,   I  do  not  believe   that   this  will  necessarily  satisfy   those   that  object   to   the  
precautionary   principle   on   the   basis   of   rationality.   Sunstein’s   challenges   rely   on   a   fairly  
strong  notion   of   irrationality,   since   they   suggest   that   the  precautionary  principle   leads   to  
internally   inconsistent   or   incoherent   policies.   But   rationality   objections  may   be   based   on  
weaker  notions.  Furthermore,  Steel’s  handling  of  another  rationality  challenge,  put  forward  
by   Martin   Peterson   (2006)   seems   to   me   to   be   similarly   based   on   rejecting   unnecessarily  
strong  claims  from  the  critic  of  precaution.  In  this  case  the  claim  is  that  certain  variations  in  
the   likelihoods   of   outcomes   can   counterbalance   each   other   precisely,  which   is   implausible  
when  we  have  must   rely  on  purely  qualitative   information   (Steel,   2014,  p.   40-­‐‑41).   Several  
comments  made  in  various  seminars  by  precaution-­‐‑skeptics  have  further  strengthened  my  
suspicion   that   Steel’s   refutations   of   Sunstein’s   and   Peterson’s   objections   are   not   entirely  
satisfactory.  As  one  such  philosopher  argued,  the  real  challenge  to  the  precautionary  prin-­‐‑
ciple  is  that  the  alternative,  namely  expected  utility  maximization,  works  so  well.  Article  3  
thus   defends   a   Steel-­‐‑style   precautionary   principle   from   rationality   objections   that   are  
grounded  in  the  ideas  underlying  expected  utility  theory  –  i.e.   in  the  kinds  of  claims  used  
by  proponents  of  expected  utility  theory  to  argue  that  their  approach  is  uniquely  rational.  
My  defense  of  the  precautionary  principle  mainly  concerns  the  very  use  of  thresholds  
in  risk  management.  As  such,   it   is  a  defense  of   the   tripod  schema,  rather   than  of  any  par-­‐‑
ticular  version  of  the  precautionary  principle.  Munthe  (2015)  has  criticized  Steel  for  neglect-­‐‑
ing  (or  rather  refusing)  to  address  the  question  of  when  a  particular  version  of   the  precau-­‐‑
tionary  principle  is  justified,  and  consequently  neglecting  to  address  the  ethical  justification  
for  precaution.  To  a  certain  extent,  I  sympathize  with  Steel’s  approach.  The  justification  of  a  
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given  version  of  the  principle  will  depend  on  a  number  of  context-­‐‑specific  details,  and  the  
question   of   what   level   of   protection   of   health   and   environment   is   desirable   seems   to   be  
within   the   remit   of   democratic   decision-­‐‑making.   At   the   very   least,   the   rationality-­‐‑related  
aspects  of   justification  that  Steel  addresses  are  complementary  to  the  purely  normative  as-­‐‑
pects   that  concern  Munthe  –   they  show  what  kinds  of   relationships  between   the   involved  
values  are  needed   if   the  precautionary  principle   is   to  be   justified,  but  are   silent  on  which  
values  bear  this  relationship  to  each  other.  
Nevertheless,  my  defense  of  the  precautionary  schema  does  invoke  ethical  theory  to  a  
larger  extent  than  Steel.  In  particular,  I  suggest  that  several  strands  of  moral  theory  justify  
the  use  of  thresholds  of  harm  and  knowledge  when  possible  bad  outcomes  are  dispropor-­‐‑
tionate  to  possible  good  outcomes  (and  that  disproportionality  occurs  more  frequently  that  
some  might   think).   Furthermore,   I   argue   that   some   restrictions   on  what   values  H   and  K  
may  take  are  necessary  to  defend  the  use  of  thresholds  on  purely  instrumental  terms  (that  
is,   defending   the   use   of   the   precautionary   principle   even   assuming   that   expected   utility  
maximization   is   the  correct  normative   theory  of  choice  under  uncertainty).  Hopefully,  my  
Article   thus   contributes   to   the   synthesis   of   instrumentalist   and  normative   arguments   that  
Munthe  (2015,  p.  221)  hopes  for.    
  
4.2 Cost-benefit analysis  
In  Article   3,   I   suggest   that   the   realistic   rival   to   the  precautionary  principle   is  not   an   ideal  
version  of  expected  utility  theory,  but  rather  a  non-­‐‑ideal  version,  namely  cost-­‐‑benefit  analy-­‐‑
sis.   In   that   Article,   I   argue   that   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   is   not   necessarily   closer   to   ideal   ex-­‐‑
pected  utility  theory  than  the  precautionary  principle  in  conditions  of  uncertainty.  The  rea-­‐‑
son   is   that   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   requires   relatively  precise   estimation  of   its   input  parame-­‐‑
ters,  i.e.  the  utilities  and  likelihoods  of  various  possible  outcomes.  This  introduces  inevitable  
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estimation  errors   into   the  analysis,  which  results   in  divergence  from  ideal  expected  utility  
theory,   and  which  are   likely   to  be  worse   than   the   errors   introduced  by   the  precautionary  
principle.   Steel   argues   that   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   leads   to   paralysis   in   cases   of   uncertainty,  
since  the  lack  of  precise  quantitative  inputs  “no  action  can  be  unambiguously  justified  in  its  
terms”  (Steel,  2014,  p.  23).  My  argument  is  largely  complementary  to  Steel’s;  his  argument  
assumes  that  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  must  or  will  respect  uncertainty,  while  mine  concerns  the  
problems  when  uncertainty  is  not  respected.  But  nevertheless  Steel’s  argument  seems  to  me  
incomplete.   He   assumes   that   if   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   does   not   unambiguously   justify   any  
action,  no  action  will  be  taken.  But  whether  that  is  true  depends  on  the  institutional  embed-­‐‑
dings  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis.  
   Cass  Sunstein,  who  is  the  target  of  my  Article  4,  provides  a  detailed  analysis  of  a  case  
in  which  uncertainty  in  the  input  parameters  are  high.  The  case  concerns  the  regulation  of  
arsenic   in   drinking  water,   and   a   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   of   the   proposed   regulation   showed  
monetized  benefits  ranging  from  $13  million  to  $3.4  billion  (Sunstein,  2002,  Ch.  7).  Sunstein  
draws  the  following  “lessons”  about  the  use  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  in  this  case:  
  “Does  all  this  suggest  that  CBA  is,  in  cases  of  this  sort,  unhelpful?  It  would  not  
be   hard   to   imagine   an   affirmative   answer   to   that   question.   A   skeptic   might  
conclude   that  because   the   range  of  uncertainty   is   so   large,   any  number  at   all  
could  be   justified,  and  the  ultimate  decision   is  essentially  “political”  or  based  
on  “values”.  This  is  not  exactly  wrong,  but  it  should  not  be  taken  as  a  convinc-­‐‑
ing  challenge  to  CBA.  An  analysis  of  benefits  and  costs  cannot  resolve  the  ul-­‐‑
timate  judgment,  but  it  can  certainly  inform  it.  Once  we  understand  the  poten-­‐‑
tial   effects   of   different   arsenic   regulations,   and   see   where   the   uncertainties  
come  from,  we  are  in  a  much  better  position  to  know  what  to  do.  Of  course  the  
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decision  will  be  a  product  of  “values”;  how  could  it  be  otherwise?  The  point  is  
that  the  values  should  be  identified  as  such,  so  that  when  the  government  acts  
its  reasons  are  transparent  and  explicable”  (Sunstein,  2002,  p.  178).  
If  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  is  merely  an  informational  input  into  decision-­‐‑making,  then  Steel  is  
not  right  to  say  that  it  leads  to  paralysis.  Perhaps  the  associated  “values”  lead  to  paralysis,  
e.g.  because  they  underwrite  a  presumption  against  regulation  if  benefits  do  not  unambigu-­‐‑
ously  exceed  costs,  but  the  analysis  itself  does  not.  
   If  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  is  merely  an  informational  input,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  it  could  
be  objectionable.  However,  there  are  two  problems  with  Sunstein’s  argument  here.  First,  it  
is  not  exactly  obvious  that  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  is  uniquely  in  the  position  to  inform  decision-­‐‑
making  by  accounting  for  all  benefits  and  costs.  As  I  argue   in  Article  4,   the  description  of  
the   effects  of   a   regulation   is  only  one  part  of   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis.   It   also   comprises   com-­‐‑
mensuration  of  values  of  different  effects  by  monetization,  i.e.  by  assigning  a  dollar  value  to  
each  effect.  Other  regulatory  strategies,  including  the  precautionary  principle,  can  unprob-­‐‑
lematically  base  themselves  on  all  the  best  information  available.  Second,  Sunstein  does  not,  
when  push  comes  to  shove,  limit  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  to  the  status  of  an  informational  tool.  
If   fact  he  discusses  a  very   large  number  of   legal  and  institutional  uses,  many  of  which   in-­‐‑
clude  wide  scope  for  discretionary  decisions  on  the  part  of  judges  and  administrators.  Con-­‐‑
sequently   it   is  difficult   to  ascertain  what   that  overall   effect  on   risk   regulation  would  be   if  
Sunstein  got  to  implement  everything  he  wanted.  But  there  are  at  least  two  proposals  that  
suggest  that  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  have  a  more  direct  effect  on  policy  than  merely  informing  
it.   Sunstein   argues   that   (i)   regulatory   agencies  must   show   that   the  benefits   of   a  proposed  
regulation   justify   its   costs,   and   (ii)   that  presumptive   floors   and   ceilings   for   the  value  of   a  
statistical  life  should  be  used.  I  Article  4,  I  especially  target  these  two  proposals.  
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   My   argument   challenges   Sunstein’s   inventive   defence   of   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   as   a  
corrective  to  the  cognitive  biases  that  influence  our  reasoning  about  risk.  Traditionally,  cost-­‐‑
benefit  analysis   is   justified  by  reference   to   the   ideal  of  economic  efficiency,  and  hence  de-­‐‑
pends  on   the  amalgamation  of   liberal  and  consequentialist   considerations   that   justify   that  
ideal.  By  arguing  that  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  functions  as  a  corrective  to  cognitive  biases,  Sun-­‐‑
stein  hopes  to  secure  an  “incompletely  theorized  agreement”  on  its  use  from  proponents  of  
all  normative  theories.   I  argue  that   the  aspects  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis   that  Sunstein’s  pro-­‐‑
posal   (i)   and   (ii)   above  promote   are  not  necessary   for   correcting   the  most   obvious  biases,  
namely  those  that  give  rise  to  false  beliefs  about  the  magnitude  of  risks.    
What   (i)  and  especially   (ii)  do  promote   is  “coherent”  valuations  of  risk.  The   ideal  of  
coherence  implies  that  the  value  of  a  statistical   life  that  different  regulations  imply  should  
not  diverge   too  much   from  each  other.  The   intuition   that   it   is   somehow   irrational   to   care  
more  about  one  risk  than  another  when  they  are  similar   is  well  known  –  and  it   is  not  un-­‐‑
common   to   hear   researchers   complain   that   members   of   the   public   are   irrational   to   care  
about   the  small   risks  associated  with   technology  when   they  also  ride   their  bike  without  a  
helmet,  which  is  much  more  dangerous.  This  is  an  instance  of  a  similarity  argument,  and  as  
such  my  general  arguments  in  Article  2  apply  to  these  as  well.  In  Article  4,  I  discuss  three  
concrete  arguments  that  Sunstein  makes  for  accepting  the  coherence  ideal,  and  for  believing  
that   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis  promotes   coherence   in   the  ways   that   are   supported  by   these   ar-­‐‑
guments.  In  each  case,  I  argue,  the  use  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  is  not  supported.    
  
4.3 The regulation of synthetic biology risks 
My  arguments  in  Articles  3  and  4  do  not  directly  address  the  risks  and  uncertainties  of  syn-­‐‑
thetic   biology   specifically,   but   rather   address   the  more   general   question   of  what   strategy  
should  be  used  for  risk  regulation  (although  I  do  use  examples  from  the  synthetic  biology  
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case  in  Article  3).  Their  scope  is  also  limited;  I  have  only  shown  that  the  precautionary  prin-­‐‑
ciple  is  robust  to  a  certain  criticism,  and  that  one  defence  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  fails.  Con-­‐‑
sequently,  my   contribution   to   answering   question   (II)   –   how   synthetic   biology   should   be  
regulated  with  respect  to  risks  to  health  and  environment  –  is  likewise  limited  and  general.  
Nevertheless,   I  want   to   finish   by   saying   a   little   about   the   conclusions   that   can   be   drawn  
about  the  regulation  of  synthetic  biology  specifically.  
   Most  importantly,  the  precautionary  principle,  on  the  account  of  it  I  have  defended  –  
and  any  account  that  is  defensible,  as  far  as  I  can  tell  –  does  not  justify  a  moratorium  on  “the  
release   and   commercial   use   of   synthetic   organisms”   as   the   civil   society   groups   demand  
(FOE  et  al.,  2012,  p.  3).  Most,  and  probably  all,  current  commercial  applications  do  not  pre-­‐‑
sent  any  meaningful  risks  to  health  or  the  environment  –  e.g.  because  they  are  used  only  in  
contained  facilities,  because  they  would  not  be  able  to  survive  in  the  wild,  or  because  they  
are  not  remotely  likely  to  be  harmful.  At  best  (or  worst,  depending  on  your  perspective),  the  
precautionary  principle  justifies  pre-­‐‑release  testing  of  organisms  in  non-­‐‑contained  use,  e.g.  
as   pesticides.   Even   in   such   a   scheme,   there   is   scope   for   the   use   of   similarities  with   other  
organisms  as  important  evidence  for  safety.  For  example,  there  seems  to  be  little  reason  to  
impose   strict   regulation   of   yeasts  modified   to  metabolize   vanillin   (rather   than   alcohol   or  
carbon  dioxide)  given  that  no  significant  harms  has  as  yet  resulted  from  thousands  of  years  
of  using  of  yeast  for  baking  and  brewing  (except,  of  course,  the  harms  from  the  consump-­‐‑
tion  of  the  metabolite   in  the  latter  case).  Furthermore,  existing  regulations  already  have  to  
deal  with  the  intentional  release  of  microorganisms,  and  thus  should  not  be  unfamiliar  with  
the  possible  problems  posed  by  the  ability  of  organisms  to  survive  and  reproduce.    
   A  more  novel  problem  posed  by  synthetic  biology  is  the  regulation  of  organisms  that  
are  radically  different  from  existing  ones.  These  organisms  create  problems  for  risk  assess-­‐‑
ment,  since  we  do  not  have  any  data  on  how  they  behave  in  an  uncontained  environment.  
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Uncertainty  about  precise  effects  will  likely  be  high.  But  once  again,  it  is  hard  to  construct  
an  argument  for  a  ban  or  a  similarly  restrictive  policy.  For  such  a  ban  to  be  justified  on  the  
basis  of   the  precautionary  principle,  we  would  have   to  have   some  evidence   (empirical   or  
theoretical)  that  a  given  application  may  lead  to  serious  damage,  and  alternative  regulations  
that  safeguards  against  that  damage  while  being  less  restrictive  would  have  to  be  lacking.  
Whether  that  is  the  case  cannot  be  settled  by  philosophical  argument.    
Similarly,   the   factual   details   are   important   in   the   case   of   gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function   research,  
which  clearly  introduces  the  possibility  of  extremely  bad  outcomes  (such  as  an  H5N1  pan-­‐‑
demic,  which  could  kill  more   than  100  million  people).   If   there   is  some  way  of   regulating  
the  conduct  of  such  research  that  sufficiently  lowers  the  likelihood  of  a  very  bad  outcome,  
such   as   higher   laboratory   safety   standards   and   limited   permissions   to   conduct   such   re-­‐‑
search,  then  that  is  clearly  preferable  to  a  ban.  Even  if  that  is  not  possible,  the  justifiability  of  
a  ban  depends  on  the  likelihood  that  the  relevant  research  will  result  in  the  prevention  of  a  
similarly  bad  outcome.  If  H5N1  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research  would  enable  us  to  avoid  a  pan-­‐‑
demic,  or  massively  limit  the  fatalities  of  such  a  pandemic,  and  if  it  is  at  least  as  likely  that  
the  research  will  prevent  a  pandemic  as  that  it  will  cause  one,  then  the  precautionary  prin-­‐‑
ciple  would  not  tell  against  such  research.  
At   some  point,   synthetic   biology   is   likely   to   give   rise   to   products  with   risks   of   the  
more  ordinary  kind  –  where  we  can  establish  a  statistical  correlation  between  the  product  
and  some  adverse  effect.  If  my  argument  in  Article  4  is  sound,  it  would  not  be  irrational  not  
to  use  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  as  the  basis  for  the  regulation  of  such  products.  This  is  a  relative-­‐‑
ly   limited   conclusion,   and   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis  may   still   be  warranted   on   other   grounds.  
But  I  would  suggest  (and  do  suggest  in  the  Article)  that  the  distribution  of  risks  and  benefits  
matter   quite   a   lot,   both   for   the   legitimacy   of   specific   regulations   and   for   risk   perception.  
Consider  the  neighbouring  case  of  GM  food.  It  is  often  argued  that  these  have  massive  ben-­‐‑
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efits,  and  furthermore  have  no  risks.  But  suppose  they  posed  some  small  risk  to  the  health  of  
those  eating  them.  Since  very  few  of  the  benefits  of  GM  agriculture  accrues  to  consumers,  it  
seems   entirely   reasonable   for   them   to   demand   regulations   –   not   necessarily   bans,   but   at  
least   rules   that   enable  people   to   avoid  GM   food.  Arguing   that   the  benefits   to   farmers   are  
larger   than   the  health   costs   to   consumers,   and   that   regulations   are   therefor  unjustified,   is  
not  prima  facie  plausible.  This  does  not  show  that  opposition  to  GM  food  is  warranted,  but  
only  that  it  relies  on  the  fact  that  the  risks  are  zero.  If  ordinary  people  are  to  be  convinced  to  
support  technologies  that  they  are  not  certain  are  safe,  then  they  need  to  be  convinced  that  
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In  2010,   the   J.  Craig  Venter   Institute   (JCVI)   announced   that   they  had  created   the   first   cell  
with  a  wholly  synthetic  genome.  This  was  a  milestone  in  the  development  of  synthetic  biol-­‐‑
ogy,   and   was   widely   publicised   as   an   important   step   towards   creating   artificial   life.   It  
spurred  much  debate,  including  debate  concerning  the  ethical  implications  of  creating  arti-­‐‑
ficial   life   and   of   synthetic   biology   generally.  An   important   strand   of   that   discussion   con-­‐‑
cerned   whether   these   developments   were,   in   fact,   morally   significant.   In   a   2013   paper,  
Thomas  Douglas,  Russell  Powell  and  Julian  Savulescu  (henceforth  DPS)  argue  that  creating  
artificial  life  is  not  morally  significant.    
In   this  paper,   I   critique   their  argument.   I  argue   that   the  definitions  of   ‘artificial   life’  
and  of   ‘moral   significance’  are  unnecessarily  narrow:  They  do  not   facilitate   the  best   inter-­‐‑
pretations  of  ethical  objections  to  creating  artificial  life,  and  they  are  not  well  motivated  on  
independent  grounds.  In  the  first  two  sections,  I  examine  the  notions,  starting  with  artificial  
life,   and   following  with  moral   significance.   In  each  case,   I   aim   to   show   that  DPS’   concep-­‐‑
tions  do  not  uniquely  capture  the  sense  of  the  relevant  concept,  and  that  they  are  not  well  
suited  to  the  subject  matter,  namely  synthetic  biology.  In  the  final  section,  I  attempt  to  show  
how   important  critical  views  on  synthetic  biology  are  more  plausible  when   interpreted   in  
line   with   my   more   expansive   understanding   of   artificial   life   and   of   moral   significance.  
Therefore,  I  conclude,  DPS  have  not  succeeded  in  showing  that  creating  artificial   life,  con-­‐‑
sidered  as  an  aspect  of  synthetic  biology,  is  not  morally  significant.  
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2. Creation of artificial life 
In   this   section,   I  discuss   the  way  DPS  understand   the  activity   that   they  are  evaluating.   In  
this  section,  I  argue  that  the  definition  of  ‘artificial  life’  that  DPS  rely  on  is  poorly  suited  for  
evaluating  the  creation  of  artificial   life  as  that  concept  applies  to  synthetic  biology.  The  defini-­‐‑
tion  neither   tracks   the   core  projects  of   synthetic  biology  nor   the   ethical   concerns   about   it.  
Before  making  that  argument,   I  will  argue  that  there  are  several  equally  plausible  concep-­‐‑
tions  of  artificial  life,  of  which  DPS  discuss  only  one.  
  
2.1 Artificial life 
DPS’  definition  of  artificial   life   is  based  on   the  assumption   that  “[t]he  creation  of  artificial  
life  would  have  to  consist  …  in  the  creation  of  an  artificial  living  entity,  henceforth  an  ‘artifi-­‐‑
cial  organism’”  (Douglas  et  al.,  2013,  p.  689).  They  then  go  on  to  offer  the  following  defini-­‐‑
tion  of  when  an  organism  is  artificial:  
We  will  take  an  organism  to  be  artificial  just  in  case  either  (1)  all  core  elements  
of  that  organism  were  initially  constructed  from  chemically  simple,  non-­‐‑living  
materials  to  the  specification  of  a  person  or  other  natural  rational  being,  or  (2)  
it  descended  from  an  organism  (or  pair  of  organisms  in  the  case  of  sexual  crea-­‐‑
tures)  that  was  constructed  in  this  way.  (Douglas  et  al.  2013,  p.  689)  
This   definition   involves   a   certain   conception   of   artificiality   (as   that   concept   is   applied   to  
life),  concerning  the  subject  of  artificiality  –  or  in  other  words  what  phenomenon  artificiality  
is  predicated  of.  For  any  conception  of  artificial  life,  the  subject  will  have  to  be  life  or  living  
things.   But   these   notions   have   several  meanings,   yielding   several   possible   conceptions   of  
artificiality;   each  corresponding   to  a   sense  of   ‘life’  or   ‘living   thing’  of  which  artificiality   is  
predicated.  We  can  distinguish  between  (at  least)  three  conceptions.  
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Token  artificiality.  This  is  the  conception  that  is  assumed  by  DPS.  It  sees  the  sub-­‐‑
ject  of  artificiality  as  the  individual  (token)  organism.    
Type  artificiality.  On  the  second  conception,  the  subject  of  artificiality  is  not  the  
individual  organism  but  the  type  or  kind  of  organism.  The  description   ‘artifi-­‐‑
cial  life  form’  may  be  more  apt  than  ‘artificial  organism’  for  this  conception.  On  
this  conception,  genetically  modified  organisms   (GMOs)  are  artificial,  and  so,  
arguably,   are   domesticated   and   selectively   bred   plants   and   animals   (Preston  
2013;  Sperber  2007).    
State-­‐‑of-­‐‑being  artificiality.  Finally,  the  subject  of  artificiality  could  be  the  very  liv-­‐‑
ingness  of  living  things.  Here,  it   is  those  definitive  features  of  living  things  in  
virtue  of  which   they   count   as   living   that   are   recreated   in   artificial   form.  This  
would   include   such   things   as   homeostasis,   growth   and   reproduction.   Exam-­‐‑
ples   include   organisms   not   based   on   DNA,   and   (on   some   views)   computer  
simulations  of  life.  The  term  ‘artificial  life’  best  applies  to  this.  
     
I   have   only   described   the   various   conceptions   here   in   a   very   rough-­‐‑and-­‐‑ready   form.  My  
suggestion   is   that   neither   corresponds  more   precisely   to   our   linguistic   intuitions  with   re-­‐‑
spect  to  ‘artificial  life’  than  the  others.  
The   JCVI’s  2010  announcement   sparked  considerable  debate  concerning  whether  or  
not  artificial   life  had  been  achieved.  DPS  note  this  and  refrain  from  taking  a  stance  on  the  
question.  But  they  do  take  a  stance  on  what  is  at  issue  in  that  debate.  On  the  claim  that  the  
JCVI  had  created  artificial   life   is  “doubtful  …  given  that  only  the  genome  and  none  of  the  
cytoplasmic   structures  were   synthesized   by   scientists”   (Douglas   et   al.,   2013,   p.   688).   The  
implication  is  that  if  the  cytoplasmic  structures  had  also  been  synthetic,  artificial  life  would  
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have  been  created.  But  this  point  was  also  disputed,  on  the  grounds  that  such  a  bacterium  
would  merely  be  a  copy  of  a  naturally  occurring  life  form  (Bedau  et  al.,  2010;  see  especially  
the  comments  by  George  Church,  Steen  Rasmussen,  Martin  Fussenegger  and  Jim  Collins).  
For  example,  Steen  Rasmussen  argues  that  creating  artificial  life  would  require  “construct-­‐‑
ing  life  using  different  materials  and  blueprints”  (Bedau  et  al.,  2010,  p.  423),   i.e.  would  re-­‐‑
quire  a  state-­‐‑of-­‐‑being  artificial  organism.  On  the  other  side,  Martin  Fussenegger  argues,  the  
JCVI   bacterium   was   “a   technical   advance,   not   a   conceptual   one”,   and   that   “[t]his   latest  
technology  will   simply   increase   the   speed  with  which   new   organisms   can   be   generated”  
(Bedau  et  al.,  2010,  p.  424),  implying  that  type  artificiality  is  the  relevant  conception.  
It  may  be  that  one  conception  is  superior  to  another  in  some  respect  (e.g.  for  learning  
about  the  nature  of  life  or  disproving  vitalism).  My  claim  here  is  the  modest  one  that  none  
of  the  three  conceptions  better  corresponds  to  the  ‘folk’  concept  of  artificial  life,  simply  be-­‐‑
cause  there  is  no  unified  concept  (Machery,  2012).  So  there  is  no  reason  to  restrict  our  un-­‐‑
derstanding  of  artificial   life   to   just  one  of   the  conceptions  based  on  conceptual  analysis  or  
linguistic  intuitions.    
  
2.2 Artificiality and synthetic biology 
In   this   section,   I   argue   that   the  DPS  definition   is   ill   suited   for   capturing  what   is  going  on  
within  synthetic  biology.  In  order  to  do  so,  it  will  be  useful  to  look  more  closely  at  the  defi-­‐‑
nition  of  artificiality.  
On  the  DPS  definition,  an  organism  is  artificial  just  in  case  “all  core  elements  of  that  
organism   were   initially   constructed   from   chemically   simple,   non-­‐‑living   materials   to   the  
specification  of  a  person”   (or   the  organism  was  descended  from  such  organisms).  We  can  
distinguish  two  aspects  of  artificiality  in  this  definition  (as  DPS  themselves  do):  
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Fabrication.  The   fact   that  “all   core  elements  …  were   initially  constructed   from  
chemically  simple,  non-­‐‑living  materials”.  We  can  distinguish  between  fabrica-­‐‑
tion  in  general  –  the  bare  fact  that  something  was  produced,  in  some  sense,  by  
human   beings   –   from   the   specifics   of   DPS’   definition   of   fabrication.   For   the  
former,  I  will  use  the  word  ‘production’  and  its  derivative,  reserving  ‘fabrica-­‐‑
tion’  for  DPS’  criterion.  
Design.  The  fact  that  the  organism  is  created  “to  the  specification  of  a  person”.    
DPS’  place  more  emphasis  on  fabrication  than  on  design.  Fabrication  is  treated  as  a  neces-­‐‑
sary   condition,   since   the   fact   that   organisms   produced   by   predecessor   technologies   (e.g.  
GMOs)  are  claimed  not  to  be  artificial  “since  these  are  not  constructed  from  chemically  sim-­‐‑
ple,  non-­‐‑living  materials”  (Douglas  et  al.,  2013,  689).  On  the  other  hand,  design  seems  to  be  
non-­‐‑necessary,   since   an   organism   that   is   “genetically   and   phenotypically   identical   to   [a]  
wild  type”  can  still  be  artificial  (Douglas  et  al.,  2013,  689).  One  might  argue  that  even  a  copy  
is  designed  to  be  a  copy,  but  in  that  case  the  design  conditions  seems  to  be  automatically  met  
whenever  the  fabrication  condition  is.  I  suggest  that  DPS’  focus  on  token  artificiality  is  the  
cause  of  this  inequality  in  emphasis.  If  we  want  to  capture  type  artificiality,  design  is  a  nec-­‐‑
essary  condition;  fabricated  copies  of  existing  life  forms  are  precisely  not  new  life  forms.    
   I  argued  above  that  there  is  no  reason  to  restrict  the  artificial  life  to  token  artificiality  
on  conceptual  grounds.  My  claim  now  is   that   the  related  emphasis  on   fabrication   is  not  a  
good  reflection  of  what  synthetic  biologists  are  doing  –  synthetic  biologists  take  themselves  
to  be  designing  new   life   forms   just   as  much  as   fabricating   individual  artificial  organisms.  
DPS   focus   almost   exclusively  on   the   JCVI’s   synthetic   cell,   but   synthetic  biology   is  not   co-­‐‑
extensional  with  the  project  of  the  JCVI,  or  with  projects  like  it.  On  the  contrary,  synthetic  
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biology  is  a  broad  field,  encompassing  several  different  types  of  project  (some  might  even  
argue  that  it  is  not  a  unified  field  at  all).    
Maureen   O’Malley,   Alexander   Powell,   Jonathan   F.   Davies   and   Jane   Calvert   (2008)  
suggest   a   rough   division   of   synthetic   biology   research   into   three   groups:   (i)   DNA-­‐‑based  
device  construction,   (ii)  genome  driven  cell  engineering  and  (iii)  protocell  creation.  Group  
(i)   is   the  group  that   is  most  directly  engaged  in  developing  biologically  based  technology,  
and   in  bringing  engineering  principles   into  biology  (a  outlined   in  Endy,  2005).  One  of   the  
poster  children  for  synthetic  biology,  the  modification  of  e.  coli  and  baker’s  yeast  to  produce  
a  precursor   to   the  malaria  drug  artemisinin,  also  belongs   in   this  group.  Group  (ii)  encom-­‐‑
passes   the   JCVI’s   project.   Its   aims   include   synthesizing   entire   genomes   and   producing   a  
minimal  cell  by  isolating  the  genes  required  for  maintaining  basic  life  processes.  Group  (iii)  
includes  those  researchers  who  are  working  to  construct  “minimal  cellular  systems”  and  to  
understand  “fundamental  biological  properties”  by  recreating  them.  O’Malley  et  al.  include  
inter  alia  George  Church’s  work  in  this  group  (O’Malley  et  al.,  2008,  p.  59).  
   There  is  no  reason  to  think  than  any  one  of  these  groups  is  more  definitive  of  synthet-­‐‑
ic  biology   than   the  others.  Each  contains  paradigmatic  projects  and  prominent  spokesper-­‐‑
sons  for  the  field.  Furthermore,  the  technological  aims  of  synthetic  biology  are  present  in  all  
groups.1  At  the  most  basic  level,  those  aims  consist  in  creating  organisms  that  have  proper-­‐‑
ties   that   are  useful   for  human  beings.  Design  and   type   artificiality   are   clearly   essential   to  
such  aims  –  it  is  the  prospect  of  being  better  able  to  create  novel  life  forms  that  suit  our  de-­‐‑
sires  that   is   the  promise  of  synthetic  biology  viewed  as  a  technological  endeavour.  On  the  
other  hand,  not  all  of  the  projects  would  place  much  weight  on  the  fabrication  aspect.  With-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
1  For  a  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  scientific  and  technological  aspirations  of  synthetic  biolo-­‐‑
gy  see  (Holm,  2012).    
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in  group  (i),  for  example,  the  organisms  that  are  created  are  typically  modified  versions  of  
existing  organisms,  such  as  bacteria,  yeasts  or  algae.    
   So  the  field  of  synthetic  biology  does  not  share  the  emphasis  on  fabrication  that  DPS  
exemplify.   If   anything,   it   seems   that   design   and   type   artificiality   is  more   central.   Under-­‐‑
standing  the  ethical  implications  of  artificial  life  as  an  aspect  of  synthetic  biology  thus  requires  
taking  design  and  type  artificiality  seriously.  
  
2.3 Artificiality and ethical concerns 
Even   if   synthetic   biology’s   conception   of   artificial   life   is   not   restricted   to   fabrication   and  
token  artificiality,  it  could  still  be  true  that  ethical  objections  are  grounded  in  these  concep-­‐‑
tions.  DPS  argue  that  they  are.  They  note  that  designed  organisms  have  existed  for  a   long  
time,  arguably  since  the  first  plants  and  animals  were  domesticated  more  than  10.000  years  
ago.  Given  this  fact,  they  argue,  “it  would  be  surprising  if  those  alarmed  by  the  prospect  of  
creating   artificial   life   were   alarmed   by   the   [design]   aspect”.   Furthermore,   if   design   was  
what  worried  people,  “it  would  be  difficult  to  explain  why  the  JCVI’s  creation  was  singled  
out   for   attention”   (Douglas   et   al.,   2013,   689).   So  DPS  pose   two  explanatory   challenges   for  
those  who  see  the  design  aspect  of  artificial  organisms  as  a  possible  basis  for  ethical  objec-­‐‑
tions:  (i)  Why  did  the  JCVI’s  specific  project  receive  so  much  attention,  when  design  played  
no  role  in  it?  (ii)  Why  does  synthetic  biology  attract  ethical  attention  at  all,  when  designed  
organisms  are  also  created  by  many  other  technologies,  from  domestication  to  genetic  engi-­‐‑
neering?  
Regarding  (i),  I  am  less  convinced  than  DPS  that  the  JCVI  was  the  object  of  attention,  
at  least  in  the  sense  that  critics’  arguments  were  aimed  directly  at  what  the  JCVI  had  done  
(or  at   the  culmination  of   that  project).  Certainly  not  all  critics  concerned  themselves  much  
with   the  details  of  what   the   JCVI  had  done.  Even  direct  reactions   to   the   JCVI,  such  as   the  
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report   of   the   Presidential   Commission   for   the   Study   of   Bioethical   Issues   (PCSBI)   did   not  
focus   exclusively   on   that   project   (Presidential   Commission   for   the   Study   of   Bioethical   Is-­‐‑
sues,  2010).  Of  course,  the  JCVI’s  announcement  occasioned  much  debate,  but  this  simple  fact  
is  not  hard  to  explain;  the  event  was  widely  publicised,  and  often  described  “in  ways  more  
provocative   than   accurate”   (PCSBI,   2010,   155).   And   for   philosophers,   the   announcement  
presented   an   opportunity   to   consider   and   debate   the   merits   of   synthetic   biology   more  
broadly. 
Now consider (ii), the idea that it is hard to explain why synthetic biology should re-
ceive any attention if critics were worried about the design aspect and not about fabrication. 
Note that the very existence of an explanation problem requires that critics accept  the  earlier  
instances  of  designed  organisms  as  morally  unproblematic.  While   this   is  plausible   for  do-­‐‑
mestication  and  probably  selective  breeding,  the  immediate  predecessor  to  synthetic  biolo-­‐‑
gy  –  traditional  genetic  engineering  –  has  not  exactly  met  universal  approval.  So  the  datum  
to  be  explained  seems  more  often  to  be  why  people  should  be  sceptical  of  genetic  engineer-­‐‑
ing  and  synthetic  biology  when   they  accept  domestication  and   (probably)   selective  breed-­‐‑
ing.  But   of   course   there   are   critics  who,   like   Joachim  Boldt   and  Oliver  Müller,   argue   that  
“certain   ethical   implications  of   synthetic  biology  go  beyond   those  of  genetic   engineering”  
(Boldt  &  Müller,  2008).  Either  way,  it  seems  to  be  true  that  there  are  instances  of  designed  
organisms  that  critics  view  as  unproblematic.  So  the  question  remains:  How  to  explain  this  
fact  if  the  basis  of  ethical  misgivings  is  the  fact  that  synthetic  organisms  are  designed?  
There  are,  I  think,  two  main  ways  in  which  an  explanation  could  be  given.  First,  one  
could  argue  that  design  only  provides  grounds  for  an  objection  when  certain  other  factors  
are  (or  are  not)  present.  The  method  of  production  could  be  one  such  factor  –  so,  for  exam-­‐‑
ple,  a  critic  might  hold  that  designing  new  (type  artificial)  organisms  by  way  of  selecting  the  
most  useful  specimens  for  breeding  or  planting  is  unproblematic,  while  doing  so  by  way  of  
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directly   changing   the  organism’s  genome   is   troubling.   In   such  cases,  design   is   still   a  non-­‐‑
redundant  part  of  the  basis  for  objections.  
Second,   one   could   argue   that   differences   in   degree   are   crucial.   For   such   a   view,   the  
range   and   specificity   of   human   control   over   the   organism’s   properties   are   ethically   im-­‐‑
portant.  This,  I  think,  provides  the  best  interpretation  of  some  prominent  examples  of  critics  
that   stress   that   synthetic   biology   is   more   problematic   than   genetic   engineering.   This   in-­‐‑
cludes  Boldt   and  Müller,  who  DPS   cite   as   an   example  of   this   type  of  view.   It   is   true   that  
Boldt   and  Müller   argue   that   ‘creation’   is  more   troubling   than   ‘manipulation’.   But   at   least  
one  of  the  reasons  why  this  is  the  case  is  that  created  organisms  exhibit  a  more  radical  kind  
of  design.  Whereas  manipulation   (i.e.   genetic   engineering)   “can  be  described  as   softening  
the   unpleasant   edges”   of   an   existing   organism,   creation   (i.e.   synthetic   biology)   “does   not  
add  value  to  an  existing  organism;  it  brings  into  existence  something  that  counts  as  valuable  
from  our  point  of  view”.  And  the  core  ethical  problem  seems  to  be  that  this  entails  the  view  
that  “nature  is  a  blank  space  to  be  filled  with  whatever  we  wish”  (Boldt  &  Müller,  2008,  p.  
388).  Furthermore,  Boldt  and  Müller  suggest  that  “the  creation  of  an  organism  that  does  not  
differ   from   a   natural   counterpart   in   any   relevant   respect”   is   less   troubling   than   standard  
genetic  engineering  (Boldt  &  Müller,  2008,  p.  388).  In  other  words,  fabrication  in  itself  is  not  
the  basis  for  Boldt  and  Müller’s  ethical  objections.  In  §4,  I  will  argue  that  the  same  goes  for  
several  other  prominent  arguments.  
  
2.4 Taking stock 
I  have  argued  that  DPS’  restriction  of   ‘artificial’   life   to   token  artificiality  and  fabrication   is  
not  warranted.  Neither  (i)  considerations  about  the  proper  meaning  of  the  concept  of  artifi-­‐‑
cial  life,  (ii)  a  desire  to  capture  the  core  of  synthetic  biology,  or  (iii)  the  need  to  explain  why  
synthetic  biology  has  been  the  object  of  ethical  objections  are  sufficient  grounds  for  such  a  
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restriction.  I  therefore  suggest  that  an  examination  of  the  moral  significance  of  creating  arti-­‐‑
ficial  life  should  have  a  broader  focus  than  DPS’  paper  does  –  it  should  focus  on  the  kinds  of  
things  synthetic  biologists  are  doing  with  organisms.    
  
3. Moral significance 
In  this  section,  I  consider  the  second  facet  of  the  moral  significance  of  creating  artificial  life,  
namely  moral  significance.  I  first  consider  generally  what  moral  significance  might  be  taken  
to  be,  and  then  discuss  DPS’  definition  of  it.  I  will  argue  that  this  definition  is  too  narrow,  
especially  because  it  ignores  the  possibility  that  creating  artificial  life  might  be  conditionally  
(but  not  unconditionally)  acceptable.  
  
3.1 Senses of significance 
As  was  the  case  for  artificial  life,  there  is  no  single  agreed-­‐‑upon  definition  of  moral  signifi-­‐‑
cance.  And   like  artificial   life,   it   is  useful   to  distinguish  between  senses  based  on  what   the  
subject  of  moral  significance  is.  As  far  as  I  can  tell,  there  are  at  least  four  possibilities:  
(B)  Significance  of  Beings.  Moral  significance  is  an  extension  of  moral  considera-­‐‑
bility.  A  being  is  morally  considerable  just  in  case  we  ought  to  take  it  (and  its  
interests)   into  account   in  our  moral  deliberations.  The  moral   significance  of  a  
considerable  being  is  the  weight  we  ought  to  give  that  being  (and  its  interest)  
in  moral  deliberation  (Goodpaster,  1978,  p.  322-­‐‑323).  
(P)  Significance  of  Properties  of  Beings.  A  property  of  a  being   is  morally  signifi-­‐‑
cant  if  that  property  plays  a  part  in  determining  the  moral  status  of  the  being.  
Examples  of  properties  that  have  been  argued  to  be  significant  include  being  a  
person,  being  sentient  and  being  alive.    
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(F)  Significance  of  Features  of  Actions.  A  feature  of  an  action  is  morally  significant  
if  it  plays  a  role  in  determining  the  overall  moral  status  of  the  action.  Morally  
significant  features  provide  reasons  for  and  against  performing  actions.    
(T)  Significance  of  Action  Types.  An  action  type  (or  a  practice)  is  morally  signifi-­‐‑
cant  if  some  moral  judgment  is  true  of  the  type  as  such.  That  is,  significance  is  
predicated  of  the  whole  type  rather  than  individual  instances  of  the  type.  Only  
if  some  moral  judgment  is  true  of  that  whole  is  the  action  type  significant.  
Both   (B)   and   (P)  may   play   a   role   in   the   ethics   of   synthetic   biology.   For   (B)   the   question  
would  be  how  much  weight  to  assign  to  the  interests  of  artificial  organisms.  (P)  is  an  issue  if  
the  discussion  concerns  whether  artificiality  for  organisms  ought  to  alter  their  moral  status.  
But  that  does  not  seem  to  be  what  concerns  DPS,  since  their  discussion  clearly  concerns  the  
moral  significance  of  an  action  or  a  practice  –  namely  of  creating  artificial  life.  
   That  leaves  (F)  and  (T)  as  possible  sense  of  moral  significance  in  this  case.  Since  creat-­‐‑
ing  artificial  life   is  clearly  an  action  type,  we  might  think  that  (T)  is  the  obvious  choice.  But  
that  fact  in  itself  does  not  rule  out  (F),  since  being  a  token  of  a  type  is  also  a  feature  of  an  ac-­‐‑
tion.  (F)  would  ground  the  claim  that  the  bare  fact  that  an  action  constitutes  the  creation  of  
artificial  life  is  a  reason  not  to  perform  that  action.  In  other  words,  the  property  of  being  an  
instance  of  creating  artificial  life  would  be  a  wrong-­‐‑making  feature  of  any  action  that  has  it.  
This  does  not  mean  that  all  such  actions  are  wrong  all  things  considered.  Creating  artificial  
life  would  more  plausibly  be  a  pro  tanto  or  contributory  wrong-­‐‑making  feature,  i.e.  a  feature  
that  could  be  outweighed  by  other,  right-­‐‑making  features.  
   If   (T)   is   the   right   sense   of  moral   significance,   the   question   is   whether   some  moral  
judgment  attaches  to  creating  artificial  life,  considered  as  a  type  of  action.  It  need  not  be  the  
case  that  the  relevant  moral   judgment  applies  to  each   instance  in  the  set,  since  some  moral  
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judgments  are  not  apt  to  be  applied  to  individual  instances.  I  am  thinking  especially  of  the  
judgment  that  an  action  type  is  conditionally  acceptable  –  i.e.  the  judgment  actions  of  the  type  
are  permissible  under  some  conditions,  but  not  under  others.  As  I  will  argue  below,  this  is  
exactly   the   judgment   that   critics   of   synthetic   biology  most   plausibly  make   (or,   for   some,  
ought  to  make),  and  it  is  a  judgment  that  DPS  are  unable  to  capture.    
  
3.2 Moral significance and artificial life 
Let  me  now  turn  from  general  considerations  about  moral  significance  to  DPS’  specific  def-­‐‑
inition  of  the  concept  for  the  case  of  creating  artificial  life.  Their  definition  is  this:    
We  will  take  [the  creation  of  artificial  life]  to  have  such  significance  just  in  case  
(a)   there   are   moral   reasons   not   to   create   artificial   organisms,   or   factors   that  
weaken  our  moral  reasons  to  create  them,  and  (b)  these  are  specific  to  the  crea-­‐‑
tion  of  artificial  organisms  (Douglas  et  al.,  2013,  p.  689).    
I   have   already   argued   that   condition   (b)   is   problematic,   since   worries   based   on   design  
would  apply  to  the  contrast  practices  that  DPS  have  in  mind,  such  as  genetic  engineering.  I  
will  not  say  more  about  it  here.  
   Consider  how  condition  (a)  relates  to  (F)  and  (T),  the  senses  of  moral  significance  that  
are  relevant  for  creating  artificial  life.  If  (a)  is  interpreted  in  terms  of  (F),  there  would  have  to  
be  reasons  why  being  an  instance  of  creating  artificial  life  is  a  wrong-­‐‑making  feature.  That  
is,  the  reasons  would  have  to  make  sense  of  why  creating  artificial  life  is  always,  or  at  least  
typically,  pro  tanto  wrong.  If  (a)  is  interpreted  along  the  lines  of  (T)  the  claim  would  be  that  
the  whole  set  of  actions  that  fall  under  the  type  ‘creating  artificial  life’  is  wrong  –  or  rather,  
that  there  are  reasons  for  this  conclusion  (or  against  the  conclusion  that  it  is  right,  or  obliga-­‐‑
tory).  
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   Whether  we  go  for  the  (F)-­‐‑  or  the  (T)-­‐‑interpretation,  the  burden  to  be  lifted  for  some-­‐‑
one  who  wants  to  argue  that  creating  artificial  life  is  morally  significant  is  a  fairly  heavy  one  
if   DPS’   definition   is   used.   What   need   to   be   provided   are   reasons   why   it   is   intrinsically  
wrong  to  create  artificial  life,  or  whether  the  practice  as  such  is  wrong.  I  do  not  doubt  that  
some  critics  hold  such  a  view.  But  they  certainly  need  not  hold  it.  In  particular,  critics  may  
hold   the  much  more   limited  view   that   creating   artificial   life   is   conditionally   acceptable.  De-­‐‑
fending   conditional   acceptability   means   arguing   that   creating   artificial   life   is   acceptable  
under  some  conditions,  but  not  under  others.    
   Some  will  no  doubt  object  that  conditional  acceptability  is  equivalent  to  the  claim  that  
creating  artificial  life  is  not  morally  significant,  since  not  all  instances  of  it  are  problematic.  I  
think  this  objection  is  misguided,  for  three  reasons:    
(1)  The  objection   is  plausible   if   significance   is   interpreted  along   the   lines  of   (F).  For  
many,   it   is  hard   to   see  how  being  an   instance  of   creating  artificial   life   could  be  a  morally  
significant  feature  if  only  some  instances  of  the  action  are  (even  pro  tanto)  objectionable.  For  
in   that   case,   surely   it   is  not   in  virtue  of   being   an   instance  of   creating   artificial   life   that   the  
action  is  objectionable,  but  in  virtue  of  the  other  features  that  make  up  the  conditions  under  
which  it  is  unacceptable.  But  if  significance  is  instead  interpreted  as  (T),  the  moral  judgment  
pertains  to  the  whole,  and  the  claim  that  each  instance  is  wrong  is  not  needed.  
(2)   The   notion   of   conditional   acceptability   seems   to   be   indispensable   for   thinking  
about   technology  in  general.  Technologies  are   tools   that  allow  us  to  do  certain  things  that  
we  would  not  otherwise  be  able  to  do,  and  given  that  technologies  are  developed  purpose-­‐‑
fully   by   human   beings,   we   should   expect   them   not   to   be   unconditionally   bad.   Ignoring  
conditional   acceptability   in   technology   ethics   induces   thinking   in   terms   of   a   dichotomy  
between  pro-­‐‑  and  anti-­‐‑technology  positions.  Since  pure  anti-­‐‑technology  positions  are  rarely  
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plausible,   this  amounts   to  stacking  the  deck  in  favour  of  a  pure  pro-­‐‑position  that   is  rarely  
informative.    
(3)   Conditional   acceptability   entails,   or   provides   the   basis   for,   moral   judgments   in  
cases  where  the  agent  has  to  form  an  opinion  on  the  practice  as  a  whole.  It  entails  that  the  
practice  ought  not   to  be  unconditionally  permitted,   and,   for   some  conditions,   that   certain  
regulations  or   institutional  embeddings  of  the  practice  should  be  put  in  place.  And  it  pro-­‐‑
vides  the  grounds  for  ultimate  rejection  of  the  practice  for  some  agents.  In  particular,  agents  
that  have  no  control  over  whether  the  conditions  will  be  met  may  rationally  reject  the  prac-­‐‑
tice,  especially  if  they  are  not  optimistic  about  the  likelihood  that  conditions  will  be  met.  For  
such   agents,   the   decision  whether   to   support   the   practice   is   effectively   a   decision   under  
uncertainty.  For  such  decisions,   the   fact   that  a  bad  outcome  –   in   this  case   instances  of   the  
practice  that  do  not  meet  the  acceptability  conditions  –  need  not  occur  is  beside  the  point.  
A  different  objection  to  conditional  acceptability  is  that  it  threatens  to  make  every  ac-­‐‑
tion  type  morally  significant,  since  (plausibly)  every  action  type  has  a  token  that  is  wrong.  
So   the   reasons   for   judging   the   practice   conditionally   acceptable   only   should   be   suitably  
specific  to  the  practice.  In  our  case,  it  is  particularly  important  those  reasons  do  not  merely  
result  from  the  fact  that  creating  life  is  a  species  of  the  genus  dealing  with  living  things  –  i.e.  
that  the  reasons  for  conditional  acceptability  are  not  at  work  whenever  we  are  dealing  with  
organisms.2    
I  conclude,  then,  that  moral  significance  should  include  cases  of  conditional  accepta-­‐‑
bility.   In   the  next   section,   I  will   argue   that   the  arguments   for  moral   significance   that  DPS  
consider   fare  better  when   interpreted  as   arguments   for   conditional   acceptability,   and   that  
the  reasons  for  conditional  acceptability  are  suitably  specific.    
                                                                                                                        
2  Thanks   to  an  anonymous  reviewer   for  Bioethics  for   suggesting   that   the  general   category  of  dealing  
with  life  might  be  the  important  contrast  in  this  case.  
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4. Arguments for moral significance 
So  far  I  have  argued  that  DPS’  interpretations  of  artificial  life  and  of  moral  significance  are  
both  too  narrow.  A  thorough  examination  of  the  moral  significance  of  creating  artificial  life  
should  consider  reasons  for  significance  that  stem  from  the  design  aspect  of  artificiality,  and  
it   should   consider   the  possibility   that   creating   artificial   life   is   conditionally   acceptable.   In  
this   section,   I  will   (unfortunately  all   too  briefly)   try   to   show  how  some  of   the  main  argu-­‐‑
ments   fare   in   light  of  my  widened  understanding  of  what  moral   significance   for   artificial  
life  entails.  I  divide  the  arguments  into  two  groups  –  one  concerning  the  value  of  life  (and  
nature),  the  other  concerning  uncertainty.  
  
4.1 The value of life 
Most  of  DPS  paper  discusses  various  arguments  that  aim  to  show  that  creating  artificial  life  
will,  may  or  does  already  undermine  the  value  (or  moral  status)  of  life  and/or  nature.  Very  
roughly,  there  are  two  worries;  (i)  that  creating  artificial  life  may  lead  to  a  situation  wherein  
some   living   beings’   proper  moral   status   is   undermined;   (ii)   that   creating   artificial   life   ex-­‐‑
presses  objectionable  attitudes  to  (or  valuations  of)  life  and  nature.  
   Consider  first  (i).  The  main  worries  are  (a)  that  our  creating  life  may  produce  a  con-­‐‑
ception  of  life  that  undermines  the  moral  status  of  living  things,  and  (b)  that  we  are  likely  to  
disregard   the   interests   of   living   beings   that  we  have   created   simply   because  we   are   their  
creators.  On  a  charitable  reading  the  arguments  are  presenting  various  scenarios  that  (they  
believe)   are   among   the  possible   consequences   of   creating   artificial   life,   and   that   are   to   be  
avoided.  The  most  plausible  direct  conclusion  would  be  to  demand  that  certain  safeguards  
be   put   in   place   to   avoid   these   scenarios,   such   as   ethics   education   and   continued   ethical  
evaluation  of  new  developments  (both  suggested  by  the  PCSBI  (2010,  pp.  134-­‐‑140)).  In  other  
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words,  a  charitable  reading  would  understand  these  as  arguments  for  conditional  accepta-­‐‑
bility.  And  the  reasons  for  this  are  specific  to  creating  life  –  it  is  the  fact  that  we  are  creating  
life  that  (according  to  the  objection)  may  lead  to  our  maltreatment  of  living  things  in  ways  
(a)  or   (b).   It   is  of   course   true   that  any   instance  of  dealing  with   living  beings   requires   that  
those  beings  be  treated  right.  But  that  is  not  the  claim  made  here;  instead,  the  claim  is  that  
the  practice  of  creating  life  may  result  in  our  treating  living  things  badly.  And  the  condition  
attached  to  acceptability  is  not  that  living  beings  in  fact  be  treated  right,  but  that  we  insti-­‐‑
tute  mechanisms  that  ensure  that  creating  life  will  not  have  those  results.  
   It  also  seems  that   the  best  version  of   (i)  would   take   issue  primarily  with   the  design  
aspect  of  artificiality.  The  fact  that  we  can  design  organisms  to  suit  our  every  desire  seems  
to  be  a  more  plausible  cause  of   the  undermining  of  moral  status  of   living  beings   than   the  
fact  that  we  can  fabricate  copies  of  existing  life  forms.  And  with  respect  to  the  artificial  or-­‐‑
ganisms   themselves,   a  plausible  worry   is   that   their   interests  will  not  be   considered   in   the  
design  process;  i.e.,  we  will  choose  traits  that  suit  ourselves,  but  not  the  created  organisms  
(as  is  arguably  already  the  case  for  many  agricultural  animals).  This  further  reveals  another  
facet  of  conditional  acceptability  –  namely  that  creating  artificial  life  is  acceptable  only  if  we  
adequately  consider  the  interests  of  created  organisms  when  doing  so.  
   Now   consider   (ii),   the   complaint   that   creating   artificial   life   expresses   objectionable  
attitudes  towards  life  or  nature.  DPS’  answer  to  this  objection  is  that  (a)  what  attitudes  are  
expressed  depends  on  the  internal  mental  states  of  the  creator,  and  (b)  not  every  instance  of  
creation  of  artificial  life  expresses  objectionable  attitudes.    
I  think  (a)  misses  the  point  of  the  objection.  An  expressivist  critic  can  argue  that  the  
attitudes   expressed   do   not   depend   on   internal  mental   states.   Rather,   actions   express   atti-­‐‑
   86  
tudes  by  revealing  them  –  attitudes  are  what  makes  sense  of  the  actions.3  In  our  case,  the  idea  
is  typically  that  creating  artificial  life  reveals  a  desire  to  develop  “an  expansive,  even  limit-­‐‑
less,  ability  to  shape  life  and  the  future”  (Baertschi,  2012,  p.  438),  which  is  inconsistent  with  
showing  “respect   towards  what  has   evolved,   instead  of   it   being  objectified,   instrumental-­‐‑
ized,  commodified,  subjected  and  manipulated”  (Swierstra  &  Rip,  2007,  p.  16).  Notice  that  it  
seems   to   be  design  more   than   fabrication   that   provides   the   basis   for   these   concerns.   Fur-­‐‑
thermore,  the  concerns  are  about  too  much  design,  which  explains  why  critics  do  not  object  
to  domestication,  but  do  object  to  synthetic  biology  (or,  more  often,  to  genetic  modification  
in  general).  
   Even   though  I   think   (a)   is   false,   (b)   is  plausibly   true.  Not  every   instance  of  creating  
artificial  life  will  plausibly  express  problematic  attitudes,  even  on  the  objection’s  own  terms.  
Proponents   of   the   expressivist   objection   typically  worry   about   one   of   two   things:   (1)   that  
new  technologies  are  replacements  for  natural  phenomena  (Lee  1999;  Preston  2008),  or  (2)  that  
new  technologies  attempt  to  solve  problems  (e.g.  environmental  problems)  by  utilizing  the  
same   control-­‐‑ideology   that   produced   those  problems   (Sandler,   2007,  Chapter   6).   In   either  
case,  some  instances  of  creating  life  plausibly  are  not  problematic.  In  the  case  of  (1),  it  seems  
that  only  ‘nature  replacing’  is  problematic.  Many  instances  of  creating  life  within  synthetic  
biology  would   leave  nature  untouched.  A  plausible  version  of   (1)  would  have  no  quarrel  
with  such  instances.4  
                                                                                                                        
3  This  is  a  very  basic  sketch  of  an  expressivist  view.  For  excellent  statements  of  expressivism  (in  this  
sense),   see  Anderson   (1993)   and  Anderson  &   Pildes   (2000).  Note   that  Anderson   and   Pildes   do   not  
defend  an  expressivist  critique  of  synthetic  biology  (or  other  technologies).    
4  It   should  perhaps  be  noted   that   the   specifics   of  why  modern  biotechnologies   are  nature   replacing  
leave   it  somewhat  murky  whether  every   instance  of  creating   life  would  be  nature  replacing.  See  Lee  
(1999)  and  Preston  (2013).      
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For  (2),  the  obvious  conclusion  seems  to  be  that  creating  life  is  conditionally  accepta-­‐‑
ble;   genetic  modification   technology   is   acceptable   so   long   as   it   is   supplemented   by   other  
strategies   for   solving   the   relevant  problem   (such  as  efforts   to   reduce  human  strain  on   the  
environment),  and  does  not  repeat  old  mistakes  of  overconfidence  and  recklessness.  In  this  
case,  the  reasons  for  conditional  acceptability  are  not  specific  to  creating  life,  but  applies  to  
all  ‘technological  fixes’.  However,  the  reasons  do  not  apply  to  dealing  with  life  in  general.  
  
4.2 Uncertainty 
The  uncertainty  objection,  as  DPS  describe  it,  says  that  creating  artificial  life  “involves  over-­‐‑
stepping  the  limits  of  human  knowledge,  thus  unwarrantedly  risking  unintended  negative  
consequences”  (Douglas  et  al.,  2013,  p.  390).  The  basic  worry,  then,  is  that  our  knowledge  of  
biological   systems   and   of   the   interactions   between   organisms   and   their   environment   (be  
that  an  ecosystem  or  a  human  body)   is   too   limited   for  us   to  successfully  predict  what   the  
effects  of  a  newly  created  organism  will  be  upon  that  environment.    
   DPS  have  a  very  general  response  to  the  objection,  namely  that  the  risk  posed  by  an  
organism  depends  on  its  non-­‐‑genealogical,  especially  causal,  properties,  and  not  on  the  way  
it  was  produced.  While  this  is  true,  it  does  not  address  the  connection  between  creating  –  in  
particular,  designing  –  new   life   forms  and  uncertainty.  The  objection   is   about   the   limit  of  
our   knowledge   of   biological   systems.   In   other  words,   it   is   about  whether  we   can   predict  
what  non-­‐‑genealogical,  causal  properties  the  life  forms  we  create  will  have.  The  problem  is  
supposed  to  be  that  we  do  not  know  enough  (a)  to  be  sure  that  each  new  organism-­‐‑type  is  
exactly  the  way  we  intend  it  to  be,  and/or  (b)  to  be  sure  that  it  will  not  have  harmful  effects  
on  the  environment  in  which  it  will  be  placed  (even  if  it  is  as  we  intend  it  to  be).    
   The  soundness  of  the  uncertainty  worry  will  depend  on  views  about  what  the  proper  
level  and  kind  of  evidence  for  safety  is.  But  supposing  that   it   is  sound,  the  most  plausible  
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conclusion  to  draw  from  it  is  not  wholesale  abandonment  of  synthetic  biology.  Rather,  the  
objection   supports   regulation  and  caution,   especially  with   the  aim  of  avoiding   interaction  
between  artificial  organisms  and  humans  or   the  environment  until  we  have  sufficient  evi-­‐‑
dence   that   they  are  harmless.   In  other  words,   conditional   acceptability   is   supported.  And  
the  reasons  for  conditional  acceptability  are  closely  connected  to  the  fact  that  we  are  creat-­‐‑
ing  life.  If  knowledge  of  type  (a)  is  what  is  lacking,  only  instances  of  designing  life  would  be  
problematic.  If  type  (b)  is  at  issue,  then  all  instances  of  releasing  designed  organisms  will  be  
problematic,  but  also  some  instances  of  placing  non-­‐‑designed  life  in  new  environments.  Full  
specificity  is  only  achieved  in  case  (a),  but  even  in  case  (b)  conditional  acceptability  does  not  
obtain  for  dealing  with  life  in  general.  
  
5. Conclusion 
I   hope   to   have   shown   above   that   attention   to   the   different   conceptions   of   artificial   life   is  
important  for  understanding  the  content  of  the  various  objections  that  have  been  raised  to  
creating  artificial  life,  and  that  the  aspect  of  design  grounds  prominent  objections.  Further-­‐‑
more,  I  have  argued  that  the  strongest  versions  of  these  prominent  objections  argue  for  the  
conditional  acceptability  of  creating  artificial  life.  I  have  not  here  argued  in  any  detail  for  or  
against  either  the  value-­‐‑of-­‐‑life  or  the  uncertainty  objections,  but  merely  shown  that  one  way  
of  dismissing  them  is  unsuccessful.  I  hope,  however,  to  have  shown  what  the  discussion  of  
these  objections  ought  to  be  about  if  it  is  to  be  fruitful,  namely  the  question  of  when  –  under  
what  conditions  –  it  is  acceptable  to  produce  artificial  life  forms.  
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In   debates   on   genetic  modification   (GM)1,   references   to   the   similarity   between   these   new  
technologies  and  existing,  well-­‐‑established  technologies  are  common.  For  example,  an  edi-­‐‑
torial  in  Scientific  American  arguing  against  labelling  of  GM  food  makes  the  following  claim:  
We  have  been  tinkering  with  our  food’s  DNA  since  the  dawn  of  agriculture.  By  
selectively  breeding  plants  and  animals  with  the  most  desirable  traits,  our  pre-­‐‑
decessors   transformed   organisms’   genomes,   turning   a   scraggly   grass   into  
plump-­‐‑kerneled  corn,  for  example  (Labels  for  GMO  Foods,  2013)  
I  will   refer   to   this  basic  claim  –   that  GM  is   in   fact   similar   (in  some  relevant   respect)   to  an  
established  technology  –  as  a  similarity  claim.  Often,  as  in  this  case,  the  specific  import  of  the  
similarity   claim   is   not  made   explicit,   although   it   is   clear   from   the   context   that   the   fact   is  
supposed  to  play  some  part  in  defending  GM  from  critics.  I  will  refer  to  the  use  of  similarity  
claims  to  defend  GM  as  a  similarity  argument.  Similarity  arguments  are  ubiquitous.  Tsjalling  
Swierstra  and  Arie  Rip   (2007,  p.  9)   identify   it  as  a  common  “trope”  of  debates  about  new  
and  emerging  technologies.   In  a  study  using  facilitated  discussions  between  scientists  and  
non-­‐‑scientists  on  GE  (and  in  particular  the  common  objection  that  GE  is  unnatural),  at  least  
                                                                                                                        
1  By  ’genetic  modification’  I  mean  technologies  that  directly  alter  the  genomes  of  organisms,  such  as  
transgenesis,  genome  editing  and  synthetic  biology.  Several  ’borderline’  technologies  could  be  includ-­‐‑
ed,   e.g.  mutagenesis   and  protoplast   fusion.   These   are   rarely   discussed,   and   I  will   not   say   anything  
specific  about  them  in  the  paper.   I  am  mainly  concerned  with  the  debate  concerning  GM  applied  to  
plants  and  microorganisms,  but   I  presume  similarity  claims  and  arguments  occur   in   the  case  of  hu-­‐‑
man-­‐‑  and  animal  GM  as  well  –  and  indeed  in  many  other  fields  of  applied  ethics.  
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three  of  the  five  scientists  used  the  similarity  claim  as  their  basic  argument  (Deckers,  2005).  
And  Jonathan  Pugh  (2015a)  describes  it  as  “the  standard  response”  to  the  so-­‐‑called  playing  
God  objection.2    
Despite  its  ubiquity,  it  is  less  than  clear  what  the  precise  content  of  the  argument  –  its  
premises  and  conclusion  –   is   supposed   to  be.  Pugh  gives   this   concise   statement  of   the  ar-­‐‑
gument:  “Humans  have  been  selectively  breeding  both  plants  and  animals  for  hundreds  of  
years,  and  this  can  be  viewed  as  an  indirect  form  of  genetic  modification  that  we  do  not  find  
morally   problematic”   (Pugh   2015a).   It   seems   that   the   fact   that   we   do   not   find   selective  
breeding  morally  problematic,  even  though   it,   too,   is  a   form  of  genetic  modification,   is  an  
important  premise.  Nils  Holtug  suggests  the  same  when  he  argues  that  any  sense  of  ‘natu-­‐‑
ral’  that  is  to  function  as  an  objection  to  GM  based  on  its  being  unnatural  “should  not  apply  
to  the  intentional  genetic  modification  of  organisms  through  selective  breeding  (since  even  
proponents  of  the  …  objection  want  to  allow  this  technology)”  (Holtug,  2009,  p.  237).  Swier-­‐‑
stra  and  Rip  suggest  that  the  similarity  argument  is  a  kind  of  argument  from  precedent:  “If  
we  see  these  earlier  technologies  as  being  in  accordance  with  our  present  moral  intuitions,  
we  should  now  be  consistent  and  see  the  new  technologies  as  similarly  acceptable”  (Swier-­‐‑
stra  &  Rip,  2007,  p.  9).  R.  Paul  Thompson  similarly  argues  that  “[v]ilifying  this  or  that  do-­‐‑
main  of  science  and  technology  (GM  agriculture,  for  example)  while  accepting  the  benefits  
in  another  domain  (GM  medicine,  for  example)  is  …  inconsistent”  (Thompson,  2011,  p.  110).    
Similarity  arguments,   then,  are   simultaneously  ubiquitous,  prima   facie  plausible  and  
somewhat   unclear.   My   aim   in   this   paper   is   to   provide   some   clarity.   My   strategy   is   to  
(re)construct  an  argument,  containing  premises  and  a  conclusion,  based  on  the  claims  made  
in   the  quotes   in   the  preceding  sections.   I   suggest   that  we  can  distinguish  between  a  weak  
and  a  strong  version  of  this  argument,  depending  on  what  the  conclusion  is  supposed  to  be.  
                                                                                                                        
2  In  a  different  version  of  the  same  article  (Pugh,  2015b),  it  is  described  merely  as  ”familiar”.  
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I  then  evaluate  the  argument’s  persuasiveness.  My  aim  is  not  to  refute  or  even  criticize  the  
argument,  but  rather  to  show  which  parts  of  the  argumentative  space  the  argument  closes  
off  to  the  GM  critic  and  which  it  does  not  –  that  is,  what  kinds  of  objection  to  GM  similarity  
arguments  are  effective  against  and  what  kinds  they  are  not  effective  against.  I  then  apply  
this  analysis  to  two  specific  instances  on  the  similarity  argument  found  in  the  GM  literature.  
  
2. Similarity Arguments 
When   talking   about   similarity   arguments,  we   can  make   a   distinction   between   specific   in-­‐‑
stances  and  a  generic  argument  (or  argument  structure).  A  specific  instance  of  the  similarity  
argument  includes  reference  to  a  particular  objection  to  GM  and  to  a  particular  existing  tech-­‐‑
nology.   In   the  previous   section,  we  have  mainly   seen   similarity   arguments  directed   at   so-­‐‑
called  intrinsic  objections,  i.e.  objections  according  to  which  there  is  something  problematic  
in  the  very  fact  of  modifying  organisms  directly.  These  include  complaints  that  GM  is  un-­‐‑
natural,   that   it   constitutes   our   ‘playing   God’,   that   it   commodifies   or   otherwise   degrades  
living  beings,  or  that  it  is  an  expression  of  an  objectionable  attitude  of  domination  over  na-­‐‑
ture  –  as  well  as  brute  complaints  that  genetic  modification  is  simply  wrong.  Less  frequent-­‐‑
ly,   similarity  arguments  are  used  against  other  objections,   such  as   that  GM  creates   risk   to  
human   health   and   the   environment,   or   even   that  GM   leads   to   a   concentration   of  market  
power.  In  this  paper,  however,  I  focus  on  the  intrinsic  objections  since  these  are  by  far  the  
most  common  targets  of  similarity  arguments.  
   Besides  a  particular  objection,  a  specific  similarity  argument  also   invokes  some  par-­‐‑
ticular  technology  with  which  GM  is  compared.  The  most  frequently  used  technologies  are  
technologies  whereby  we   also   alter   organisms   on   the   genomic   level,   i.e.   everything   from  
early  domestication   through   scientific   breeding   and  hybridization.  Another   popular   com-­‐‑
parison   is  medicine,  both   taken  as   the  general  practice  of  healing   the  sick  and  combatting  
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disease,   and   GM   technologies   in   medical   applications   (e.g.   the   production   of   insulin   in  
modified  bacteria).  What  technology  is  used  obviously  depends  on  the  objection  to  GM  that  
the   similarity   argument   targets.   The   comparison   technology   must   share   the   feature   that  
grounds   the  objection.  Thus  medicine  as  a  general  practice   is   typically   invoked   to  combat  
objections   based   on  GM   being   unnatural,  while   scientific   breeding   and   hybridization   are  
used  to  counter  objections  based  on  objectionable  attitudes  to  life  or  nature.  
In  this  paper  I  will  focus  on  two  similarity  arguments.  The  first  argument  is  directed  
at  the  unnaturalness  objection  as  it  is  commonly  expressed  by  members  of  the  general  pub-­‐‑
lic.   Similarity   arguments   using   both   medicine   and   non-­‐‑GM   agriculture   has   been   used  
against  this  objection.  The  second  is  a  different  variety  of  the  unnaturalness  objection,  which  
is   mostly   found   among   philosophical   critics   of   GM.   This   strand   of   objection   is   typically  
based  on  the  claim  that  GM  turns  organisms  into  or  treats  organisms  as  artefacts.  The  rele-­‐‑
vant   comparison   technologies   are   those   by   which   humans   have   previously   changed   the  
genomic  make-­‐‑up  of  organisms,  such  as  domestication/cultivation  and  scientific  breeding.    
   In   the   remainder   of   this   section   and   in   the  next   section,   I  will   focus   on   the   generic  
similarity  argument.  The  generic  similarity  argument  is  the  general  argument  structure  that  
specific   similarity  arguments  exemplify.   It  has   two  open  variables,  namely   the   two   things  
just  discussed:   the  established   technology   that  GM  is   similar   to   (call   it  T)  and   the   feature,  
used  by  the  GM  critic  as  a  basis  for  her  objection,  with  respect  to  which  the  two  technologies  
are  similar  (call  it  F).  The  generic  argument  consists  in  two  premises  and  a  conclusion.  The  
first  premise  is  the  basic  similarity  claim  
(1)  F  is  a  feature  of  T  as  well  as  of  GM  
The  second  premise  is   that  the  T  in  question  is  not  morally  problematic.  There  are  several  
different  ways  of   framing  this.  Pugh  argues  that  selective  breeding  is  “an  indirect   form  of  
genetic  modification   that  we  do  not   find  morally  problematic”;  Holtug   stresses   that   even  
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those  who  object  to  GM  “want  to  allow”  selective  breeding;  Swierstra  &  Rip  describes  the  
claim  as  being  that  T  is  “in  accordance  with  our  present  moral  intuitions”;  and  Thompson  
focuses  on  the  fact  that  critics  “accept  the  benefits”  of  GM  in  medicine.  I  will  abstract  from  
these  differences  in  framing  and  state  the  premise  as  
(2)  T  is  not  morally  problematic    
  
Finally,   the  conclusion  of   the  argument   is   that   the  objection   to  GM  based  on  F   is   in  
some  way  in  trouble  due  to  (1)  and  (2).  In  many  cases,  especially  in  public  debate,  the  pre-­‐‑
cise  content  of  the  conclusion  is  not  made  explicit  –  (1)  and  (2)  are  simply  put  forward  as  a  
rejoinder  to  the  F-­‐‑based  objection.  The  examples  cited  from  the  philosophical  literature  give  
differing  conclusions  as  well.  Swierstra  &  Rip  interpret  similarity  arguments  as  drawing  the  
conclusion   that   “we   should   …   now   see   the   new   technologies   as   similarly   acceptable”  
(Swierstra  &  Rip,  2007,  p.  9);  Pugh  introduces  his  similarity  argument  to  exemplify  why  the  
playing  God  objection   is   “not  persuasive”   (Pugh  2005a);   Thompson  argues   that   the   argu-­‐‑
ment  shows  the  critic  to  be  “inconsistent”  (Thompson,  2011,  p.  110);  and  Holtug  claims  that  
it  is  one  among  several  “requirements”  of  any  naturalness  based  objection  that  the  sense  of  
‘natural’  used  does  not  apply  to  selective  breeding  (Holtug,  2009,  p.  237).  Roughly  speaking,  
we  can  distinguish  between  a  weak  and  a  strong  conclusion.  According  to  the  weak  conclu-­‐‑
sion,  the  GM  critic  owes  an  explanation  for  why  F  is  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problem-­‐‑
atic  when   it   is  not   such  a   reason   in   the  case  of  T.  According   to   the   strong  conclusion,   the  
critic’s   objection   is   simply   refuted   by   the   similarity   argument.   That   is,   the   argument   has  
shown  that  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic.  We  can  state  these  two  con-­‐‑
clusions  as  follows:  
The  weak  conclusion  (WC):  So  the  GM  critic  owes  an  explanation  of  why  F  is  a  reason  to  
find  GM  morally  problematic,  but  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic  
   97  
The  strong  conclusion  (SC):  So  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic  
  
   It  is  worth  noting  that  the  generic  similarity  argument  is  my  reconstruction  of  a  pat-­‐‑
tern   of   argument   that   is   ubiquitous   in   the  debate   on  GM,   but  whose  precise   content   and  
import  is  often,  if  not  always,  left  unclear.  The  procedure  I  am  using  is  thus  somewhat  dif-­‐‑
ferent  from  what  many  might  think  is  ‘best  practice’  in  philosophy,  namely  finding  the  best  
and  most  well-­‐‑developed  instance  of  a  view  or  an  argument  and  criticising  that.   I  diverge  
from  that  practice  because  for  two  reasons.  First,   the  similarity  arguments  that  are  ubiqui-­‐‑
tous  in  the  GM  literature  are  of  the  vague  and  somewhat  hasty  style  I  have  described  above,  
and  very   few   (if   any)   thoroughly  worked-­‐‑out  versions   exist.  The   combination  of  ubiquity  
and  vagueness  suggests  to  me  that  clarification  is  called  for.  Second,  my  aim  is  not  to  argue  
that   similarity   arguments   are   bad   arguments,   but   to   investigate   how   effective   they   are  
against  common  objections  to  GM.  Consequently,  I  do  not  believe  that  I  am  criticisable  for  
arguing  against  a  straw  man,  or  of  criticising  an  argument  that  I  have  simply  made  up.3  
  
3. Evaluating the generic similarity argument 
I  have  argued  that  we  can  make  a  distinction  between  a  weak  and  a  strong  version  of  the  
generic  similarity  argument.  Either  version  is  a  reply  to  an  objection  to  GM  of  the  form  “F  is  
a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic”.  The  weak  argument  is  as  follows:  
(1)  F  is  a  feature  of  T  as  well  as  of  GM  
(2)  T  is  not  morally  problematic    
(WC):   So   the  GM  critic   owes   an   explanation  of  why  F   is   a   reason   to   find  GM  morally  
problematic,  but  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic  
                                                                                                                        
3  Thanks   to   Julian   Savulescu   and   an   anonymous   reviewer   for   Ethical   Theory   and  Moral   Practice   for  
pressing  me  to  clarify  this.  
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The  strong  argument  substitutes  (SC)  for  (WC),  yielding:  
(1)  F  is  a  feature  of  T  as  well  as  of  GM  
(2)  T  is  not  morally  problematic    
(SC):  So  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic  
  
In  this  section,  I  critically  evaluate  these  generic  arguments.  I  argue  that  there  are  two  ‘gaps’  
between  the  two  premises  and  the  conclusion(s),  and  suggest  how  these  gaps  may  be  filled.  
I  will  further  argue  that  there  is  a  clear  risk  of  fallacies  of  equivocation  with  respect  to  what  
is  meant  by  ‘morally  problematic’  and  what  the  feature,  F,  that  grounds  the  objection  to  GM  
is.    
  
3.1 The first gap: From all-things-considered judgments to pro tanto reasons 
The  first  gap  concerns  a  discrepancy  between  how  (2)  is  formulated  and  how  (WC)  and  (SC)  
are   formulated.  According   to   (2),  T   is  not  morally  problematic,  while   (WC)  and   (SC)  both  
make  reference  to  the  claim  that  F  is  not  a  reason  to  object  to  GM.  In  order  for  the  argument  
to  work,  we  need  the  claim  
(3)  F  is  not  a  reason  to  object  to  T  
There   are   three  possible  ways  of  getting   to   (3).   First,  we   can  attempt   to   infer   (3)   from   (2).  
Second,  we  can  argue  that  the  relevant  critic  of  GM  accepts  (3)  rather  than  merely  (2).  And  
third,  we  can  reframe  the  similarity  argument  and  substitute  (3)  for  (2)  as  a  premise.  
   Consider  the  first  option.  Inferring  (3)  from  (2)  would  require  defending  the  claim  
(4)  If  T  is  not  morally  problematic,  then  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic.    
As  a  general  principle,   (4)   fails   since   it  does  not   acknowledge   the  distinction  between  pro  
tanto  reasons  and  all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered  judgments.  This  distinction  is  a  familiar  one.  A  pro  
tanto  reason  is  a  consideration  that  counts  in  favour  of  (or  against)  a  particular  conclusion.  
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But  there  may  be  other  considerations  that  provide  reasons  for  the  opposite  conclusion.  All-­‐‑
things-­‐‑considered  judgments  are  the  result  of  weighing  up  all  the  pro  tanto  reasons  that  pull  
in  different  directions.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  judgment  that  a  given  pro  tanto  reason  
favours  is  also  the  judgment  that  is  the  all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered  right  one.  For  example,  even  if  
using  GM  entails  some  risk  of  harm  to  health  or  the  environment,  the  benefits  of  the  tech-­‐‑
nology  may  be  sufficient  to  outweigh  this  bad  aspect.  Consequently,  we  cannot  infer  from  
the   fact   that   the   judgment   recommended   by   a   pro   tanto   reason   is   not   the   all-­‐‑things-­‐‑
considered  right  one  that  the  pro  tanto  reason  does  not  hold.  So  (4)  is  not  true  as  a  general  
rule.  But  (3)  could  still  be  inferred  from  (2)  in  a  specific  case  if  either  of  two  conditions  are  
met:  (a)  F  is  not  a  pro  tanto  reason  only,  but  rather  a  sufficient  reason;  (b)  T  does  not  have  any  
other   feature   (or   set   of   features)   that   provides   a   reason   for   judging   that   T   is  not  morally  
problematic   (or   any   such   reason   is   or  would   be  weaker   than   F,   and  would   thus   be   out-­‐‑
weighed  by  F).  
   Consider  first  (a),  that  F  is  a  sufficient  reason  rather  than  merely  a  pro  tanto  reason.  A  
sufficient  reason  is  (as  the  name  suggests)  a  reason  that  is  in  itself  sufficient  for  securing  the  
judgment.  Sufficient  reasons  are  typically  associated  with  fairly  strong  forms  of  deontology  
that  issue  exceptionless  prohibitions  against  performing  actions  with  certain  properties  (e.g.  
actions  that  are  lies,  or  the  killing  of  a  person,  or  a  violation  of  rights).  For  objections  to  GM  
that  rely  on  such  absolutist  views  –  i.e.  views  according  to  which  anything  that  has  the  fea-­‐‑
ture  F  is  all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered  morally  problematic  merely  in  virtue  of  having  F  –  (3)  follows  
from  (2),  and  thus  the  first  gap  in  the  generic  similarity  argument  is  filled.  Although  I  sus-­‐‑
pect  at   least  some  critics  do  rely  on  absolutist  views,  not  everyone  does.   In  many  cases,   it  
will  be  a  matter  of  interpretation  whether  the  GM  critic  in  question  takes  F  to  provide  a  pro  
tanto  or  a  sufficient  reason  for  finding  GM  morally  problematic.  In  a  subset  of  these,  there  is  
no  concrete  critic  at  all,  since  the  similarity  argument  is  used  to  counter  abstracted  versions  
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of  common  objections.  I  will  take  up  the  question  of  how  we  should  interpret  objections  to  
GM  in  the  final  section  of  the  paper  
   Now  consider  (b).  Even  if  F  is  only  a  pro  tanto  reason,  the  judgment  that  T  is  morally  
problematic  would  still  follow  if  there  were  no  stronger  reason  on  the  other  side.  For  many  
of  the  established  technologies  used  in  common  similarity  arguments,  such  as  medicine  or  
domestication  and  cultivation  –   there  clearly  are  strong  reasons  against   the   judgment   that  
they   are   all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered   morally   problematic,   such   as   the   large   benefits   to   human  
welfare  these  practices  entail  or  have  made  possible.  The  best  case  for  making  an  inference  
of  type  (b)  would  be  to  invoke  a  comparison  technology  or  practice  that  offers  no  benefits,  
but  still  has   the   feature  F.   It   is,  of  course,  a  common  strategy   in  applied  ethics   to   imagine  
cases  where  a   feature  of   interest   is   ‘isolated’   in   this  way  and  elicit   intuitions  about   it.  But  
similarity  arguments  are  not  arguments  that  use  hypothetical  cases,  but  arguments  that  use  
actual  and  well-­‐‑established  technologies  –  and  much  of  their  prima  facie  persuasiveness  re-­‐‑
lies  on  this  fact.  I  doubt,  for  that  reason,  that  the  (b)-­‐‑strategy  for  inferring  (3)  from  (2)  would  
be   successful   for   any   actual   similarity   argument.   But   of   course,   if   a   concrete   critic   of  GM  
holds  that  the  relevant  T  possesses  no  or  too  few  features  that  provide  reasons  in  favour  of  
it,  (3)  would  be  established.  
   I  now  return   to   the   two  other  ways  of  getting   (3),  besides   inferring   it   from   (2).  The  
first  of  these  is  to  argue  that  the  relevant  GM  critic  actually  holds  (3)  rather  than  merely  (2)  –  
that   is,   that   she   already   believes   that   F   is   not   a   reason   to   find   GM  morally   problematic.  
Whether  this  is  the  case  will  depend  on  the  concrete  critic  in  question,  and  again  the  issue  of  
interpretation  arises.  But   the   fact   is   that   if   the  critic  actually  holds   (3),   the   first  gap  disap-­‐‑
pears.  
The  final  possibility  is  to  reformulate  the  similarity  argument  by  substituting  (3)  for  
(2),  and  hence  to  make  the  claim  that  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic  a  prem-­‐‑
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ise  in  the  argument.  This  does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  the  best  interpretation  of  the  examples  
of  similarity  arguments  from  philosophers  given  above,  but  it  may  be  a  plausible  interpreta-­‐‑
tion  of  many  uses  of  similarity  arguments  in  public  debate.  There  is  certainly  no  in-­‐‑principle  
reason   why   similarity   arguments   could   not   be   framed   in   this   way.   If   they   are,   they   are  
strengthened  in  the  sense  that  the  first  gap  never  opens  up.  However,  this  comes  at  a  price,  
since   the   intuition   that   a   certain   well-­‐‑established   technology   is   not   all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered  
morally  objectionable   is   typically  very   strong,  while   the   intuition   that   a   certain   feature  of  
such  a  technology  does  not  provide  a  pro  tanto  reason  for  finding  it  morally  problematic  is  
less  strong.  Still,   it  seems  plausible  that  many  have  the  intuition  that,  for  example,  the  fact  
that  domesticated  plants  and  animals  are  genetically  altered  relative  to  their  wild  ancestors  
does  not  provide  even  a  pro  tanto  reason  to  object  morally  to  the  practice  of  domestication.  
  
3.2 Second gap: Transferability of reasons 
Suppose  that  we  accept  that  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic,  i.e.  that  (3)  has  
been  established.  There  is  now  a  second  gap  between  (3)  and  the  conclusions  
(WC):   So   the  GM  critic   owes   an   explanation  of  why  F   is   a   reason   to   find  GM  morally  
problematic,  but  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic  
and  
(SC):  So  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic  
In  both  conclusions,  the  assumption  is  that  there  is  some  demand  that,  if  you  judge  F  to  be  a  
reason  in  one  case,  you  ought  also  judge  it  to  be  a  reason  in  the  other  case.  Let  me  first  con-­‐‑
sider  the  strong  conclusion  (SC).  Here,  we  need  some  way  of  getting  from  the  fact  that  F  is  
not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic   to   the  conclusion  that  F   is  not  a  reason  to   find  
GM  morally  problematic,  i.e.  from  (3)  to  (SC).  Unlike  what  was  the  case  with  respect  to  the  
first   gap,  we   cannot   even  hope   to   find   textual   evidence   that   the   critic   in  question  accepts  
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(SC),  except  in  cases  where  the  critic  blatantly  contradicts  herself.  Neither  can  we  rely  on  a  
direct  intuition  that  (SC)  is  true,  at  least  without  making  the  similarity  argument  redundant.  
So  we  are  left  with  the  option  of  inferring  (SC)  from  (3).  Doing  so  would  require  defending  
the  claim  
(5)  If  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic,  then  F  is  not  a  reason  to  find  GM  
morally  problematic  
In  other  words,  we  must  be  able  to  transfer  the  reason-­‐‑giving  force  of  F  from  the  case  of  T  to  
the  case  of  GM  
Transferability  as  a  general  principle  has  come  under  attack  by  those  attracted  to  par-­‐‑
ticularism  in  ethics.  A  prominent  example   is   Jonathan  Dancy,  who  criticizes  what  he  calls  
“switching  arguments”:  
A  switching  argument  is  an  attempt  to  determine  what  to  say  here  by  appeal  to  
what  we  say  about  something  else  …  The  particularist  supposes  that  all  these  
argument  forms  are  attempts  to  force  us  into  a  view  of  the  present  case  by  ap-­‐‑
peal   to   some   feature   of   another   case,   or   some   comparison   between   this   case  
and  that.  And  the  response  to  moves  of  that  sort  is  invariably  sceptical;  they  all  
attempt  to  pre-­‐‑empt  the  authority  of  the  present  case  (Dancy,  1993,  p.  64-­‐‑65).    
It  should  be  noted  here  that  Dancy  allows  that  “our  judgment  can  be  enlightened  by  a  com-­‐‑
parison  between  a  new  case  and  others   in  our  experience”.  What  he  objects   to   is   the   idea  
that  there  is  a  rational  demand  to  conform  our  judgments  about  one  case  to  our  judgment  in  
another.  
Counting  in  favour  of  transferability  is  the  fact  that  the  use  of  data  from  one  case  to  
draw   conclusions   about   another   case   is   very   widespread   in   practical   reasoning.   Conse-­‐‑
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quently,  rejecting  its  validity  is  would  place  us  in  a  situation  of  near  paralysis  with  respect  
to  our  ability  to  make  decisions  based  on  reasons  and  reasoning.  Thus  Simon  Blackburn:  
  [A]  great  deal  of  ethical   thought  …  concerns  how  to  act.  But  such  thought   is  
essentially  a  matter  of  selecting  and  weighing  features  that  recur  from  one  sit-­‐‑
uation   to   another.   In   trying   to  discover  what   to  do,  we   imagine  different   ac-­‐‑
tions,   and   register   their   good   and   bad   features.   It   is   essential   to   this   process  
that   that   these   features  are  reliably  extracted  from  any  contexts  or   total  situa-­‐‑
tions  in  which  we  have  come  across  them,  and  carry  some  moral  import  when  
transplanted   into   the  new  hypothetical   situation  …  If   these   features   lost   their  
moral   import   just  as  soon  as   they  were  abstracted   from  other  cases,   in  which  
they  had  been  marinaded  with  others  to  give  some  holistic  moral  gestalt,   this  
process  would  be  totally  unjustified  (Blackburn,  1996,  p.  97)    
I  think  Blackburn  is  right  in  pointing  out  the  potentially  far-­‐‑reaching  implications  of  deny-­‐‑
ing   transferability.   Furthermore,   as   Blackburn   suggests,   denying   transferability   conflicts  
with   the  phenomenology  of   ethical   thinking.  We  do   in   fact   take   the   things   that  matter   to  
matter  generally.  And  we  do  come  to  judgments  about  new  cases  using  reasons  judgments  
that  we  accept  antecedently,  rather  than  simply  look  at  the  case  and  directly  intuit  a   judg-­‐‑
ment.   Any   limitations   to   the   transferability   of   reasons   should   leave   our   ability   to   reason  
about  cases  using  beliefs  about  reasons  with  general  scope  intact.  
Interestingly,   there   is   a  weaker  version  of   the  worry   expressed  by  Dancy   that  does  
exactly   that.  On   this   view,   reasons   should   be   understood   as   defaults   (Horty,   2007;  Horty,  
2012).  A  default  is  here  understood  as  a  consideration  that  supports  a  judgment,  but  which  
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may  be  outweighed  (as  above)  or  excluded  altogether  by  other  considerations.4  It  is  this  latter  
option  that  creates  a  problem  for  transferability,  since  a  default  that  is  not  excluded  in  one  
case   may   nevertheless   be   excluded   in   another   case.   The   difference   between   being   out-­‐‑
weighed   and   being   excluded   is   that   an   outweighed   reason   still   retains   its   reason-­‐‑giving  
force,  whereas   an   excluded   reason  does  not.   For   example,   the   fact   that   an   action   of  mine  
puts  you  in  some  danger  of  harm  –  say,  I  try  to  knock  a  can  of  soda  out  of  your  hand  with  a  
baseball  –  is  a  reason  not  to  perform  that  action.  But  the  fact  that  you  consented  to  my  per-­‐‑
forming  the  action  –  say,  you  dared  me  to  try  to  knock  the  can  out  of  your  hand  –  removes  
the  reason-­‐‑giving  force  of  hurting  you  altogether.  And  this  is  different  from  the  case  where  
there  were  merely  strong  counterweighing  reasons  for  trying  to  knock  the  can  out  of  your  
hand  –  say,  that  it  was  attracting  wasps  that  threatened  to  sting  you.  Here,  the  possibility  of  
hurting  you  with  the  baseball  still  retains  some  reason-­‐‑giving  force,  as  witnessed  by  the  fact  
that  I  would  be  obliged  to  apologise  if  you  were  in  fact  to  get  hurt.    
So  if  a  feature  is  a  reason  for  some  judgment  in  one  case,  it  may  nevertheless  not  be  a  
reason   for   that   same   judgment   in   another   case   –   if   it   is   excluded   in   the   latter   case.   This  
means  that  we  can  alleviate  Blackburn’s  worry  that  reason-­‐‑giving  features  lose  their  reason-­‐‑
giving  force  as  soon  as  they  are  abstracted  from  the  case  in  which  we  originally  found  them  
to  have  moral   import,  but  keep   the  possibility  open   that   the   reason-­‐‑giving   force  does  not  
transfer  to  this  particular  new  case.  In  the  standard  case,  we  have  established  that  some  con-­‐‑
sideration  is  a  default  reason  and  then  attempt  to  show  (or  disprove)  that  the  default  reason  
holds  in  some  particular  case.  In  the  case  of  the  similarity  argument,  the  situation  is  slightly  
                                                                                                                        
4  Or  more  precisely,  other  considerations  may  provide  a  reason  to   judge   that   the  original  considera-­‐‑
tion  is  not,  after  all,  a  reason  for  the  original  judgment.  The  notion  of  exclusion  (and  enabling)  that  is  
the  basis  of  the  default  view  also  constitutes  Dancy’s  grounds  for  defending  particularism.  It   is  thus  
plausible   to   take   the  default  view   to   capture  all   the  worries   about   transferability   that  Dancy’s  view  
does.  
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different.  The  claim  in  (5)  is  that  F  is  not  a  reason  in  the  case  of  T,  and  that  this  lack  of  reason-­‐‑
giving  force  transfers  to  the  GM  case.  So  in  order  to  be  able  to  infer  (SC)  from  (3),  the  pro-­‐‑
ponent   of   the   similarity   argument  would   have   to  make   the   case   that   the   lack   of   reason-­‐‑
giving  force  of  F  in  the  case  of  T  is  not  due  to  its  merely  being  excluded  in  that  case.  Fur-­‐‑
thermore,  the  SA  must  make  the  case  that  there  are  no  special  enabling  considerations  in  the  
case  of  GM  that  endows  F  with  reason  giving  force  in  this  case  although  it  has  no  such  force  
normally.5  Unless  the  proponent  argues  for  these,  (SC)  has  not  been  shown  to  be  true  –  there  
remains  space  for   the  GM  critic   to  hold  a  view  whereby  F   is  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  
problematic,  but  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic.  
This  brings  me   to   the  weak  conclusion   (WC),   that   the   critic  owes  an  explanation  of  
why  F  is  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic,  but  not  a  reason  to  find  T  morally  prob-­‐‑
lematic.  The  discussion  above  shows  how  the  critic  may  come  up  with  such  an  explanation.  
The  difference  can  be  justified  either  by  showing  that  there  are  enabling  considerations  that  
make  F  a  reason  in  the  GM  case,  or  that  there  are  excluding  considerations  that  remove  the  
reason-­‐‑giving  force  in  the  case  of  T.  A  lot  now  hinges  on  what  we  mean  by  the  claim  that  
the  critic  “owes  an  explanation”.  There  is  a  spectrum  of  progressively  stronger  claims  here.  
The  mildest   claim  would  merely  be   that   it  would   improve   the  critic’s  view   if   she  were   to  
present  an  explanation  of  the  seeming  inconsistency.  The  strongest  claim  would  be  that  the  
similarity  argument  has  established  a  presumption  in  favour  of  the  strong  conclusion  that  F  
is  not  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic.  If  the  mild  form  of  (WC)  is  what  is  meant,  it  
is   fairly  uncontroversial   that   (WC)   follows   from   (3).   The   strongest   version,   that   there   is   a  
presumption   in  favour  of   (SC),  on  the  other  hand,  seems  to  me  to  require  at   least   that   the  
                                                                                                                        
5  The   relation   between   excluding   considerations   and   enabling   considerations   is   unclear   –   they  may  
simply  be  different  ways  of  describing  the  same  thing.  My  sense  is  that  the  main  difference  between  
considerations   that   are  most   aptly  described  as   excluders   and  enablers,   respectively,   is  whether   the  
situations  they  point  to  can  be  described  as  ’standard  conditions’  or  the  ’normal’  state  of  affairs.  
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proponent   of   the   similarity   argument   considers   some   possible   contextual   differences   be-­‐‑
tween  the  cases  –  i.e.  considers  what  possible  exclusionary  or  enabling  considerations  may  
exist.  But  generally,  the  question  of  when  a  presumption  in  favour  of  a  certain  claim  exists  
or  has  been  established  is  underexplored  in  ethics,  and  I  offer  no  theory  of  it  here.  
  
3.3 Equivocations  
The  third  and  final  potential  issue  with  the  similarity  argument  concerns  possible  equivoca-­‐‑
tions  in  premises  (1)  and  (2).  In  (1)  the  F  that  is  a  feature  T  may  not  be  the  same  as  the  F  that  
GM  critics  take  to  be  a  reason  finding  GM  morally  problematic.  In  (2),  the  sense  in  which  T  
is  not  morally  problematic  may  not  be   the   sense   in  which  GM   is   supposed   to  be  morally  
problematic.  
   There  are  three  particular  issues  that  the  proponent  of  the  similarity  argument  should  
be  aware  of.  First  of  all,  the  meaning  of  ‘morally  problematic’  is  not  as  obvious  as  one  might  
be   tempted  to   think.  Commonly,  no  precise  meaning  of   ‘morally  problematic’   is  stated  by  
the  critic,  especially  where  the  critic  is  a  layperson  (or,  of  course,  where  the  critic  is  merely  
imagined).  The  sense  of  ‘morally  problematic’  that  is  typically  understood  by  proponents  of  
the  similarity  argument  is  ‘morally  unacceptable’.  But  there  are  at  least  two  possible  weaker  
senses.   First,   ‘morally   problematic’   may  mean   ‘pro   tanto   morally   problematic’   (similar   to  
W.D.   Ross’   notion   of   a   prima   facie  duty).   This   sense   is   very   closely   related   to  what   I   dis-­‐‑
cussed  above  under  the  heading  of  pro  tanto  reasons.  There  is  only  little  difference  (if  any)  
between   saying   that   F   is   a   pro   tanto   reason   to   judge   that  GM   is  morally   problematic   (all-­‐‑  
things-­‐‑considered),   and   saying   that   F   is   a   sufficient   reason   to   judge   that   GM   is   pro   tanto  
morally  problematic.  So  in  effect,  this  possibility  reduces  to  the  possibility  that  F  is  merely  a  
pro  tanto  reason.  The  second  weaker  sense  of   ‘morally  problematic’   is   ‘not  unconditionally  
morally  acceptable’  –  or,  more  colloquially  (though  less  precisely)  ‘conditionally  acceptable’.  
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The  conditions   referred   to  could  be  various   regulatory  mechanisms,   such  as   safety  guide-­‐‑
lines   or   oversight  measures;   they   could   be   social   or   economic   background   conditions;   or  
they  could  simply  be   the  existence  of  sufficiently  strong  reasons   to  engage   in   the  relevant  
application  of  GM.  There  is  some  evidence  that  public  attitudes  to  GM  are  well  captured  by  
the  notion  of  conditional  acceptability  (Marris  et  al.,  2001).    
   The  second  issue  concerns  F.  Setting  aside  the  possibility  of  gross  misinterpretations  
of  objections,  equivocations  on  F  can  occur  if  the  specific  sense  of  F  that  the  GM  critic  sug-­‐‑
gests  is  a  reason  to  find  GM  morally  problematic  (call  it  FGM)  is  a  species  of  the  more  general  
kind  F.  So  while  it  is  true  that  F,  in  some  sense,  holds  for  T,  FGM  does  not.  For  example,  the  
feature  ‘that  X  constitutes  the  rearranging  of  naturally  occurring  materials’  is  very  general.  
It   is   probable   that   the  GM   critic   has   something  more   specific   in  mind   –   say,   rearranging  
naturally   occurring  materials   in   a   certain  way,   or   rearranging   a   certain   kind   of   naturally  
occurring  materials.  Once  more,  careful  interpretation  of  critics’  claims  is  needed.  
   The  third  issue  is  related  to  the  second.  Even  where  F  does  refer  to  the  same  phenom-­‐‑
enon,  it  may  be  the  amount  or  degree  of  F  that  does  the  reason-­‐‑giving  work.  That  is,  the  critic  
might  not  believe  that  the  mere  fact  that  GM  has  the  feature  F  is  problematic,  but  that  it  is  
the  fact  that  it  has  too  much  of  F  that  is.  There  are  clear  cases  where  degree-­‐‑differences  make  
all  the  difference  to  the  reason-­‐‑giving  force  of  a  feature.  For  example,  monetary  cost’s  rea-­‐‑
son-­‐‑giving  force  is  clearly  sensitive  to  degree  difference.  As  is  causing  harm  in  at  least  some  
cases,  e.g.   in  the  case  of  proportionality   judgments  in  the  use  of  military  power.  These  are  
cases  of  trade-­‐‑offs,  where  some  amount  of  a  bad  thing  (e.g.  monetary  loss,  deaths)  is  accept-­‐‑
ed  in  order  to  obtain  some  good  (e.g.  a  nice  dinner,  lasting  peace  in  the  Middle  East).  Critics  
of  GM  may  have  such  trade-­‐‑offs  in  mind.  The  argument  would  then  be  that  given  the  (per-­‐‑
ceived)  benefits  of  (an  instance  of)  GM,  the  degree  of  F  involved  is  reason  to  judge  that  we  
ought  not  engage  in  (this  instance  of)  GM.  In  other  words,  this  degree  of  F  is  too  high  a  price  
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to  pay  given  the  benefits  of  GM.  Note  the  similarity  to  the  issue  of  pro  tanto  vs.  all-­‐‑things-­‐‑
considered  reasons.  In  that  case,  the  issue  was  whether  T  had  features  that  (could)  outweigh  
the  weight  of  the  reason  provided  by  F.  Here,  the  issue  is  whether  a  different  level  of  F  re-­‐‑
quires   stronger   counterweighing   benefits   –   and,   supposing   that   the   level   of   F   is   indeed  
higher  for  GM  than  for  T,  that  the  reasons  in  favour  of  GM  need  to  be  weightier  than  those  
in  favour  of  T.    
But  it  may  not  be  the  case  that  critics  have  trade-­‐‑offs  in  mind.  Rather,  they  may  think  
that  some  degree  of  F  is  unproblematic,  but  that  a  sufficiently  high  degree  of  F  is  a  reason  to  
find  an  activity  morally  problematic.  Some  might  doubt   that  degrees  could  matter   for   the  
very  reason-­‐‑giving  force  of  a  consideration,  as  it  would  do  in  this  case.  Indeed,  it  is  common  
to   see   arguments   to   the   effect   that   a   difference   between  GM  and   an   earlier   technology   is  
merely  one  of  degree  rather  than  kind,  and  that  therefore  it  cannot  make  an  ethical  difference.    
A   reason   for   such  doubt  might  be   this:  Suppose   that  F1  (F   to  degree  1)   is  not  a   reason   for  
some  judgment,  and  that  F2  is  a  degree  of  F  that  is  only  a  tiny,  imperceptible  amount  larger  
than  F1.  By  the  principle  of  treating  like  cases  alike,  we  should  conclude  that  therefore  F2  is  
not  a   reason.  By  repeating   this   reasoning,  we  are  eventually  driven   to   the  conclusion   that  
not  even  Fn,  the  largest  possible  degree  of  F,  could  provide  a  reason.  So  if  there  is  a  degree  
F1  that  is  not  a  reason  for  the  judgment,  then  no  degree  of  F  is  such  a  reason.  
The  reasoning  above  is  similar  to  the  reasoning  that  generates  sorites  paradoxes,  such  
as  the  case  of  the  relationship  between  the  number  of  hairs  on  a  man’s  head  and  his  being  
bald   (a  man  with   100,000  hairs   is   not   bald,   and   one   hair’s  difference  doesn’t  make   a  man  
bald;  so  a  man  with  99,999  hairs  is  not  bald;  so  a  man  with  99,998  hairs  is  not  bald  ...  so  a  
man  with  zero  hairs  is  not  bald).    But  note  that  there  is  no  paradox  in  our  case.  In  the  case  of  
the  bald  man,  the  paradox  arises  because  the  end  point  –  that  a  man  with  zero  hairs  is  not  
bald  –   is  clearly  false.  But   in  our  case,  whether  Fn  has  reason-­‐‑giving  force   is  contested.   In-­‐‑
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stead,   the   problem  with   our   quasi-­‐‑sorites   case   is   that   denying   the   possibility   that   Fn   is   a  
reason  when  F1  is  not  entails  that  we  are  committed  to  a  type  of  rational  slippery  slope  for  
features  that  come  in  degrees:  Once  you  have  accepted  that  some  degree  of  F  is  not  a  reason  
for   a   judgment,  you  are   rationally   committed   to  accepting   that  no  degree  of  F   could  be  a  
reason.  Thus  critics  would  seem  to  be  justified  in  objecting  to  technologies  using  arguments  
that  look  like  slippery  slopes,  which  is  a  consequence  that  we  should  not  be  happy  with.  
   In   order   to  deal  with   this   issue,   the  proponent   of   the   SA   can   attempt   to   show   that  
degrees  cannot,  or  ought  not,  make  a  difference  in  the  specific  case  at  issue.  There  are  three  
strategies  available.  First,  one  can  simply  deny  that  there  is  in  fact  a  difference  in  the  degree  
of  F  between  GM  and  T.   If   that   is   the  case,   the  difference   in  degree  of  F  obviously  cannot  
account  for  different   judgments,  since  it  does  not  exist.  Second,  one  can  argue  that  the  de-­‐‑
gree  of  F   in  GM  and  T   lies  on   the  same  side  of   the   (possibly   fuzzy)   limit  beyond  which  F  
provides  a  reason.  An  example  of  this  phenomenon  is  budgetary  restrictions;  if  either  of  two  
courses   of   action   cost  more   than  our   available   budget,   it   does  not  matter   (for   the   reason-­‐‑
giving   force  of   the  budgetary  restriction)   that  one   is  more  costly   than   the  other.  This  may  
require  interpretation  of  the  possible  grounds  a  critic  might  have  for  taking  Fn  to  be  a  rea-­‐‑
son.  Third,  one  can  deny  that  F  is  the  kind  of  thing  that  admits  of  degrees,  or,  weaker,  that  
any  plausible   reason-­‐‑giving   force   of   F   cannot   vary  with   the   degree   of   F.   There   are  many  
examples  of   the   former,   e.g.   the   fact   that   someone   is  dead  or   the   fact   that  you   signed   the  
contract.   Nozick’s   conception   of   rights   is   an   example   of   the   latter.   According   to   Nozick  
“stealing  a  penny  or  a  pin  or  anything  from  someone  violates  his  rights”,  and  thus  no  de-­‐‑
gree  difference  can  matter  to  whether  a  right  is  broken  or  not  (Nozick,  1974,  p.  75).    
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3.4 Taking stock 
My   arguments   in   the   three   preceding   sections   have   shown   that   the   similarity   argument  
leaves  some  argumentative  space  for  the  GM  critic.  First  of  all,  it  is  possible  for  the  critic  to  
maintain  that  F  is  a  pro  tanto  reason  to  find  T  morally  problematic,  even  though  T  is  not  all-­‐‑
things-­‐‑considered  morally  problematic.  Second,   the  critic   can  argue   that   contextual  differ-­‐‑
ences  –  exclusionary  and  enabling  considerations  –  make  it  the  case  that  F  is  a  reason  to  find  
GM  problematic,  but  not  to  find  T  morally  problematic.  Third,  the  critic  can  argue  that  the  
sense  of  F  that  she  takes  to  provide  a  reason  for  objecting  to  GM  is  not  the  same  sense  of  F  
that   is  present   in   the   case  of  T  –  either  because  FGM  and  FT  differ   in  kind,  or  because   they  
differ   in  degree.  Fourth,  and  finally,   the  critic  can  argue   that   the  sense   in  which  she   takes  
GM  to  be  morally  problematic  is  not  the  sense  in  which  T  is  not  morally  problematic.  Note  
that  making  any  one  of  these  arguments  would  be  sufficient  to  block  the  strong  conclusion  
of  the  similarity  argument  or  to  discharge  the  explanatory  burden  that  the  weak  conclusion  
imposes  on  the  critic.   In  the  next  section,  I   look  at  whether  three  types  of  objection  to  GM  
that  have  been  subjected  to  a  similarity  argument  can  use  this  argumentative  space  to  avoid  
the  conclusions  of  the  similarity  argument.  
  
4. Specific similarity arguments in the genetic modification debate 
Recall  that  specific  similarity  arguments  target  a  particular  objection  to  GM  using  a  particu-­‐‑
lar  comparison  technology.   In   this  section  I  discuss   two  such  specific  arguments.  The  first  
targets   the  objection  based  on  naturalness   as   it   exists   in   the  public  debate  over  GM   food,  
and  uses  medicine  (in  general  as  well  GM  medicine  specifically)  as  a  comparison  technolo-­‐‑
gy.   The   second   targets   a  more   specific   version   of   the   unnaturalness   argument   that   finds  
fault  with  our  transforming  organisms  into  artefacts,  and  uses  selective  breeding  and  simi-­‐‑
lar  technologies  as  a  comparison  technology.    
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4.1 Naturalness and medicine 
There  is  evidence  that  a  major  source  of  public  scepticism  towards  GM  food  is  based  on  the  
idea  that  GM  food  is  unnatural  (Gaskell  et  al.,  2010,  p.  38).  But  medicine  is  also  unnatural,  in  
the  sense  that   it  consists   in  preventing  natural  process   from  taking  their  course.  Similarly,  
specific  medical  treatments  based  on  GM  seem  to  be  just  as  unnatural  as  GM  food  is.  Insofar  
as  we   think   that  medicine   in  general   and  GM  medicine   specifically  are  not  morally  prob-­‐‑
lematic,  we   have   premises   (1)   and   (2)   of   a   similarity   argument   against   the   unnaturalness  
objection  to  GM  food.  How  could  a  defender  of  the  unnaturalness  objection  avail  herself  of  
the  argumentative  space  left  by  the  similarity  argument?    
   The  most  promising  route  to  take  for  the  GM  critic  in  this  case  seems  to  me  to  focus  
on  the  meaning  of  ‘(un)naturalness’.  The  comparison  with  medicine  in  general  seems  to  rely  
on  an  understanding  whereby  everything  that  has  been  produced  by  human  beings  is  un-­‐‑
natural.  Taking  unnaturalness  to  be  a  reason  to  object  to  a  practice  would  thus  make  every  
aspect   of   human   culture   objectionable.   For   that   reason   alone   it   is   doubtful   that   any   critic  
bases  her  objection  in  this  sense  of  ‘natural’.  And  psychological  and  social  scientific  studies  
have  shown  that  ordinary  people’s   judgments  about  what  things  are  natural  (especially  in  
the  domain  of  food)  are  fairly  sophisticated,  and  depend   inter  alia  on  whether  things  have  
been  added  or  subtracted  from  the  ‘original’,  whether  alterations  are  mechanical  or  chemi-­‐‑
cal  and  whether  the  changes  could  in  principle  have  occurred  without  human  help  (Rozin  
2005;  Rozin,   Fischler  &  Shields-­‐‑Argelès,   2009;  Mielby   et   al.,   2010).   Paul  B.  Thompson6  has  
suggested  that  the  most  common  conception  of  naturalness  at  play  in  the  GM  food  debate  is  
an  “artisanal”  conception  (Thompson,  2003).  On  this  conception,  natural  farming  is  farming  
                                                                                                                        
6  To   avoid   unnecessary   confusion:   Note   that   Paul   B.   Thompson   is   a   different   person   from  R.   Paul  
Thompson,  cited  in  §1.  
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that  uses  contextualized  knowledge  about  the  specific  ecosystem  in  which  it  takes  place  and  
exploits   the   synergies   it   contains   between   plants,   animals   and   soils.   It   is   contrasted  with  
‘industrial’  methods  such  as  the  use  of  chemical  fertilizer  and  pesticides.  GM  agriculture  is  
associated  with   this   latter,  unnatural   approach   to   farming.   Interestingly,   this   connects   the  
unnaturalness  objection  to  the  so-­‐‑called  ‘technological  fix’-­‐‑objection,  according  to  which  the  
problem  with  GM  agriculture  is  that  it  (so  critics  claim)  seeks  to  solve  problems  caused  by  
industrialization  –   such  as  pollution,   topsoil   loss  and   increasingly  aggressive  pests  –  with  
more   industrialization,   instead   of   removing   the   root   causes   of   those   problems   (see   e.g.  
Sandler,  2007,  Chapter  6).  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  similarity  argument  using  medicine  
as  such,   the  most   interesting  point   is   that   the  artisanal  conception  of  naturalness  does  not  
apply  to  such  very  general  technologies  (medicine  as  such,  agriculture  as  such),  but  at  most  
to  certain  ways  of  practicing  them.  It  is  thus  not  true  that  the  general  practice  of  healing  the  
sick   is  artisanally  unnatural,  and  hence  that  general  practice  does  not  share   the  relevant  F  
that  underlies  the  objection  to  GM.  
Assuming  that  the  artisanal  conception  of  naturalness  is  the  conception  that  underlies  
the  objection  still  does  not  do  away  with  the  similarity  argument  that  uses  GM  medicine  as  
the  comparison  technology.  For  presumably  there  is  an  artisanal  conception  of  natural  med-­‐‑
icine  as  well,  and  critics  of  GM  food  presumably  do  not  take  the  fact  that  novel  medicines  
developed  by  GM  are  non-­‐‑artisanal  as  a  reason  to  find  them  morally  problematic.  Can  this  
difference  in  judgments  be  rationalized  by  either  of  the  two  remaining  routes?    
First,  consider  the  possibility  that  GM  medicine  is  pro  tanto  problematic  because  it  is  
unnatural,  but  that  this  reason  is  outweighed  by  its  benefits.  In  expressing  misgivings  about  
“certain  forms  of  stem-­‐‑cell  research”  G.A.  Cohen  argues:  
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And  do  not  say,  “If  your  child’s   life  depended  on  it  …”  There  are  all  kinds  of  
awful  things  that  I  would  not  otherwise  dream  of  doing  that  I  might  do  if  my  
child’s  life  depended  on  it  …When  people  say:  “If  you  had  cancer…,”  one  can  
sometimes  reply:  “Yes,  of  course,  that  might  unbalance  my  judgment.”  Making  
people  imagine  that  they  are  in  dire  straits  in  order  to  cause  them  to  agree  with  
something  is  an  attractive  resort  for  those  whose  arguments  are  not  (otherwise)  
strong  (Cohen,  2011,  p.  209).    
What  Cohen  suggests  is  that  people  will  be  willing  to  accept  more  or  less  anything  if  saving  
lives,  especially  one’s  child’s  or  one’s  own,   is  placed  in  the  other  side  of   the  scales.  So  the  
mere  fact  that  we  do  not  tend  object  to  GM-­‐‑based  medicine  is  not  a  particularly  strong  rea-­‐‑
son  to  believe  that  there  is  no  reasons  for  objecting  to  it  (including  the  possible  reason  that  it  
is  unnatural  in  the  relevant  sense).    
   Second,  consider  the  possibility  that  contextual  considerations  (excluders  or  enablers)  
can  explain  why  ‘artisanal’  unnaturalness  is  a  reason  to  find  GM  food  problematic  but  not  
GM  medicine.  One  plausible  view   is   that  people   take  natural   foods   to  be  healthier   (more  
nutritious  and/or  less  likely  to  be  detrimental  to  health  in  any  way)  or  superior  in  terms  of  
taste   than   non-­‐‑natural   foods,   i.e.   to   have   properties   that   are   desirable   in   foods.   And   the  
comparable  belief,  that  natural  medicine  is  better  at  curing  disease,  i.e.  has  properties  desir-­‐‑
able  in  medicines,  is  not  as  prevalent  (and  of  course  those  who  do  think  natural  medicine  is  
better   are   likely   to   deny   that   naturalness   is   no   reason   in   the   case   of  medicine).   A   study  
(Rozin   et   al.,   2004)   bears   this   out:   More   than   70%   agreed   that   natural   foods   were   more  
healthy  than  non-­‐‑natural  (in  an  artisanal  sense  of  natural/unnatural),  while  only  24%  agreed  
that  natural  medicines  were  more  effective  at  curing  diseases.    
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   Finally,   consider   the   possibility   that   the   proponent   of   the   similarity   argument   has  
misunderstood   in  what   sense   critics   take  GM  to  be  morally  problematic.  Even   if   it  makes  
sense  for  people  to  prefer  artisanally  natural  foods  to  non-­‐‑natural  foods,  this  does  not  seem  
to  warrant   the  view   that  GM  food  ought  not   to  be  produced.  But   there   is  unquestionably  
widespread  resistance   to  allowing  GM  food,  especially   in  Europe.  Could   it  nevertheless  be  
the   case   that   naturalness   per   se   only   functions   as   a   reason   for   preferring   natural   foods?  
Could  the  more  extensive  resistance  be  explained  if  that  were  the  case?  I  believe  it  could,  by  
three  things  (or  a  combination  of  two  or  more  of  them).  First,  unnaturalness  is  also  tied  to  a  
belief  that  GM  crops  are  risky  in  the  sense  that  they  are  likely  to  harm  the  environment  or  to  
contaminate   non-­‐‑GM   foods.   Given   such   a   belief,   it  makes   sense   to  want   to   prohibit   GM  
crops.  Second,   the  preference  for  naturalness,  especially   insofar  as   it   is  based  on  the  belief  
that   natural   foods   are   healthy,   rationalizes   an   objection   to   being   subjected   to   unnatural  
foods  unknowingly.  That  is,  naturalness  may  play  a  role  in  an  argument  for  labelling  rather  
than  a  ban.  Third,  support  for  not  allowing  GM  crops  need  not  be  based  on  the  claim  that  
planting   such   crops   is  wrong,   but   could   instead   be   understood   as   an   integral   part   of   the  
view  that  we  should  go  back  to  a  more  artisanal  way  of  farming.  A  critical  stance  towards  
GM  is   thus  closely  connected   to  a  critical  stance  on   ‘industrial’  agriculture,  and  a  positive  
stance   on   such   things   as   agroecology.   It   expresses   a  more   general   view   about   how   food  
production  should  be  practiced  in  the  future.  
  
4.2 Manipulation of organisms and breeding techniques 
The   second   specific   similarity   argument   targets   an   objection   to  GM   that   is   found   among  
philosophers  rather  than  ordinary  citizens  (although  some  such  may,  of  course,  hold  it  too).  
According   to   the  objection,   the  problematic   feature  of  GM   is   that   it   amounts   to   the   inten-­‐‑
tional  design  of  organisms’  genotypes,  thereby  making  those  organisms  into  artefacts  (call  
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this   ‘manipulation’).  Manipulation  may  be   taken   to  be  another,   rather   specialized  concep-­‐‑
tion   of   naturalness.   The   comparison   technology  used   is   earlier  ways   of  modifying  organ-­‐‑
isms  –  from  domestication  and  cultivation  to  scientifically  informed  breeding  and  hybridi-­‐‑
zation.  Again,  the  question  is  whether  those  who  object  to  GM  based  on  manipulation  can  
avail  themselves  of  the  argumentative  space  left  by  the  similarity  argument.  
   Consider  first  the  possibility  that  manipulation  is  in  fact  a  pro  tanto  reason  to  object  to  
earlier  technologies  as  well,  but  that  these  are  not  all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered  morally  problemat-­‐‑
ic.  One  problem   is   that   the   fact   that  we  have  domesticated  plants   and  animals  has  deter-­‐‑
mined   the   future   of   our   species   to   such   an   extreme   degree   that   arguing   that   it   was   all-­‐‑
things-­‐‑considered  wrong  of  us  to  do  so  generates  a  version  of  the  so-­‐‑called  “apology  para-­‐‑
dox”,  wherein  we  apologise   for   a   fact   that   is   a  necessary   condition   for  our  own  existence  
(Thompson,   2010).   Luckily,   I   think   we   can   largely   sidestep   this   issue,   since  most   people  
would  accept  the  direct   intuition  that  manipulation  is  not  wrong  in  the  case  of  domestica-­‐‑
tion  and  hybridization.  Furthermore,  the  philosophers  who  object  to  GM  based  on  manipu-­‐‑
lation  tend  also  to  accept  that  the  manipulation  done  through  domestication  is  not  pro  tanto  
problematic.  
   Next,  consider  possible  contextual  considerations  that  rationalize  viewing  manipula-­‐‑
tion  as  a  reason  to  find  GM  problematic,  but  not  a  reason  to  find  domestication  problematic.  
I  can   think  of   two  views.  First,  one  underlying  reason  for  objection   to  GM  on  the  basis  of  
manipulation  is  that  it  is  risky,  not  in  the  sense  that  GM  is  likely  to  be  harmful,  but  that  we  
are  not  able   to  predict   sufficiently  well  what   effects,  positive  or  negative,  developing  and  
using  GM  organisms  might  have.  For  example,  Joachim  Boldt  has  argued  that  the  develop-­‐‑
ment  of  wholly  novel  organisms   in  synthetic  biology  challenges  risk  assessment,   since  or-­‐‑
ganisms’  behaviour  can  only  be  known  by  observing  them  ‘in  the  wild’  (Boldt,  2013).  Since  
other  methods   for   creating   organisms  work   by   changing   organisms   from   the   outside,  we  
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typically  have  a  better  sense  of  how  the  novel  organism  behaves  and  what  effects  it  has  in  
the  setting  in  which  it  will  be  used.    Second,  another  worry  that  underlies  the  manipulation  
objection   is   that   it  will   lead   us   to   treat   living   beings  with   less   respect   than   they   are   due  
sometime   in   the   future,   since  manipulation   is   or   encourages   viewing   organisms   as  mere  
machines.  Since  we  already  know  the  effects  of  domestication  and  scientific  breeding  on  our  
relationship  with  other  living  beings,  this  underlying  worry  is  not  relevant  in  the  case  of  the  
comparison  technologies.  
   Third,  consider  the  possibility  that  the  similarity  argument  employs  a  different  sense  
of  ‘manipulation’  than  that  used  by  the  GM  critics.  This  is  in  fact  typically  the  case,  at  least  
when  we  are   talking  about  philosophical  critics.  These   typically  stress   that   there   is  an   im-­‐‑
portance  difference   in  degree  and/or  kind  between  how  we  manipulate  organisms   in  GM  
and  how  we  do  so   in  selective  breeding  and  similar   technologies.  Borrowing  a   term  from  
Beth   Preston   (2013),   our   interventions   in   organisms’   genotypes   have   become   more   “re-­‐‑
fined”,   in   the   sense   that   we   exercise   more   precise   control   and   employ   more   detailed  
knowledge  in  doing  so.7  Several  GM  critics  argue  that  this  difference  in  refinement  makes  a  
moral   difference.   For   example   Keekok   Lee   (1999)   argues   that  more   refined   interventions  
produce   organisms   that   are  more   artefactual,   since   they   embody   human   aims   and   inten-­‐‑
tions  to  a  higher  degree  than  organisms  produced  by  less  refined  methods.  Since  artefactual  
entities  lack  a  kind  of  value  that  non-­‐‑artefactual  (natural)  entities  have,  this  means  that  GM  
organisms   are   less   valuable   than   non-­‐‑GM   organisms.   Christopher   Preston   (2012)   argues  
along  the  same  lines  as  Lee,  but  suggests  that  it  is  only  when  organisms  lose  connection  to  
the  process  of  evolution  –  as  some  organisms  envisaged  by  synthetic  biologists  would  argu-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
7  Histories  of  such  interventions  that  support  this  view  are  provided  by  Richard  W.  Bulleit  (2005)  for  
the  case  of  animals,  and  by  Denis  J.  Murphy  (2007)  for  the  case  of  plants.  It  is  plausible,  according  to  
these   accounts,   that   early   domestication   was   entirely   unintentional,   i.e.   that   humans   exercised   no  
conscious  control  of  organisms’  genotype.  
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ably  do  –  that  they  become  less  valuable  than  other  organisms.  And  several  authors,  includ-­‐‑
ing  Lee,  Cohen,  Bill  McKibben  (2003,  p.  178)  and  Joachim  Boldt  and  Oliver  Müller  (Boldt  &  
Müller,  2008)  argue  that  having  too  much  control  is  problematic,  e.g.  because  it  encourages  
lack  of  respect   for  other   living  beings,  or  because   it   is  detrimental   to  human  well-­‐‑being  to  
live  in  a  world  entirely  shaped  by  our  own  intentions.  
   Finally,  consider  whether  manipulation-­‐‑based  objections  could  be  aimed  at   the  con-­‐‑
clusion   that   GM   is   conditionally   acceptable.   It   is   somewhat   hard   to   tell,   since   there   is   a  
marked  lack  of  policy  recommendations  and  explicit  normative  conclusions  in  the  writings  
of  those  who  object  to  GM  based  on  manipulation.  But  there  are  at  least  two  kinds  of  con-­‐‑
clusion  that  (as  far  as  I  can  tell)  are  often  sought,  and  which  amount  to  some  form  of  condi-­‐‑
tional  acceptability.  The  first,  exemplified  by  Boldt  &  Müller,  is  that  GM  technologies  (spe-­‐‑
cifically  synthetic  biology  in  Boldt  &  Müller’s  case)  should  be  subject  to  some  kind  of  ethical  
oversight  structure  –  for  example  that  an  ethical  code  of  conduct  should  be  put  in  place,  or  
that   new   applications   should   be   discussed   by   ethicists   and/or   in   public   deliberation.   The  
second  possible  conclusion,  exemplified  by  Lee  and  Preston,   is   that  natural   (unmanipulat-­‐‑
ed)   entities   have   a   value   that  manipulated   entities   are   lacking.   In   effect,   this  means   that  
there   is  a  pro   tanto   reason   to   create  or  preserve  a  natural  organism  rather   than   to   create  a  
GM  organism.   This   does   not   rationalize   a   general   rejection   of  GM,   but   only   resistance   to  
those  instances  where  GM  organisms  replace  natural  ones.  Furthermore  it  is  at  least  an  open  
question  how  much  extra  value  naturalness  adds,  since  presumably  there  are  also  other  val-­‐‑
ues  at  play  when  we  are  deciding  whether  to  let  a  natural  or  an  unnatural  organism  exist.  
  
5. Conclusions 
I  have  argued  that  comparisons  of  GM  and  established  technologies  are  frequently  used  as  
part  of   an  argument,  namely   the   similarity  argument  as  put   forward   in  §2.   I  have  used  a  
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generic   version   of   the   argument   to   show   that   it   leaves   some   parts   of   the   argumentative  
space   open.   I   have   then  used   this   to   show   to   how   certain   common  objections   to  GM   can  
avoid  the  seeming  inconsistency  that  the  similarity  argument  highlights.  This  simultaneous-­‐‑
ly  shows  how  these  objections  must  be  framed  if  they  are  to  avoid  the  inconsistency.  Before  
ending,  I  would  like  to  offer  some  general  reflections  on  the  usefulness  of  similarity  argu-­‐‑
ments  in  the  light  of  the  above.  
   First,  the  fact  that  similarity  arguments  close  of  parts  of  the  argumentative  space  con-­‐‑
tributes   to  understanding  the  worries   that  GM  critics  have,  and  thus  forms  the  basis   for  a  
more  detailed  critique  of  their  objections.  For  example,  my  analysis  suggests  that  the  belief  
that  GM  food  is  less  healthy  than  ‘natural’  food  is  important,  and  that  the  notion  that  GM  is  
essentially   an   extension   of   chemically   intensive   industrialized   farming   is   crucial.   In   some  
cases,  the  position  that  the  GM  critic  must  carve  out  to  avoid  the  inconsistency  that  a  simi-­‐‑
larity   argument   alleges   is   vulnerable   to   other   objections   (arguably   this   is   the   case   for   the  
health-­‐‑related   naturalness   objection).   In   other   cases,   answering   the   similarity   argument  
requires   formulating   an   objection   in   a  more   limited  way   than   it  might   have   been   under-­‐‑
stood  (arguably  this   is   true  for  Lee’s  and  Preston’s  version  of   the  manipulation  objection).      
But  in  neither  case  is  a  similarity  argument  sufficient   in  itself;  or  at   least   is  more  fruitfully  
used  as  one  element  in  a  larger  argumentative  strategy.  
Second,   there  are  other  uses  of   similarity  arguments,  or  at   least   similarity   claims.   In  
particular,   they  can  be  used  as   intuition  generators,   in   the   sense   that   they  elicit   the  direct  
intuition  that  F  is  not  a  reason.  In  this  case,  the  similarity  argument  may  seem  redundant  –  
we  could  instead  just  directly  argue  that  F  is  not  a  reason.  However,  it  is  sometimes  useful  
to   consider   the  moral   relevance   of   a   feature   in   a   relatively   familiar   set   of   circumstances,  
rather   than   abstractly.   Features   described   abstractly   can   sometimes   seem   relevant   because  
the  abstraction  makes  it  more  difficult  get  a  clear  picture  of  what  having  the  feature  actually  
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amounts  to.  I  think  this  is  true  in  the  case  of  the  widespread  idea  (among  lay  people)  that  all  
living  things  are  valuable  –  which  tends  to  be  undermined  by  noting  that  we  are  not  trou-­‐‑
bled  by  the  murder  of  millions  of  bacteria  that  each  of  us  commit  daily.8  Similarly,  reflecting  
on   the   fact   that   age-­‐‑old   crops   like   corn   are   results   of   human  manipulation   of  DNA  may  
make  vivid  the  intuition  that  manipulation  is  not  morally  dubious.  
   Third,  as  I  have  suggested  at  several  places,  it  matters  greatly  for  the  effectiveness  of  
similarity  arguments  how  objections  are  interpreted.  In  many  cases,  objections  are  not  stat-­‐‑
ed   in   a   detailed   and   rigorous   manner,   especially   where   members   of   the   public   are   con-­‐‑
cerned.   It   seems   to  me   that   the   interpretative   virtues   of   charity   and   avoiding   straw  men  
should   lead   to   a  presumption   that  GM  critics  probably  do  not  have   an  objection   in  mind  
that  falls  victim  to  a  similarity  argument.9  This  goes  even  for  the  weak  conclusion,  at  least  in  
some   contexts.   The  weak   conclusion   seeks   to   place   some   explanatory   burden   on   the  GM  
critic.  In  cases  where  the  similarity  argument  is  used  in  the  course  of  a  dialogue  with  a  crit-­‐‑
ic,  this  is  of  course  a  fair  move.  But  in  many  cases,  the  audience  of  a  similarity  argument  is  
not  the  critic  herself,  but  rather  a  third  party.  In  such  cases,  the  boundary  between  the  weak  
and  strong  conclusions   is  blurred,  especially   if   it   is  suggested  that   the  critic  would  have  a  
hard  time  discharging  her  explanatory  burden.  Apart  from  the  interpretative  vices  that  are  
potentially  exhibited,  there  is  also  evidence  that  those  who  use  so-­‐‑called  rebuttal  analogies  –  
of  which   the   similarity   argument  may   be   seen   as   an   example   –   are   judged   as   being   less  
competent  and  less  ethical  debaters  by  third-­‐‑person  observers  of  debates  (Whaley,  1998).  It  
may  thus  not  be  a  good  idea  from  a  pragmatic  point  of  view  to  use  similarity  arguments  if  
the  aim  is  to  defend  GM  and  convince  readers  or  listeners  that  GM  is  ethically  sound.       
                                                                                                                        
8  Of  course,  biocentrists  within  environmental  ethics  have  ways  of  arguing  that  our   intuitions  about  
the  moral  standing  of  microorganisms  and  plants  does  not  decide  the  issue  of  their  moral  standing.  
9  Tom  Douglas   has   suggested   (in   conversation)   that   some   similarity   arguments   are   used   simply   as  
interpretative  tools,  designed  to  bring  out  what  the  critic’s  view  most  plausibly  is.  
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Many  of  our  activities   simultaneously  offer   the  possibility  of  great  benefit   and   the   risk  of  
serious   harms.   Technological   developments   allow   us   to   improve   health,   happiness   and  
environmental   sustainability,  but  may  also   cause  great   losses   to   those   same  values.  These  
are  risky  things.  We  must  figure  out  how  we  are  to  secure  the  benefits  without  incurring  the  
harms.  And   if  we  cannot  do   that,  we  must   figure  out  what  harms  we  can  risk   in  order   to  
keep   the   chance  of   the  benefits.   Such   choices,  where  we  must  decide  which  policy   to   im-­‐‑
plement  when  each  policy  may  lead  to  several  different  outcomes,  are  what  I  will  call  ‘risky  
choices’.  The  precautionary  principle   (PP)   is  supposed  to  help  us   in  making  risky  choices.  
At  the  most  general  level,  it  asks  us  to  act  to  eradicate  risks  of  severe  harm,  even  if  we  must  
pay  the  price  of  forgoing  possibly  significant  benefits.  
   Many  have  argued  that  PP  is  a  poor  guide.  The  categorical  demand  that  severe  risks  
be  eradicated  has  seemed  to  many  irrational.  In  this  paper,  I  will  investigate  what  this  sup-­‐‑
posed  irrationality  might  amount  to.  I  suggest  that  there  are  three  intuitively  strong  objec-­‐‑
tions  to  PP  that  all  make  the  claim  that  guiding  our  choices  by  PP  is  irrational.  I  will  argue  
that  these  objections  can  be  answered,  at  least  when  PP  is  interpreted  in  a  suitably  moderate  
way.  The   challenge   I   present   goes   beyond   the  much-­‐‑discussed   claim   that  PP   is   incoherent  
(Sunstein,  2005).  By  defending  PP  from  stronger  rationality  objections,  I  hope  to  strengthen  
the   case   for   PP   as   an   element   in   sound   risk   management.   In   addition,   the   limits   within  




2. The precautionary principle 
The  most  famous  formulation  of  PP  is  probably  the  Rio  Declaration  of  1992,  which  defines  
PP  as  follows:  “Where  there  are  threats  of  serious  or  irreversible  damage,  lack  of  full  scien-­‐‑
tific  certainty  shall  not  be  used  as  a  reason  for  postponing  cost-­‐‑effective  measures  to  prevent  
environmental  degradation”   (UNEP,  1992,  §15).  As   several  authors  have  shown,   the  basic  
schematic   structure  of   the  Rio  Declaration  can  be   found   in  most,   if  not  all,  other   formula-­‐‑
tions   of   PP   in   legal   and   policy   documents   and   in   the   academic   literature   (Manson,   2002;  
Sandin,  1999;  Trouwborst,  2006,  Ch.  3).  That  structure  consists  in  the  identification  of  some  
harm   that  an  activity  may  cause  (“threats  of  serious  or  irreversible  damage”),  some  degree  
of  uncertainty  as  to  whether  the  activity  will  cause  the  harm  (“lack  of  full  scientific  certain-­‐‑
ty”)  and  a  precautionary  action  taken  to  avoid  the  harm  (“cost-­‐‑effective  measures  to  prevent  
environmental  degradation”).  I  take  it  to  be  as  uncontroversial  as  is  reasonably  possible  that  
this  basic  structure  is  definitive  of  PP.  
   There  are  two  possible  sources  of  confusion  in  this  definition  of  PP  as  a  relationship  
between  harm,  uncertainty   and  action,  namely   ‘uncertainty’   and   ‘action’.  Uncertainty   is   a  
feature  of  our  knowledge  of  the  relationship  between  some  activity  or  policy  (e.g.  the  emis-­‐‑
sion  of  CO2)  and  some  harmful  outcome  (e.g.  global  warming).  But  it  is  a  negative  feature  of  
this  knowledge.  It  defines  a  type  of  knowledge,  namely  (full  scientific)  certainty,  as  not  nec-­‐‑
essary.  This   tells  us  very   little,  and   in  particular   leaves   it  open  what  kind  of  knowledge   is  
sufficient   and/or  necessary.   Concerning   action,   the   confusion   runs   in   the   other   direction.   It  
sounds  as  if  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the  harm  and  some  action.  But  in  fact  no  
particular  kind  of  action  is  typically  named.  At  best,  some  desired  or  required  features  of  the  
action  are  mentioned  –  in  the  case  of  the  Rio  Declaration,  that  it  is  “cost-­‐‑effective”  and  seeks  
“to  prevent  environmental  degradation”.    
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   I   therefore   suggest   that  we   substitute   ‘knowledge’   for   ‘uncertainty’   and   define   the  
relationship  to  action  negatively,  such  that  PP  prohibits  certain  policies  with  respect  to  the  
possibly   harm-­‐‑producing   activity.1  Consequently,   the   basic   PP   schema   is   this:   If  we   have  
some  degree  of  knowledge  that  a  policy  will  cause  some  harm,  then  that  policy  is  prohibited.  
This   leaves   only   two   variables,   namely   harm   variable   (H)   and   the   knowledge  variable   (K).  
These  function  as  thresholds,  such  that  any  policy  that  we  have  knowledge  at  least  as  good  
as  K  will   lead  to  harm  at   least  as  bad  as  H  is  prohibited.  Using  H  and  K  as  thresholds  re-­‐‑
quire   that  we  are  able   to  rank  both  outcomes  and  types  of  knowledge.   I  will  assume  here  
that  this  can  be  done,  at  least  in  principle  –  i.e.  that  it  makes  sense  to  rank  one  outcome  as  
better  or  worse   than  another,  or   that  we  have  at   least  as  good  reason  to  believe  one   thing  
than  another.  With  respect  to  H,  I  will  denote  the  overall  goodness  of  an  outcome  its  utility.  
With  respect  to  K,  I  will  follow  the  standard  Bayesian  idea  that  the  strength  of  our  reasons  
to   believe   some   proposition   and   the   likelihood   of   that   proposition   being   true   are   at   root  
identical.  Consequently,  instead  of  talking  about  how  good  reason  we  have  to  believe  that  a  
policy  will  lead  to  an  outcome,  I  will  often  talk  of  how  likely  that  outcome  is.    
  
2.1 Coherence  
PP,  as  defined  here,  thus  prohibits  any  policy  that  triggers  H  and  K  thresholds,  and  allows  
all  other  policies.  In  any  concrete  application,  H  and  K  must  be  set  to  specific  levels.  Follow-­‐‑
ing  Steel,  I  will  call  an  instance  of  PP  with  fixed  H  and  K  thresholds  a  “version”  of  PP  (Steel,  
2014,  p.  27).  Since  PP  only  prohibits  policies  that  trigger  H  and  K,  and  allows  all  others,   it  
does  not  select  a  unique  policy  in  all  circumstances  (only  when  just  one  policy  is  allowed).  
                                                                                                                        
1  My   account   here   follows,   and   is   highly   indebted   to  Daniel   Steel’s   account   (2014).  However,   Steel  
does  not  consistently  use  the  language  of  prohibition,  partly  (I  think)  because  it  makes  the  objection  to  
PP  that  he  wants  to  reject  –  the  incoherence  objection  –  hard  to  even  state.  
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Consider  the  example  of  so-­‐‑called  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research  on  the  H5N1  influenza  virus.  In  
gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research,  pathogens  are  modified  in  ways  that  make  them  more  dangerous  
than  they  currently  are  in  order  to  study  the  mutations  that  may  make  them  more  danger-­‐‑
ous  in  the  wild.  In  the  H5N1  case,  a  strain  of  influenza  virus  with  extremely  high  mortality  
rates   (of   over   50%)  was  modified   in   a  way   that   probably  makes   it   transmissible   between  
human  beings  (which  it  had  not  previously  been).  An  H5N1  pandemic  is  estimated  to  kill  
anything  between  2  million  and  1.4  billion  people  (Rozell,  2015).   If  conducted  in   laborato-­‐‑
ries   of   the   required   safety   level   –   biosafety   level   3   (BSL-­‐‑3),   the   risk   that   enhanced  H5N1  
virus   escapes   and   causes   a  pandemic  has  been   estimated  at   between  1/1.000   and  1/10.000  
per  laboratory  year  (Lipstich  &  Ingleby,  2015).  Suppose  that  the  version  of  PP  we  are  work-­‐‑
ing  with  sets  H  and  K  such  that   these   fatality  and  probability  ranges  meet   the   thresholds.  
Then  the  policy  of  conducting  H5N1  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research  in  BSL-­‐‑3  laboratories  is  pro-­‐‑
hibited  by  PP.  However,  no  other  policy   recommended,   since  we  do  not  yet  know   if   any  
such  policy  is  itself  allowed  by  PP.    
   Consider   for   example   a   total   ban   on   H5N1   gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function   research,   which   some  
might  advocate  on  the  basis  of  the  version  of  PP  considered.  Is  this  policy  allowed  by  PP?  
That  will   depend   on   the   likelihood   that   a  ban  will   cause   a   similar   number   of   deaths   (or  
more  precisely  that  a  ban  will  cause  the  failure  to  prevent  a  similar  number  of  deaths).  Since  
the  research  would  be  extremely  valuable  in  case  the  H5N1  virus  naturally  mutates  to  be-­‐‑
come  human-­‐‑to-­‐‑human  transmissible,  and  since  it  is  likely  that  the  virus  will  do  exactly  that  
at  some  point,  it  is  very  plausible  that  a  ban  would  meet  the  H  and  K  thresholds  and  thus  be  
prohibited.  But  there   is   likely  another  policy  that  would  be  allowed,  namely  one  in  which  
H5N1  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function  research  is  conducted  in  safer  laboratories  than  BSL-­‐‑3.  If  this  policy  
sufficiently  lowers  the  likelihood  that  the  virus  escapes  and  causes  a  pandemic  –  such  that  it  
is  below  the  K  threshold  –  then  it  will  be  allowed.    
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   This   example   illustrates   an   important   virtue   of   the   account   of   the  PP   that   I   defend  
here,  namely   that   it  avoids   the   incoherence  objection.  According   to   the   incoherence  objec-­‐‑
tion,   the   PP   prohibits   every   policy,   and   therefore   also   prohibits   the   very   policy   that   it   is  
used  to  justify  (Sunstein,  2005,  Ch.  1).  There  are  two  aspects  to  this  objection.  The  first  is  that  
PP   is  paralyzing   because   it   prohibits   every  policy   that  may   cause   some  harm.   Since   every  
policy  may  cause  some  harm  –  even  the  safer  research  policy  on  H5N1  might  weaken  our  
response  to  a  naturally-­‐‑occurring  pandemic  somewhat  –  PP  will  prohibit  every  policy.  The  
use  of  thresholds  solves  this  problem,  since  even  if  all  policies  have  some  risks,  the  specific  
risks  of  any  given  policy  can  fall  below  either  H  or  K  (or  both),  as  is  the  case  for  the  safer  
research   policy.   The   second   aspect   of   the   incoherence   objection   is   that   PP   is   inconsistent,  
because   the   policies   it   recommends   sometimes   create   risks   that   are   at   least   as   bad   as   the  
policy  that  originally  demanded  precaution.  But  in  such  cases,  PP  as  I  have  defined  it  does  
not   recommend   the   equally   risky  policy   –   it   prohibits   it,   just   as   it   prohibited   the   original  
policy.  Daniel  Steel  names  this  feature  of  PP  the  consistency  principle,  which  he  defines  as  
the  principle  “that  a  precaution  should  not  be  precluded  by  the  same  version  of  PP  used  to  
justify   it”   (Steel,   2014,   p.   28).   The   policy   of   banning  H5N1  gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function   research   alto-­‐‑




Though  PP  does  not  recommend  any  unique  action,  a  policy  will  have  to  meet  further  re-­‐‑
quirements  than  simply  being  allowed  by  the  relevant  version  of  PP.  As  we  have  seen,  the  
Rio  Declaration  demands   that   precautionary  measures   are   “cost-­‐‑effective”.   The  European  
Commission   requires   policies   to   be   “proportional   to   the   chosen   level   of   protection”,   con-­‐‑
sistent  with  established  legal  principles  such  as  non-­‐‑discrimination,  and  open  to  review  as  
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new   research   improves   the  knowledge  base   (European  Commission,   2000,  p.   3).  The   con-­‐‑
cept   of   proportionality   is   especially   important   here.   It   is   a   general   principle   in   European  
Union   law,   and   limits   legitimate   legal   action   to  what   is   necessary   in   order   to   achieve   the  
goal   laid  down   in   the   relevant   legislation.2  An  especially   important  aspect  of   this   require-­‐‑
ment   is   that   the   policy   chosen   should   be   the   least   restrictive   one   available   (Harbo,   2010;  
Trouwborst,  2006,  p.  153).  Steel  (2014,  pp.  26-­‐‑30)  incorporates  a  proportionality  requirement  
into  his  account  of  PP,  consisting  of  the  two  sub-­‐‑requirements  of  consistency  and  efficiency.  
I  have  already  described  the  effect  of  consistency  above.  Efficiency  is  defined  as  the  demand  
that   “if  more   than  one  precaution   can  be   consistently   recommended  by   the  version  of  PP  
being  used   [i.e.   are   allowed  by   the  version  of  PP],   then   those  with   lower   costs   should  be  
preferred”  (Steel,  2014,  p.  29).  Costs  should  here  be  taken  to  include  not  only  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑pocket  
costs,  but  also  the  foregone  benefits  from  limiting  technological  innovation.  
It   is  debatable  whether  we  should  see  the  proportionality  requirement  as  part  of  PP,  
or  whether   it   is   better   seen   as   an   exogenous   principle   that   applies  when   PP   as   such   has  
nothing  to  say.  I  tend  toward  the  latter,  since  proportionality  is  a  general  principle  that  ap-­‐‑
plies  to  other  things  besides  PP,  and  since  its  justification  is  not  particularly  closely  related  
to  the  concept  of  precaution.  On  the  other  hand,  proportionality  is  clearly  not  optional,  but  
an  integral  part  of  the  use  of  PP  in  legal-­‐‑  and  policy  practice.  Consequently,  proportionality  
considerations  can  legitimately  be  used  to  argue  that  a  certain  policy  is,  or  is  not,  ultimately  
justified  with  reference  to  PP.  
   To  illustrate  the  effect  of  proportionality,  consider  example  of  synthetic  biology.  Syn-­‐‑
thetic  biology  enables  the  design  and  construction  of  biological  systems  for  useful  purposes,  
such  as  the  production  of  valuable  substances  (e.g.  biofuels,  oils,   flavourings  and  pharma-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
2  See   Article   5,   §4   of   the   Treaty   of   the   European   Union,   available   at   http://eur-­‐‑lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐‑
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT  
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ceuticals),  monitoring  and  cleaning  up  environmental  pollutants,  targeted  medical  interven-­‐‑
tions  and  more.  A  consortium  of  civil  society  groups  have  called  for  a  moratorium  on  “the  
release  and  commercial  use  of  synthetic  organisms”,  and   justified   that  call  by  reference   to  
PP   (FOE,   ICTA   &   ETC   Group,   2012,   p.   3).   FOE   et   al.   do   not   explicitly   define   H   and   K  
thresholds.  They  merely  argue  that  PP  is  triggered  in  the  synthetic  biology  case  since  it  has  
“potentially  far-­‐‑reaching  and  irreversible  impacts”,  and  that  “the  risks  of  the  technology  are  
inherently  unpredictable”.  The  moratorium  is  supposed  to  stand  until  several  requirements  
have   been  met,   including   (1)   the   development   of   a   research   agenda   based   on   the   public  
interest,  (2)  a  full  consideration  of  alternatives  have  been  undertaken,  (3)  a  full  assessment  
of  health,  environmental  and  socioeconomic  impact  has  been  undertaken,  and  (4)  oversight  
and  security  mechanisms  have  been  developed.  
   Given  the  vagueness  of  the  features  that  trigger  PP  according  to  FOE  et  al.,  it  is  possi-­‐‑
ble   that   they  rely  on  unjustifiably   low  thresholds  (e.g.   that   they   implicitly  require  full  cer-­‐‑
tainty   that  no  harm  will   occur).  But   let  us   suppose   that   synthetic   biology,   if   unregulated,  
poses  risks   to  health  and  environment   that  meet   reasonable  H  and  K  thresholds,  and   that  
the  moratorium  would  be  allowed  by  the  relevant  version  of  PP.  The  ultimate  justifiability  
of  the  moratorium  is  not  settled  by  these  facts  alone,  since  there  may  be  other  policies  that  
are  also  allowed,  and  that  are  more  efficient  (in  Steel’s  terminology).  For  example,  a  morato-­‐‑
rium  without  requirements  (1),  (2)  and  the  socioeconomic  part  of  (3)  would  prevent  risks  to  
health  and  environment   just  as  well,  and  would  be   less  restrictive.  Similarly,  a  policy  that  
restricts  only  those  particular  applications  of  synthetic  biology  that  have  a  reasonable  likeli-­‐‑
hood  of   leading  to  harm,  and  not   innocuous  ones,  would  be  preferable  on  proportionality  
grounds.   Furthermore,   proportionality   will   be   important   when   choosing   the   appropriate  
oversight  and  security  mechanisms,  as  per  demand  (4)  of  FOE  et  al.  It  is  unlikely  that  ban-­‐‑
ning  synthetic  biology  applications  will  be  necessary,  since  less  restrictive  policies  (such  as  
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extensive   pre-­‐‑release   testing)  will   in  most   cases   be   sufficient.  On   the   other   hand,   PP  may  
justify  a  ban  of  some  applications  of  synthetic  biology,  if  there  is  no  other  policy  that  would  
reduce  risks  to  an  acceptable  level.      
  
3. The rationality objection(s) 
As  we  have   seen,  PP  as  defined   in   the  previous   section   avoids   the   incoherence  objection,  
since   it  neither  paralyzes  policy-­‐‑making  by  prohibiting  all   risk-­‐‑creating  activities,  nor   rec-­‐‑
ommends  precautionary  measures  that  are  equally  likely  to  lead  to  equally  bad  outcomes  as  
the   original   policy.   The   use   of   thresholds   of   harm   and   knowledge   ensures   this   result   by  
allowing  that  some  risks  are  too  small  to  warrant  precaution,  and  by  allowing  only  policies  
that  are  consistent  with  the  version  of  PP  set  by  the  relevant  H  and  K  thresholds.    
However,  the  incoherence  objection  is  not  the  only  objection  to  PP  –  it  is  not  even  the  
only  objection  that  seeks  to  show  that  PP  is  irrational.  In  the  eyes  of  many,  we  already  have  
an  adequate  theory  of  rationality  that  applies  to  risky  choice,  namely  expected  utility  theory  
(EUT).   According   to   EUT   we   should   choose   the   policy   that   maximizes   expected   utility,  
which  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  utilities  of  each  possible  outcome  of  a  policy  multiplied  
by   the  probability   that   the  outcome  will  obtain.   In   this   section,   I  will   show  how  the   ideas  
used  to  argue  that  EUT  is  the  correct  normative  of  risky  choice  can  also  be  used  to  mount  
objections  to  PP.  Interestingly,  these  objections  are  objections  to  the  very  use  of  thresholds  of  
knowledge  and/or  harm  (or  more  generally,  value)   in  deciding  what  to  do  in  situations  of  
risk.  So  the  same  feature  of  PP  that  allows  it  to  avoid  one  rationality-­‐‑based  objection,  name-­‐‑
ly  the  incoherence  objection,  may  generate  other  rationality  based  objections.  I  identify  three  
objections  of  this  sort:  (i)  The  use  of  PP  will  lead  to  sub-­‐‑optimal  outcomes  in  the  long  run;  
(ii)  PP  treats  some  relevant  differences  in  the  utility  and/or  likelihood  of  outcomes  as  irrele-­‐‑
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vant;  (iii)  Thresholds  arbitrarily  endow  specific  utilities  and/or  likelihoods  with  special  im-­‐‑
portance.  
  
3.1 The long-run objection 
A  main  argument   for  using  EUT  as   the  normative   theory  of  risky  choice   is   that   it  ensures  
that  we  are  as  well  of  as  possible  in  the  long  run.  Any  divergence  from  EUT,  including  the  
use   of   thresholds,   therefore   predictably   leads   to   long-­‐‑run   outcomes   that   are   worse   than  
what  we  could  have  achieved  by  using  EUT.  EUT,  recall,  calls  for  the  maximization  of  ex-­‐‑
pected  utility,  i.e.  that  we  choose  the  policy  that  has  the  largest  sum  of  probability-­‐‑weighted  
utility.   Due   to   the   law   of   large   numbers,  maximizing   expected   utility   in   each   individual  
choice  will  almost  certainly  result  in  maximizing  actual  utility  in  the  long  run.  According  to  
the  law  of  large  numbers,  the  actual  value  of  a  random  variable  will  converge  to  its  statisti-­‐‑
cal  expectation  in  the  long  run.  In  risky  choice,  the  actual  utility  achieved  is  a  random  varia-­‐‑
ble,   since   it  depends  on  which  of   the  possible  outcomes  of  a  policy   is   realized.  Since  EUT  
maximizes   expected  utility,   it   ensures   that   the  expected  value   to  which  actual  utility   con-­‐‑
verges  in  the  long  run  is  the  largest  one  possible.  And  since  the  expected  utility  of  any  other  
strategy  for  risky  choice,  including  PP,  is  lower  than  the  maximum,  we  are  statistically  cer-­‐‑
tain  to  end  up  with  less  than  the  maximum  actual  utility  in  the  long  run  by  using  PP.  Since  
utility   is  a  measure  of  everything  we  care  about,  PP   is   irrational:   It   is  a  decision  principle  
that  predictably  fails  to  best  achieve  what  we  want  to  achieve.    
  
3.2 The neglect objection 
While  the  long-­‐‑run  objection  concerns  a  choice  strategy  –  that  is,  the  use  of  a  principle  like  
expected  utility  maximization  or  PP  generally  over  many  risky  choices  –  the  second  objec-­‐‑
tion  concern  single  choices.  We  can  make  at  least  some  judgments  about  how  strong  reasons  
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we  have  for  choosing  a  policy  in  an  individual  risky  choice  situation.  Call  this  the  choicewor-­‐‑
thiness  of  policies.  According  to  the  second  objection,  there  are  some  changes  in  the  intuitive  
relative  choiceworthiness  of  policies  that  PP  neglects.    
There  are  two  possible  kinds  of  change  that  can  be  made  to  a  policy,  namely  a  change  
to   the   relative3  likelihood  of  outcomes  and  changes   to   the  utilities  of  outcomes.  First,   con-­‐‑
sider  changes  to  likelihood.  Suppose  we  have  two  outcomes,  a  good  and  a  bad  one.  Intui-­‐‑
tively,  lowering  the  relative  likelihood  of  the  bad  outcome  –  and  increasing  the  likelihood  of  
a  good  outcome  –  improves  the  choiceworthiness  of  a  policy.  Similarly,  increasing  the  rela-­‐‑
tive  likelihood  of  the  bad  outcome  worsens  the  choiceworthiness  of  a  policy.  More  generally  
moving  likelihood  from  a  worse  to  a  better  outcome  improves  choiceworthiness  and  moving  
likelihood   from   a   better   to   a  worse   outcome  worsens   choiceworthiness.   Second,   consider  
changes  to  utility.  The  principle  here  is  even  clearer,  since  utility  is  not  relative  in  the  same  
way  that  likelihood  is.  Quite  simply,  a  policy’s  choiceworthiness  is  improved  if  the  utility  of  
one  of  its  possible  outcomes  is  increased,  and  its  choiceworthiness  is  worsened  if  the  utility  
of  an  outcome  is  decreased.  
PP  does  not  in  all  cases  respect  changes  of  these  kinds  of  change.  There  are  two  kinds  
of   problem.   The   first   is   that   PP   treats   two  policies   as   equally   choiceworthy   although   one  
dominates  the  other.  A  policy  dominates  another  if  it  is  more  choiceworthy  than  another  in  
any  of  the  ways  described  above.  Consider  two  policies,  A  and  B,   that  have  the  same  two  
possible  outcomes,  Good  and  Bad.  Suppose  Bad  is  sufficiently  bad  to  meet  the  H  threshold,  
and  that  the  likelihood  of  Bad  is  lower  in  A  than  in  B.  A  thus  dominates  B  in  terms  of  likeli-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
3  I  assume  that  the  likelihood  of  one  outcome  is  relative  to  the  likelihood  of  other  outcomes,  since  the  
laws  of  probability  demand  that  the  likelihood  of  all  possible  outcomes  sum  to  1;  decreasing  the  like-­‐‑
lihood  of  one  outcome  therefore  necessarily  increases  the  likelihood  of  another  outcome  (although  we  
may  not  know  which  other  outcome’s  likelihood  is  increased,  and  although  the  likelihoods  may  not  be  
known  with  much  precision).  
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hood.  As  long  as  the  likelihood  of  Bad  in  both  A  and  B  is  above  the  K  threshold,  both  poli-­‐‑
cies  will  be  equally  prohibited  by  PP.    
Next   consider   two  other  policies,  C  and  D.  Each  has   two  possible  outcomes,  Likely  
and  Unlikely.  The  likelihoods  are  identical  for  C  and  D.  The  utility  of  unlikely  is  very  low  in  
both  cases,  but  the  utility  of  Likely-­‐‑C  is  higher  than  Likely-­‐‑D.  C  therefore  dominates  D.  But  
supposing   that  Unlikely  meets   the  K   threshold,  both  C  and  D  will  be  prohibited,  and   the  
dominance  of  C  will  not  show  itself  in  the  recommendations  of  PP.  PP  thus  neglects  domi-­‐‑
nance,  both  in  terms  of  likelihood  and  in  terms  of  utility.  
The  other  problem  has  to  do  with  trade-­‐‑offs.  Suppose  we  have  two  policies,  E  and  F,  
that  each  has  a  good  and  a  bad  outcome.  Suppose  Bad-­‐‑F   is  sufficiently  bad  to  meet   the  H  
threshold,   but   that   Bad-­‐‑E   is   not.   By   improving   the   utility   of   Good-­‐‑F,   we   make   F   more  
choiceworthy.  But  as   long  as  F   is  prohibited  by  PP,  we  can  make  Good-­‐‑F  arbitrarily  better  
without  ever  making  F  more  choiceworthy  that  E.  It   thus  seems  that  the  use  of  thresholds  
implies  that  a  prohibited  policy’s  choiceworthiness  can  be  improved  by  an  infinite  amount,  
and  yet  it  can  never  be  more  choiceworthy  than  an  allowed  policy.    
  
3.3 The arbitrariness objection 
The  third  and  final  objection  is  that  the  PP’s  use  of  thresholds  of  utility  and  likelihood  arbi-­‐‑
trarily   places   a   large   importance   on   very   specific   levels   of   utility   and   likelihood.   Why  
should   exactly   these   levels   determine   the   difference   between   prohibition   and   allowance?  
The  objection  comes  in  three  different  strengths.  The  weak  version  merely  demands  that  we  
should  be  prepared  to  justify  the  use  of  the  specific  relevant  threshold  levels  when  arguing  
for  the  use  of  some  version  of  PP  in  some  individual  case.  Justification  may  be  wholly  case-­‐‑
specific,  and   there  are  no  general  criteria   for   the  kinds  of  values  H  and  K  must   take   for  a  
version  of  PP  to  be  warranted.  The  medium-­‐‑strength  objection  demands  exactly  such  gen-­‐‑
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eral  criteria.  In  other  words,  it  argues  that  PP  must  include  a  list  of  the  kinds  of  values  and  
likelihoods  that  can  figure  in  a  justifiable  version  of  PP,  and  that  we  can  give  reasons  why  
these   kinds   of   values   and   likelihoods   should   be   accorded   the   importance   that   serving   as  
thresholds  endow  them  with.  Finally,  the  strong  version  of  the  objection  claims  that  no  rea-­‐‑
son  can  be  given  for  endowing  any  values  and  likelihoods  with  this  sort  of  importance.    
According   to   the  weak   and  medium-­‐‑strength   objections,   PP   is   irrational   because   it  
does  not  support  important  judgments  with  reasons.  The  strong  version  of  the  arbitrariness  
objection   views   PP   as   irrational   because   the   very   idea   of   thresholds   violates   some   basic  
norms  that  our  normative   thinking  must  recognize.  The  kind  of  categorical  distinctions  be-­‐‑
tween  values  and/or  likelihoods  that  thresholds  require  are  simply  not  part  of  any  justifia-­‐‑
ble  normative  theory,  moral  or  prudential.  
  
3.4 Relations between the objections 
Although   the   three   objections   focus   on  different   issues,   they   are   clearly   related,   and   they  
mutually  support  each  other  in  several  ways.  The  long-­‐‑run  objection  strengthens  the  intui-­‐‑
tion  that  changes  in  choiceworthiness  should  matter.  Since  the  intuitive  changes  in  choice-­‐‑
worthiness   are   also   changes   in   expected  utility,   the   long-­‐‑run  perspective  makes  vivid   the  
costs  of  a  strategy  that  allows  the  choice  of   less-­‐‑choiceworthy  policies.  Similarly,   the   long-­‐‑
run  objection  highlights  a  danger  in  case-­‐‑specific  justification  of  thresholds,  since  the  cumu-­‐‑
lative  effects  of  choices  that  seem  acceptable  in  isolation  may  be  large  and  bad.  Finally,  there  
is  a  close  relationship  between  the  strong  arbitrariness  objection  and  the  trade-­‐‑off  version  of  
the  neglect  objection.  The   idea  behind  the   trade-­‐‑off  version  of   the  neglect  objection   is   that  
there  must  be  some  increase  to  the  utility  of  a  good  outcome  that  compensates  for  the  bad-­‐‑
ness   of   a   bad   outcome.  Martin  Peterson   (2008,   p.   115;   2009,   p.   76)   defends   this   “trade-­‐‑off  
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principle”  as  an  axiom  of  rationality.  In  another  paper  (2006,  p.  599)  he  argues  for  an  analo-­‐‑
gous  principle  with  respect  to  likelihoods.  
   The  three  objections  all  challenge  the  use  of  thresholds  of  likelihood  and  of  value  in  
risky  choice,  although  they  do  it   from  slightly  different  angles.  Furthermore,  as  noted,   the  
weaknesses  of  PP  that  they  stress  are  the  flipside  of  important  virtues  of  the  theory  the  ob-­‐‑
jections  are  grounded  on,  namely  EUT.  The  overall  challenge   they  pose   to  PP   is   thus   this:    
How,  if  at  all,  can  we  justify  the  use  of  a  decision  procedure  that  uses  thresholds  of  utility  
and  likelihood?  Such  a  procedure  is  inferior  to  EUT  in  the  long  run,  and  it  seems  not  to  re-­‐‑
spect  the  relevance  of  value  and  likelihood  changes  for  the  choiceworthiness  of  policies.  So  
why  not   just  use  EUT,  which  is  known  to  produce  optimal  outcomes  in  the  long  run,  and  
does  not  make  use  of  counterintuitive  categorical  distinctions?    
  
4. Answering the objections 
My  answer  to  the  challenge  has  two  parts.  First,  I  show  that  the  use  of  categorical  distinc-­‐‑
tions  in  value  is  more  plausible  than  one  might  suspect,  and  hence  that  EUT  may  not  be  the  
correct   normative   theory.   Second,   I   argue   that   even   if  we   assume   that   EUT   is   the   correct  
normative  theory,  we  still  might  be  well  advised  to  use  PP,  since  it  does  better  that  the  non-­‐‑
ideal  implementations  of  EUT  that  are  its  realistic  competitors.    
  
4.1 Categorical distinctions in value 
Several   of   the   rationality   objections   either   assume  or   try   to   argue   that   categorical   distinc-­‐‑
tions   in  value,  such  as  PP’s  use  of   the  H  threshold,  cannot  be   justified.  The  strong  neglect  
and  arbitrariness  objections  state  this  directly,  while  the  weaker  versions  merely  challenges  
defenders  of  PP  to  justify  the  thresholds,  or  to  provide  an  argument  for  why  the  seemingly  
relevant   changes   in   relative   choiceworthiness   cannot   make   a   prohibited   theory   more  
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choiceworthy  than  an  allowed  policy.  But,  as  I  argue  in  this  section,  several  plausible  nor-­‐‑
mative  theories  do  allow  for  categorical  distinctions.  
     Arguably   the  most   likely   source  of   categorical  distinctions   is   the  view   that  utilities  
are  defined  relationally,   i.e.  with  reference  to  the  other  outcomes  that  are  at  play  in  a  given  
choice.  A  familiar   idea   in  much  (especially  non-­‐‑consequentialist)  ethical   theory  is   that  cer-­‐‑
tain  trade-­‐‑offs  are  off-­‐‑limits,  e.g.  that  human  lives  may  not  be  traded  of  for  mere  economic  
gain.   In   the  case  of  risky  choice   the  claim  must  be   that  a  specific   type  of  bads  may  not  be  
risked  in  order  to  gain  a  chance  of  a  specific  type  of  good.  It  seems  intuitively  plausible,  for  
example,   that  we  ought  not  risk  our   lives  for  minor  economic  gains  –  say  $10  –  no  matter  
how  low  the  likelihood  of  losing  is;  and,  to  return  to  the  synthetic  biology  example,  that  we  
ought  not  risk  human  extinction  for  the  sake  of  lower  prices  on  agricultural  products.  In  the  
European  Commission’s   guidelines   on   PP,   it   is   repeatedly   stressed   that   the   protection   of  
public   health   should   take   precedence   over   economic   considerations   (e.g.   European  Com-­‐‑
mission,  2000,  p.  4,  19).  The  implication  of  a  relational  theory  is  that  changes  of  likelihood  or  
utility  of   the  kinds  stressed  by   the  neglect  objection  should  never  make  a  difference   to   the  
ranking  of  policies  –   i.e.   that  no  prohibited  policy  should  ever  be  chosen  over  an  allowed  
policy.  
   The  other  general  strategy  for  justifying  categorical  distinctions  in  value  takes  it  to  be  
the  case  that  some  bads  are  intrinsically  categorically  worse  than  most  others.  In  the  context  
of  PP,  two  kinds  of  outcome  are  often  highlighted,  namely  irreversible  and  catastrophic  ones.  
It   is  not  difficult   to  see  why  catastrophes  have  extremely   low  utility.   It   is   less  obvious   for  
irreversible  outcomes,  since  an  irreversible  outcome  could  be  good,  or  bad  but  trivial.  The  
kind   of   irreversible   outcome   that   could   generate   categorical   differences   in   utility   occurs  
when  some  valuable  thing,  or  some  bearer  of  value,  goes  out  of  existence.  Examples  include  
the   extinction   of   species,   including   humanity,  the   destruction   of   ecosystems   or   historical  
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artefacts,   the  bankruptcy  of  a  business  and   the  death  of  a  human  being.  The  general   idea  
behind  seeing  irreversible  outcomes  as  categorically  worse  than  reversible  ones  is  that  valu-­‐‑
able  things,  or  bearers  of  value,  generate  utility  at  each  point   in  time  in  which  they  exists.  
Valuable  things  can  do  so  by  having  ‘existence  value’  or  because  contemplating  them  gen-­‐‑
erates  valuable  mental  states;  bearers  of  value  can  do  so  by  being  necessary  for  the  occur-­‐‑
rence  of  valuable  features  of  states  of  affairs,  such  as  welfare.  
An  especially  strong  version  of  the  irreversibility  problem  concerns  cases  where  what  
is   lost   is   everything   that   generates   value.   This   is   known   as   the   ruin   problem.   Importantly,  
ruin   undermines   the   relevance   long-­‐‑run   considerations,   since   ruin   prevents   the   long   run  
from  ever  happening.4  From  the  point  of  view  of  an  investor,  for  example,  bankruptcy  liter-­‐‑
ally  wipes  out  everything.  Most  cases  of  ruin  depend  on  the  framing  of  decisions;  for  exam-­‐‑
ple,  my  death   is   ruinous  when  considering  how  choices  affect  value-­‐‑for-­‐‑me,  but  of  course  
does  not  amount   to   the  end  of  all  value.  Perhaps  the  extinction  of  humanity,  or  of  all   life,  
would  be  ruinous  in  a  global  framing  as  well,  if  the  very  existence  of  value  depends  on  hu-­‐‑
man  consciousness,  sentience,  or  teleological  striving.  At  least  for  all  we  know  it  could  be,  if  
no  such  things  exist  elsewhere  in  the  universe,  and  will  not  evolve  there  either.  
   However,  I  am  sceptical  that  either  catastrophes  or  irreversible  loss  of  valuable  things  
are   genuinely   categorically   worse   than   other   types   of   outcome.   Catastrophes   may   be  
thought  of  as  merely  very,  very  bad.  And  the  value  loss  of  irreversible  outcomes  will  also  be  
bounded,  if  the  alternative  to  destruction  now  is  not  existence  forever,  but  merely  existence  
for   some   time.   The   orthodox   theory   of   the   badness   of   death,   for   example,   says   that   it   is  
equal  to  the  good  life  that  the  person  would  have  experienced  had  she  not  died  now,  but  at  
the   later   time  where  she  would  have  otherwise  died   (see  McMahan,   2002,  pp.  103-­‐‑107).   If  
                                                                                                                        
4  The  long  run  is,  of  course,  not   literally  an  event.  Rather,   long-­‐‑run  value  is  a   limit  value  as  time  (or  
number  of  choices  made)  approaches  infinity.  
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other  valuable  things  also  have  a  limited  existence,  which  they  plausibly  do,  then  the  nega-­‐‑
tive  utility  of  destroying  them  will  similarly  be  bounded  (although  potentially  enormous).  
Furthermore,  it  is  noteworthy  that  many  outcomes  are  not  irreversible  as  such,  but  merely  
‘sticky’   in  the  sense  that  some  source  of  utility   is  knocked  out  for  a  considerable  length  of  
time,  but  not  forever.  For  example,  pollution  and  some  ecosystem  collapses  are  sticky  rather  
than   irreversible.   The   value   loss   of   such   outcomes  will   be   potentially  much   lower   than   a  
similar  but  genuinely  irreversible  outcome.  
   Two  considerations  nevertheless  justify  treating  irreversible  outcomes  as  categorical-­‐‑
ly  worse  than  others.  First,  such  outcomes  may  not  be  capable  of  being  outweighed  by  cor-­‐‑
responding  good  outcomes,  since  there  are  no  good  outcomes  that  have  a  positive  utility  of  
the  same  magnitude  as  the  negative  utility  of  the  irreversible  or  catastrophic  outcome.  This  
is  especially  plausible  when  irreversible  bads  are  compared  with  goods  that  only  generate  
utility  at  the  current  time.  For  example,  no  improvement  in  my  welfare  level  seems  compa-­‐‑
rable  to  the   loss  of,  say,  50  years  of   ‘normal’  good  life.  More  generally,  we  might  suppose  
that  utility  is  bounded  upwards,  i.e.  that  there  is  a  maximum  goodness  that  an  outcome  can  
have.  In  that  case,  the  magnitude  of  badness  of  very  bad  outcomes  may  in  effect  be  categor-­‐‑
ically   greater   than   the  magnitude  of   goodness   of   even   the  best  possible   outcome.  An   im-­‐‑
portant  caveat  is  that  these  considerations  do  not  apply  if  goodness  can  include  ‘opportuni-­‐‑
ty  goodness’,  i.e.  if  we  define  the  value  of  preventing  a  very  bad  outcome  as  ‘good’.  The  no-­‐‑
tion  that  opportunity  goodness  of  preventing  catastrophes  is  categorically  smaller  than  the  
ordinary   badness   of   the   catastrophe   seems   to   require   a   very   strong   form   of   the   do-­‐‑
ing/allowing  distinction  (or  a  related  distinction)  that  is  prima  facie  implausible.  
   Second,  categorical  distinctions  can  be  pragmatically  justified.  The  difference  in  utili-­‐‑
ty  is  judged  to  be  so  large  that  it  makes  sense  to  treat  two  outcomes  as  being  of  categorically  
different  value,  although  really  they  are  not.  The  advantage  to  this  move  is  that  we  can  ig-­‐‑
  142  
nore  the  details  of  precisely  how  much  worse  a  catastrophe  of  some  kind  is  than  some  other,  
more  ‘normal’  outcome.  This  line  of  argument  has  been  applied  to  human  extinction  (Parfit  
1984,  pp.  453-­‐‑454),  global  warming  (Shue,  2015)  and  nuclear  weapons  proliferation  (Goodin,  
1985;  McMahan,   1986).   In   the   context   of   PP,  Alan  Randall   (2012,   pp.   110-­‐‑121)   has   argued  
that   precaution   is  warranted  when   a   bad  possible   outcome   is  disproportionate   to   the   good  
outcome(s)  that  are  also  possible.  In  slogan  form,  “Don’t  risk  great  harm  in  pursuit  of  mod-­‐‑
erate  benefit”  (Randall,  2012,  p.  112).  As  this  phrase  suggests,  Randall’s  theory  looks  more  
like  the  relational  theories  discussed  above.  The  important  difference  from  the  intrinsic  the-­‐‑
ories  is  that  Randall  allows  for  precaution  in  cases  where  the  bad  outcome  is  not  catastrophi-­‐‑
cally  bad,  but  merely  bad  relative  to  the  good  outcomes  involved.    
   I  have  not  here  attempted  to  argue  that  categorical  distinctions  are  ultimately  part  of  
the   correct   normative   theory.  My   aim   has  merely   been   to   show   that   plausible   normative  
theories  do  allow  for  categorical  distinctions,  and  hence   that   it   is  at   least  possible   that   the  
categorical  distinctions  used  by  PP  are  justified  by  the  correct  normative  theory.  This  possi-­‐‑
bility  weakens  the  rationality  objections,  since  acting  in  accordance  with  the  correct  norma-­‐‑
tive  theory  can  hardly  be  irrational.  
  
4.2 Precaution versus real-world utility maximization 
Suppose  that  it  turns  out  that  EUT  is  the  correct  normative  theory  of  risky  choice.  PP  might  
still  be  justified  pragmatically,  as  the  best  available  decision  procedure  to  follow  in  the  real  
world.  This  is  exactly  what  I  will  now  argue  that  it   is.  I  argue  first  that  the  ideal  EUT  that  
inputs  the  correct  utilities  is  not  the  same  as  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  (that  is,  real-­‐‑world  utility  deci-­‐‑
sion  procedures  that  directly  aim  to  maximize  utility,  such  as  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis).  Second,  
I  argue  that  PP  may  not  diverge  from  ideal  EUT  in  its  recommendations  of  policies.  Third,  
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and  finally,  I  argue  that  PP  is  superior  to  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  given  the  circumstances  in  which  
we  must  choose.  
  
4.2.1 Ideal and non-ideal EUT 
Ideal  EUT  is  the  version  of  EUT  in  which  all  the  utilities  we  use  as  inputs  are  the  right  ones.  
The  project  of  finding  the  right  utilities  faces  two  problems,  namely  that  it  requires  a  large  
number  of  very  hard-­‐‑to-­‐‑make  judgments,  and  that  utilities  may  not  be  independent  of  mor-­‐‑
al  and  prudential  judgments  about  what  risky  choices  to  make.  
   Consider  the  first  problem.  In  order  to  arrive  at  precise  measures  of  the  utility  of  out-­‐‑
comes,  we  must  be  able  to  assess  the  relative  values  of  all  the  goods  and  bads  that  contrib-­‐‑
ute   to   utility.   Just   to   cover   ordinary   environmental   and   public   health   policy,   this   would  
require   assessing   the   relative   values   of   technological   innovations   in   a   number   of   fields,  
purely   financial   losses   and   gains,   the   preservation   of   ecosystems,   the  welfare   of   animals,  
detrimental   health   effects   on   human   beings   and   the   loss   of   human   life.   Clearly   this   is   a  
monumental  task.  Markets  are  the  only  example  in  which  such  a  number  of  relative  values  
are  determined  precisely,   in   the   form  of   the   relative  prices   of   goods.   But   this   is   arguably  
only  possible  because  the  relative  values  that  are  embodied  in  the  price  system  do  not  cor-­‐‑
respond  to  any   judgments  of   relative  value,  but  are  rather   the  aggregated  effects  of  many  
small   (more   or   less   qualified)   judgments.   It   is   doubtful   whether   the   aggregation   of   this  
enormous   number   of   small   judgments   can   be  mimicked   by   any   non-­‐‑market   system,   and  
also  whether  such  aggregated  relative  values  are  normatively  compelling.  
   The   second,   and   arguably   harder,   problem   is   that   determination   of   utilities   is   not  
independent   of   judgments   involving   risk.   EUT   requires   cardinal   utility   numbers,   rather  
than  merely  ordinal  ones.  Ordinal  numbers  (which  I  have  assumed  it  is  possible  to  assign)  
give  us  only  a  ranking,  such  that  a  higher  number  signifies  that  the  outcome  is  better.  Car-­‐‑
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dinal  numbers  also  provide  relative  magnitudes,  such  that  an  outcome  with  utility  6  is  twice  
as  good  as  an  outcome  with  utility  3.  Calculating  expected  utility  requires  cardinal  utilities.  
In  orthodox  axiomatic  versions  of  EUT,  cardinal  utilities  are  arrived  at  by  eliciting  prefer-­‐‑
ences  over  risky  choices.  It   is   therefore  trivially  correct  that  we  should  maximize  expected  
utility,  since  the  cardinal  utilities  are  defined  as  those  that  make  maximizing  expected  utili-­‐‑
ty  correct.   If   relative  utilities  are  supposed   to  be  morally  defensible,   the  orthodox  method  
would  therefore  require  us  to  have  a  full  and  defensible  moral  theory  of  risky  choice  before  
we  can  arrive  at  the  utilities  that  should  serve  as  input  to  ideal  EUT.  
But  suppose  we  reject  the  orthodox  way  of  determining  cardinal  utility,  and  assume  
that  we  can  assess  such  utilities   independently  of   judgments  about  what  risky  choices  are  
justified.  Ideal  EUT  will  need  to  accommodate  the  everyday  observation  that  people  tend  to  
be  risk  averse  in  the  sense  that  they  prefer  not  to  take  gambles  with  small  expected  gains  in  
terms   of  money   (or   other   goods)   if   the   possible   losses   are   large   –   e.g.   a   coin   toss  where  
heads  yield  $10.000  and  tails  yields  $-­‐‑9.000.  The  standard  way  in  which  EUT  accommodates  
common  sense  risk  aversion  is  by  assuming  that  the  marginal  utility  of  money  is  diminish-­‐‑
ing.  That  is,   the  utility  derived  from  gaining  an  extra  X  dollars  is  smaller  the  more  money  
you  already  have.  It  makes  sense  to  prefer  the  status  quo  to  the  coin  toss  because  the  $10.000  
potentially   gained   is  worth   less,   in   terms   of   utility,   than   the   $9.000   potentially   lost.   Even  
though  the  gamble  has  an  expected  gain  in  terms  of  money,  is  has  an  expected  loss  in  terms  
of  utility.  The  same  potentially  goes  for  all  other  bads  and  goods  that  contribute  to  utility.    
Diminishing  marginal  utility  makes  the  task  of  determining  the  utility  of  an  outcome  
much  harder,   because  we   cannot  merely  determine   the   amount  of   the  various  goods   and  
bads  and  then  multiply  those  by  their  respective  value.  The  reason  is  that  there  is  no  fixed  
value  for  a  unit  of  a  good  –  the  value  of  a  unit  of  a  good  is  dependent  on  how  much  of  the  
good  we  already  have.  Diminishing  marginal  utility  is  merely  one  example  of  holism  in  val-­‐‑
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ue,  i.e.  of  how  the  value  of  some  thing  depends  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  other  valuable  
(or  disvaluable)   things   (see   e.g.  Brown,   2007;   Schroeder,   2011).  The  notion  of  diminishing  
marginal  utility  generates  a  further  problem  for  EUT,  since  it  implies  that  there  is  a  de  facto  
upper  boundary  of  utility:  As  the  current  level  of  utility  grows,  the  extra  amount  of  a  good  
(e.g.   wealth   or  well-­‐‑being)   that   needs   to   be   added   to   achieve   an   extra   unit   of   utility   ap-­‐‑
proaches  infinity.  It  is  of  course  debatable  where  this  de  facto  boundary  is.  But  the  mere  fact  
that  it  is  there  supports  the  pragmatic  use  of  categorical  distinctions,  as  argued  in  §4.1.  
Determining  what   the  utilities   in   ideal  EUT  are   is   thus  a  very  difficult,  perhaps   im-­‐‑
possible  task.  Any  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  procedure,  such  as  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis,  thus  at  best  ap-­‐‑
proximates  ideal  EUT.  Such  non-­‐‑ideal  procedures  therefore  do  not  straightforwardly  inherit  
the  normative  status  of  ideal  EUT  (which  I  assume  here  to  be  the  correct  normative  theory),  
and  we  cannot  assume  that  they  recommend  the  same  policies  that  ideal  EUT  would.  
  
4.2.2 Ideal EUT and PP 
The  rationality  objections  assume  that  PP  is  a  more  or  less  radical  departure  from  ideal  EUT.  
I  will  now  argue   that   this  assumption   is  not   justified.  Since   it   is  not  clear  what   ideal  EUT  
recommends,  which   rules   out   a   direct   comparison   of   recommendations,   I   can   only   show  
that  PP  does  not   (contrary   to  popular  belief)  possess  certain   features   that  would  plausible  
bring  it  into  disagreement  with  ideal  EUT.  
First,  PP  is  often  assumed  to  be  a  principle  that  only   justifies  policies  that  are  maxi-­‐‑
mally  safe.  But  PP  primarily  prohibits  certain  policies,  namely  those  that  have  a  likelihood  
greater  than  K  of  leading  to  an  outcome  worse  than  H.  As  I  discussed  above,  it  is  open  for  
debate  whether  the  principles  used  to  select  among  the  policies  allowed  by  a  version  of  PP  
should  be  seen  as  part  of  PP  as  well.  I  suggested  that  they  should  not.  At  any  rate,  the  im-­‐‑
portant  thing  is  that  these  principles  are  not  precautionary  in  any  sense.  They  may  be  risk-­‐‑
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neutral,  or  at  most  risk-­‐‑averse  in  the  ordinary  way  that  I  have  argued  ideal  EUT  should  be  
able  to  accommodate.  
Second,  PP  could  diverge  quite  a  lot  from  ideal  EUT  if  the  H  and  K  thresholds  could  
be  set  at  any  level   (cf.   the  arbitrariness  objection).  But   they  cannot.  The  most  fundamental  
point   is   that   thresholds  must  be   justified   independently;  setting  thresholds   to   justify  one’s  
preferred  policy  is  a  misuse  of  PP.  In  practice,  any  application  of  PP  would  occur  in  institu-­‐‑
tional  settings  where  H  and  K  would  need  to  be  justified,  e.g.  in  a  court  of  law,  in  adminis-­‐‑
trative   practice   or   in   ordinary   political   deliberation   (Trouwborst,   2006,   pp.   99-­‐‑111).   Fur-­‐‑
thermore,   PP   is   already   circumscribed   by   certain   criteria   for  what   kind   of   outcomes   and  
likelihoods  can  serve  as  thresholds,  or  if  not  it  can  easily  be  supplemented  by  such  criteria.  
With   respect   to  H,   it   is   important   the  harm   is   genuinely   “special   bad”,   in   Stephen   John’s  
phrase  (John,  2007).  The  considerations  described  in  §4.1  precisely  aim  to  show  that  special  
bads  are  involved,  whether  they  are  intrinsically  or  only  relationally  special.  
With  respect  to  K,  PP  will  normally  require  at  least  the  use  of  the  best  available  scien-­‐‑
tific  data.  If  such  data  clearly  indicates  that  no  harm  is  at  all  likely,  then  PP  does  not  come  
into  function.  For  example,  the  European  Commission  requires  that  “preliminary  objective  
scientific   evaluation   indicates   that   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for   concern”   (European  
Commission,  2000,  p.  2).  And  contrary  to  what  critics  of  PP  often  suppose,  the  mere  possibil-­‐‑
ity  of  harm  is  not  sufficient.  Critics  are  not  solely  responsible   for   this,   since  some  of   those  
who  use  PP  to  justify  policies  rhetorically  also  frequently  imply  that  mere  possibility  is  suffi-­‐‑
cient.  But  PP  as  it  is  realized  in  practice  demands  more.    
  
4.2.3 PP versus non-ideal EUT 
I   have   now   argued,   in   effect,   that   there   is   no   strong   reason   to   think   that   non-­‐‑ideal   EUT  
comes  much   closer   to   ideal  EUT   than  PP  does.   Still,   given   that  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  at   least   at-­‐‑
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tempts  to  estimate  what  ideal  EUT  would  recommend,  it  might  be  reasonable  to  think  that  
we  should  prefer  using  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  as  our  decision  procedure  for  risky  choice.  But  as  I  
will  now  argue,  there  are  in  fact  reasons  to  prefer  PP  as  a  decision  procedure.  The  general  
reason   for   this   is   that   the  circumstances   in  which  our  choices  must  be  made   favour  using  
PP,  rather  than  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT.  
   The  first  way  in  which  circumstances  militate  against  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  is  well  known  in  
discussions  of  risky  choice.  Just  like  EUT  requires  cardinal  utilities,  it  also  requires  quantita-­‐‑
tive   information  about   likelihoods,   i.e.   that  probabilities  can  be  assigned   to  each  outcome.  
PP  is  often  defended  as  a  principle  that  is  supposed  to  apply  in  exactly  those  cases  where  it  
is  impossible  to  assign  precise  probabilities  (although  the  PP  I  have  defended  is  not  in  prin-­‐‑
ciple   limited   to   such   cases).  EUT  on   the  other  hand  has   (strictly   speaking)  nothing   to   say  
about  these  cases.  If  EUT  is  to  be  action  guiding  in  a  case  where  probabilities  are  missing,  it  
must  be  supplemented  by  an  extra  decision  principle  (e.g.  that  regulation  is  only  justified  if  
an   EUT   can   show   that   benefits   justify   costs).   Such   extra   principles   are   not   automatically  
justified  by  the  same  reasons  that   justify  EUT,  and  there  is  a  distinct  risk  that  they  are  ap-­‐‑
plied  unconsciously  and  therefore  without  being  properly  thought  through.  
   The  second  problem  for  EUT  is  a  generalization  of   the  first.  Successful   implementa-­‐‑
tion  of  EUT  does  not  merely  require  that  we  can  assign  probabilities  and  cardinal  utilities  to  
outcomes,  but  also  that  this  information  is  precise  and  of  good  quality.  Information  is  precise  
when  we  have   a   single-­‐‑number   value   for  probability   or  utility,   rather   than   an   interval   of  
possible  values,  or  a   rough  estimate.   Information   is  of  good  quality   if   it   is  based  on   solid  
evidence  of   the  kind  relevant   to  probabilities  and  utilities,   respectively.   In  most  cases,  our  
information  will  have  at  most  one  of  these  properties.    
Consider   for   example   the   case   of   H5N1   gain-­‐‑of-­‐‑function   research.   In   that   case   we  
have  an  estimate  based  on  relatively  good  evidence  of  the  likelihood  that  the  virus  will  es-­‐‑
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cape  from  a  BSL-­‐‑3  laboratory.  But  that  estimate  ranges  from  1/1,000  to  1/10,000,  which  gen-­‐‑
erates  large  differences  in  the  expected  utility  of  the  policy  if  the  (positive  or  negative)  utili-­‐‑
ty  associated  with  that  outcome  is  large.  In  the  H5N1  case,  it  is:  Namely  expected  fatalities  
of  between  2  million  and  1.4  billion.  The  uncertainty  in  the  probability  estimates  thus  gen-­‐‑
erates  a  difference  in  the  expected  value  of  the  BSL-­‐‑3  policy  of  between  18.000  and  1.26  mil-­‐‑
lion  lives  lost.  Although  there  are  generalizations  of  EUT  that  allows  the  treatment  of  inter-­‐‑
vals  of  probability,  they  are  not  as  normatively  attractive  as  the  simple  form  (not  to  mention  
that   they   are   technically   very   complicated).   And   any   way   of   narrowing   the   probability  
ranges  will  lower  the  quality  of  the  probability  estimate,  making  it  less  reliable.  This  again  
undermines  the  normative  attractiveness  of  EUT.  So  the  justificatory  gap  between  ideal  and  
non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  mentioned  above  holds  for  likelihood  estimates  as  well  as  utility  estimates.  
   The  problem  for  EUT  is  not  just  the  justificatory  gap.  Evidence  from  psychology  and  
behavioural  economics  suggests  that  attempting  to  use  EUT  is  not  always  a  good  strategy  in  
practice.  Experimental   evidence   suggests   that   agents  who  violate  EUT   in   certain  ways  do  
just   as   well   as,   and   sometimes   better   than,   those  who   follow   EUT   (Arkes,   Gigerenzer   &  
Hertwig,  2016;  Berg,  Eckel  &  Johnson,  2010).  In  the  field  of  investment  allocation,  for  exam-­‐‑
ple,   it  has  been  shown  that  simply  dividing  your  money  evenly  between   the  assets  under  
consideration  outperforms  sophisticated  optimization  models   in  certain  conditions   (DeMi-­‐‑
guel,  Garlappi  &  Uppal,  2007).  Generally,  using  models  such  as  EUT  in  cases  where  we  do  
not  have  precise  and  good  information  introduces  the  possibility  of  estimation  error,  while  
simpler  decision  procedures  are  typically  biased  in  some  direction  (Brighton  &  Gigerenzer,  
2012).  In  our  case,  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  risks  getting  likelihoods  and/or  utilities  wrong,  while  PP  
is  (or  at  least  may  be)  biased  in  the  sense  that  it  attaches  too  much  importance  to  the  differ-­‐‑
ence  between  being  over  and  under  the  H  or  K  thresholds.  In  cases  such  as  these,  we  face  a  
trade-­‐‑off   between  minimizing   bias   and  minimizing   estimation   error.   The   choice   between  
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these  flaws  depends  on  which  of  the  two  generates  the  least  bad  errors  in  the  concrete  deci-­‐‑
sion  environment  in  which  we  find  ourselves.    
Steel  (2014,  Ch.  4)  provides  evidence  that  PP’s  bias  is  preferable,  in  the  form  of  a  sur-­‐‑
vey  of  two  types  of  cases:  (i)  Cases  where  PP  was  not  applied,  even  though  it  was  warrant-­‐‑
ed,  and  (ii)  cases  where  PP  was  applied,  even  though  it  was  not  warranted.  In  type-­‐‑(i)  cases,  
no  action  was  taken  despite  the  existence  of  evidence  that  an  activity  was  harmful.  In  type-­‐‑
(ii)  cases,  action  was  taken,  but  the  activity  later  turned  out  not  to  be  harmful.  Steel  argues  
that   the  negative   consequences  of   type-­‐‑(i)   cases  have  been  much  worse   than   the  negative  
consequences  of  type-­‐‑(ii)  cases.  The  former  includes  the  collapse  of  fisheries,  contamination  
of  sources  of  ground  water,  and  several  hundred  thousand  deaths,  while  the  latter  included  
the  necessity  of  using  other  artificial  sweeteners  than  saccharin,  and  having  breast  enlarge-­‐‑
ments  using  other  materials  than  silicone.  
It  should  not  be  too  surprising  that  PP’s  bias  is  less  bad  than  EUT  misestimations.  As  
I  have  argued  above,  misestimations  of  irreversible  and  ‘sticky’  outcomes  may  be  large,  and  
temporal  myopia  (as  well  as  explicit  time  discounting)  means  that  we  are  prone  to  underes-­‐‑
timate   them.  On  the  other  hand,  excessive  precaution   is   typically   limited   in   time.   In  cases  
where  the  costs  of  a  policy  justified  by  PP  are  significant,  it  is  highly  likely  that  effort  will  be  
put  into  generating  further  evidence  that  shows  the  relevant  activity  to  be  safe,  or  to  design-­‐‑
ing  alternative  policies   that   are   less   costly.  The  European  Commission  demands   that  pre-­‐‑
cautionary  measures  be  subject   to  review  in   light  of  new  evidence,  and  it   requires   that  an  
identifiable   party   be   assigned   the   responsibility   for   producing  more   evidence   (European  
Commission,  2000,  p.  19-­‐‑20).  So  in  cases  where  the  original  precautionary  policy  is  not  war-­‐‑
ranted,  and  where  it  has  serious  costs,  it  will  (typically)  only  be  in  effect  for  a  limited  time.  
Furthermore,  the  proportionality  requirement  ensures  that  precaution  does  not  create  high-­‐‑
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I  have   sought   to  defend  PP   from   the   challenge  posed  by   the   rationality  objections   in   two  
ways,   a   strong-­‐‑but-­‐‑shaky   and   a   weak-­‐‑but-­‐‑robust   argument.   §4.1   provides   the   strong   but  
shaky  argument,  according   to  which  PP  may  be   (part  of)   the  correct  normative   theory   for  
risky  choices.  §4.2  provides  the  weak-­‐‑but-­‐‑robust  argument  that  non-­‐‑ideal  EUT  and  PP  are  
equally  close  to  ideal  EUT  –  assumed  to  be  the  correct  normative  theory  –  and  that  there  are  
reasons   to  prefer   using  PP   as   a  decision  procedure   in   these   cases.   In   either   case,   it   is   not  
irrational   to  use  PP,  since   it   is  either  a  way  of  correctly  taking  all   the  reasons  that  bear  on  
risky  choice  into  account,  or  a  pragmatic  decision  procedure  that  realizes  our  goals  in  risky  
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For  many  of  us,  a  moment’s  self-­‐‑reflection  would  reveal  that  we  are  far  from  perfect  when  it  
comes  to  reasoning  about  probabilities,  uncertainties  and  risk.  In  recent  decades,  cognitive  
psychologists  have  produced  further  evidence  that  confirms  this.  For  example,  people  tend  
to  neglect  the  base-­‐‑rate  when  judging  the  likelihood  of  that  a  hypothesis  is  true  given  some  
evidence   (e.g.   the   likelihood   that   a   patient   has  HIV   given   that   an  HIV   test   has   come   out  
positive).   But   base   rates  matter   a   lot.   Suppose,   for   example,   that   the   relevant   test   catches  
99%  of  all  HIV  cases,  and  only  has  a  false  positive  rate  of  1%  (that  is,  1%  of  the  HIV-­‐‑negative  
people   who   are   tested   show   up   as   positive).  Most   people   would   assume   that   it   is   over-­‐‑
whelmingly  likely  that  they  have  HIV,  given  that  the  test  is  positive.  But  suppose  now  that  
the  base  rate  for  HIV  –  the  proportion  of  people  in  the  tested  population  who  as  a  matter  of  
fact  have  HIV  -­‐‑  is  fairly  low,  say  1/10,000.  In  that  case,  the  probability  of  having  HIV  given  
that  the  test  is  positive  is  only  about  1%.    
The   tendency   to   ignore   base   rates   is   appropriately   known   as   the   base   rate   fallacy.  
Another   famous  mistake   in  reasoning   is   the  conjunction  fallacy,  wherein  people   judge  the  
probability  of  a  conjunction  to  be  higher  than  the  probability  of  an  individual  conjunct.  In  a  
famous  example,  subjects  were  given  this  short  description  of  a  woman:  “Linda  is  31  years  
old,  single,  outspoken,  and  very  bright.  She  majored  in  philosophy.  As  a  student,  she  was  
deeply  concerned  with   issues  of  discrimination  and  social   justice,  and  also  participated   in  
anti-­‐‑nuclear  demonstrations”.  Subjects  were  then  asked  to  judge  whether  it  is  more  proba-­‐‑
ble  that  Linda  is  a  bank  teller  or  that  she  is  a  bank  teller  and  an  active  feminist.  The  majority  
judged   that   the   latter   is   more   probable,   which   is   logically   impossible   (since   in   all   cases  
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where  Linda  is  a  feminist  bank  teller,  she  is  also  a  bank  teller  simpliciter).  The  base  rate  falla-­‐‑
cy  and  the  conjunction  fallacy  are  perhaps  the  most  famous  of  the  many  systematic  errors,  
or  cognitive  biases,  that  psychologists  have  found  in  ordinary  people’s  reasoning  and  deci-­‐‑
sion-­‐‑making,  but  there  are  many  others.1  
The  aim  of  most  of  the  work  done  by  psychologists,  behavioural  economists  and  oth-­‐‑
ers  concerning  judgment  and  decision  making  has  had  the  descriptive  aim  of  understanding  
how  people  in  fact  make  judgments  and  decisions.  But  more  recently,  some  have  begun  to  
draw  explicitly  normative  conclusions   from  the  psychological   findings.  Probably   the  most  
famous   example   is   libertarian   paternalism,   or   ‘nudging’,   which   consists   in   the   design   of  
‘choice  architecture’  –  the  general  set  of  circumstance  in  which  choices  are  made  –  in  a  way  
that  harnesses  biases  in  a  way  that  produces  better  choices  by  the  choosers’  own  lights.  For  
example,  default  enrolment  in  pension  plans  cause  people  to  save  more,  even  though  they  
are   free   to   opt   out.  Nudging   presents   an   alternative   to   better-­‐‑established   forms   of   policy  
intervention   that   aims   to   alter   behaviour,   such   as   informational   campaigns   or   economic  
incentives.  
My   topic   here   is   not   individual   behaviour,   but   society-­‐‑level   regulation   of   activities  
that  carry  a  risk  of  harm  to  people’s  health  or  the  environment.  In  this  field,  too,  psycholog-­‐‑
ical   findings  have  been  used  as  the  basis   for  normative  arguments.  Over  the   last  15  years,  
Cass  Sunstein  (one  of  the  originators  of  nudging)  has  argued  in  a  number  of  writings  that  
there   is   a   cognitive   argument   for   the  use   of   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis   as   a   basis   for   social   risk  
regulation.2  It   is   safe   to   say   that  Sunstein’s  arguments  have  been   influential   in  practice,   at  
                                                                                                                        
1  Wikipedia’s  ”List  of  Cognitive  Biases”  includes  well  over  150  different  biases,  from  “ambiguity  aver-­‐‑
sion”  through  “the  IKEA  effect”  to  the  “zero-­‐‑sum  heuristic”.    
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases,  accessed  July  14  2016).  
2  Sunstein  is  not  alone  in  using  our  cognitive  shortcoming  as  a  premise  in  a  case  for  cost-­‐‑benefit  analy-­‐‑
sis.   For   example,  Alan  Gibbard   argues   that   ”something   like   risk-­‐‑cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis”   is   needed   in  
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least  in  the  United  States:  Sunstein  served  for  three  years  as  Administrator  of  the  Office  of  
Information  and  Regulatory  Affairs  (OIRA)  during  the  first  term  of  Barack  Obama’s  presi-­‐‑
dency.  The  OIRA  is  responsible  for  reviewing  regulations  from  the  different  agencies  of  the  
US   government,   such   as   the   Environmental   Protection   Agency   (EPA),   the   Occupational  
Health  and  Safety  Administration  (OSHA)  and  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA),  
and  by  Sunstein’s  own  and  others’  accounts  applied  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  widely  under  his  
administration   (Heinzerling,   2014;   2015;  McGarity,   2013;   Sunstein,   2013;   2014).  My   aim   in  
this  paper  is  to  challenge  Sunstein’s  cognitive  argument:  I  will  argue  that  the  aim  of  correct-­‐‑
ing  our  cognitive  shortcomings  in  dealing  with  risk  does  not  warrant  the  use  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  
analysis  as  a  basis  for  risk  regulation.  
  
2. Sunstein’s argument 
In   a  nutshell,   Sunstein   argues   that  our   judgment   and   reasoning  about   cases  where   risk   is  
involved  is  biased  in  various  ways,  and  that  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  can  act  as  a  corrective  to  
these   biases.   Since   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis  works   as   a  mechanism   for   correcting   errors,   it   is  
justified  without   reference   to   any   controversial  moral   views,   such   as   consequentialism  or  
the  view  that  economic  efficiency  is  the  sole  goal  of  policy.  In  Sunstein’s  words  the  cognitive  
argument   should   lead   to   an   “incompletely   theorized   agreement”   between   proponents   of  
most  normative  outlooks  on  the  use  of  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  (Sunstein,  2002,  p.  99).  In  order  
to  understand  the  cognitive  argument,  we  need  to  answer  three  questions:  (1)  What  is  cost-­‐‑
benefit  analysis?  (2)  What  are  the  relevant  cognitive  biases?  (3)  How  does  cost-­‐‑benefit  anal-­‐‑
ysis  correct  these  biases?  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
order   to   ”regiment   our   judgments   about   risk,   and   so   to   avoid   the   blatant   irrationalities   of   unaided  
common  sense”  (Gibbard,  1986:  94).  
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2.1 What is cost-benefit analysis? 
At  the  most  general   level,  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis   (from  now  on  CBA)   is  a  method  for  deter-­‐‑
mining  what  the  overall  societal  costs  and  benefits  are  of  some  policy,  with  a  view  to  judg-­‐‑
ing  whether  that  policy  should  be  carried  out,  or,  where  there  are  several  alternatives,  which  
policy  should  be  chosen.  For  risk  regulation,  CBA  would  thus  consist  in  an  estimate  of  the  
value  of  the  harm  that  regulation  prevents  and  of  the  costs  of  implementing  regulation.    
In  order  to  be  able  to  compare  costs  and  benefits,  it  is  necessary  to  measure  them  on  a  
common   scale.  Typically,   that   scale   is  money.  That  means  monetizing   the  benefits,  which  
may  include,  among  other  things,  the  prevention  of  premature  deaths  or  other  health  prob-­‐‑
lems  or   the  preservation  of   ecosystems.   I  will   follow  Sunstein   in  primarily  discussing   the  
risk  of  premature  death.  The  standard  method  for  generating  monetized  values  for  these  is  
by   estimating  ordinary  people’s  willingness-­‐‑to-­‐‑pay   (WTP),   or   in   some   cases   their  willing-­‐‑
ness-­‐‑to-­‐‑accept  (WTA)  for  these  things.  That  is,   the  analyst  estimates  how  much  people  are  
willing   to  pay   in  order   to  avoid  a  certain  risk  of  death  or   the  destruction  of  an  ecosystem  
(WTP),  or  alternatively  how  much  they  would  need  to  be  paid  in  order  to  allow  themselves  
to  be  subjected  to  a  given  risk,  or  to  allow  an  ecosystem  to  be  destroyed  (WTA).  Since  these  
things  are  not  traded  on  a  market,   there  are  no  market  prices.  Therefore,  WTP/WTA  must  
be   estimated   from   relevant   market   data   –   most   importantly   the   extra   wages   workers   in  
risky  jobs  are  paid  –  or  by  surveys  that  directly  ask  people  what  their  WTP/WTA  for  some  
good  is.  
   For  analytical  purposes  it  is  useful  to  divide  CBA  into  three  aspects:  
(1)  Determining  what  effects  a  given  policy  will  have  –  how  many  lives  would  be  saved,  
what  other  health  problems  would  be  avoided,  which  ecosystems  would  be  preserved,  
how  much  would  it  cost  industry  to  implement,  how  much  prices  would  rise  or  wages  
fall  etc.  
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(2)  Determining  the  value  of  each  of  these  effects  using  some  value  metric  that  allows  for  
direct  comparison  between  disparate  effects.  
(3)  Using  money  (including  WTP/WTA)  as  the  relevant  value  metric.  
I   will   refer   to   these   as   qualitative   analysis,   commensuration   and   monetization,   respectively.  
Commensuration   is   often   described   as   quantification   (including   by   Sunstein).   This   is  mis-­‐‑
leading,   since   the   description   of   effects   in   the   ‘qualitative’   analysis   could   very   easily   be  
quantified,  and  since  the  purpose  of  going  beyond  qualitative  analysis  is  not  simply  to  put  a  
number  on  effects,  but  to  find  a  number  that  makes  effects  directly  comparable.  I  will  there-­‐‑
fore  talk  of  commensuration.  
CBA  as  described  here  is  an  analysis  of  the  effects  of  policy  options.  While  it  is  tempt-­‐‑
ing  to  assume  that  a  CBA  directly  determines  what  policy  should  be  pursued  –  i.e.  the  one  
with  the  highest  benefits  net  of  costs  –  this   is  not  implied  by  CBA  itself.  And  neither  does  
Sunstein  advocate   this   ‘hard’  use  of  CBA  as  a  decision  rule.   Instead,  he   favours  of  a   ‘soft’  
use  of  CBA.  Most  often,  he  describes  CBA  as  a  mere   informational   input   into   the  decision-­‐‑
making  process.  Such  language  suggests  that  CBA  is  entirely  divorced  from  decision  rules  –  
the  analysis   is   just  available,  providing   information   to  be  used  or  not  by  decision-­‐‑makers.  
But  in  fact  Sunstein  does  want  CBA  to  be  integrated  into  decision  rules.  For  my  purposes,  
two  aspects  of  Sunstein’s  concrete  policy  proposals  are  important  (Sunstein,  2002,  pp.  110-­‐‑
113).  First,  he  argues  that  agencies  charged  with  risk  regulation  should  be  required  to  show  
that   the  benefits  of  a   regulation   justify   the  costs.   It   is   somewhat  unclear  whether  Sunstein  
believes  there  should  be  limits  to  this  requirement,  and  if  so  what  they  should  be.  While  he  
accepts   that  CBA   should  not   be  used  where   the   law  explicitly  disallows   it,   he  never   says  
anything  about  whether  there  are  circumstances  in  which  the  law  should  disallow  CBA.  He  
also  believes  that  the  law  should  as  far  as  possible  be  interpreted  as  allowing  CBA  (Sunstein  
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2002,   Ch.   8).3  The   requirement   to   show   that   benefits   justify   costs   is   presumptive   only;   it  
should  be  possible  for  regulative  agencies  to  go  ahead  with  regulations  whose  costs  exceed  
their   benefits,   but   only   “on   the   basis   of   a   publicly   articulated   explanation”,   e.g.   in   court  
(Sunstein,  2002,  p.  112).  Second,  Sunstein  argues  that  agencies  should  be  legally  required  to  
use  presumptive  floors  and  ceilings  for  the  value  of  a  statistical  life  (e.g.  a  floor  of  $2  million  
and  a  ceiling  of  $10  million).  These  are  presumptive   in   the  sense   that  various  “qualitative  
factors”  should  be  allowed  to  push  valuations  above  the  ceiling  or  below  the  floors  (I  will  
return  to  these  qualitative  factors  below).  As  before,  the  presumption  can  only  be  overrid-­‐‑
den  on   the  basis  of   an  explicit   explanation  when   the   regulation   comes  under   review.  The  
presence  of   the  presumptions  and  demands   for  explanation   leaves   it  vague  what   the  ulti-­‐‑
mate  effects  of  Sunstein’s  proposals  would  be,  since  no  criteria  are  mentioned  for  when  an  
explanation  for  diverging  from  the  presumptions  is  adequate.  This  might  well  be  left  up  to  
the  discretion  of  judges  or  civil  servants.    
  
2.2 Cognitive biases and the corrective effects of cost-benefit analysis 
As  mentioned,   Sunstein   argues   that   a   series   of   cognitive   biases   affect   our   thinking   about  
risk,  and  that  CBA  corrects  for  these.  The  list  of  biases  differs  somewhat  between  the  differ-­‐‑
ent  writings.  Here   I   attempt   to   systematize   Sunstein’s   claims   by   dividing   them   into   four  
overarching  types  of  error.  These  categories  are  not  without  overlaps  and  interconnections,  
but  the  seem  to  me  to  represent  importantly  different  problems  in  people’s  reasoning.    
A  minor  aside  before  I  present  Sunstein’s  argument:  There  is  an  on-­‐‑going  (and  heat-­‐‑
ed)  debate  within  psychology  and  related  sciences  about   the  normative   status  of   the  phe-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
3  According   to  an  account   from  a  high-­‐‑level  EPA  officer  at   the   time,   the  OIRA  under  Sunstein’s  ad-­‐‑
ministration  pushed  this  principle  to  the  limit  of  legality,  and  perhaps  beyond  (Heinzerling,  2014,  pp.  
25-­‐‑28).  
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nomena  described  below.  There  is  general  agreement  that  human  beings  exhibit   ‘bounded  
rationality’  –  that  we  use  reasoning  schemata  that  are  much  simpler  than  those  developed  
by  normative  theories  of  practical  and  theoretical  rationality  (such  as  expected  utility  theory  
or   Bayesian   epistemology).   Such   schemata   are   known   as   heuristics.   It   is   also   generally  
agreed  that  the  use  of  such  heuristics  lead  to  biases,  i.e.  to  systematic  divergences  from  the  
normative  theories.  But  here  agreement  ends.  One  school,  the  heuristics-­‐‑and-­‐‑biases  school,  
holds   that   biases   are   errors,   and   that   using   heuristics   is   only   normatively   justified   when  
cognitive  resources  (e.g.  time  or  computing  power)  is  limited.  This  school  includes  the  No-­‐‑
bel  prize  winner  Daniel  Kahneman  and  his  long-­‐‑time  collaborator  Amos  Tversky,  as  well  as  
many   others   –   including   Sunstein.   The   other   school,   known   as   the   adaptive   rationality  
school,  views  heuristics  much  more  positively.  Proponents  of  this  school  generally  empha-­‐‑
sise   the   importance   of   matching   the   decision-­‐‑making   procedure   to   the   environment   in  
which   it   is   to  be  used.   In  many  decision  environments,  heuristics  yield  better   results   than  
the   standard   normative   theories   of   rationality   (see   Gigerenzer   &   Selten,   2001).  My   argu-­‐‑
ments   below  do   not   depend   on   either   of   these   views   of   heuristics   (and   biases)   being   the  
correct  one,   although   I  do   suggest  one  way   in  which   the   rival   school  would  be   critical  of  
Sunstein’s  proposals.  
  
2.2.1 False beliefs about the magnitude of risks 
A  risk   can  be  understood  as  a   combination  of   some  bad  outcome   that  might  occur  and   the  
likelihood  or  probability  that  this  outcome  does  occur.  For  example,  a  certain  level  of  expo-­‐‑
sure   to   some   substance   might   entail   a   1/10,000   chance   of   developing   a   fatal   cancer.   The  
magnitude  of  a  risk  is  the  product  of  the  bad  outcome  and  the  likelihood.  As  noted,  I  will  
focus   on   cases   where   the   bad   outcome   in   question   is   premature   death.   In   that   case,   the  
magnitude  of  a  risk  is  equivalent  to  the  likelihood  of  premature  death,  and,  when  summed  
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over  a  population,  to  the  annual  number  of  fatalities.  Sunstein  suggests  that  several  cogni-­‐‑
tive  mechanisms  lead  people  to  form  systematically  wrong  beliefs  about  the  magnitude  of  
various  risks.  
The  first  such  mechanism  is  the  availability  heuristic  (Sunstein,  2002,  pp.  33-­‐‑35;  2005,  
pp.  36-­‐‑39).  The  availability  heuristic  is  at  play  when  people  attempt  to  estimate  the  size  or  
frequency  of  a  class  or  event  (such  as  how  many  people  get  divorced  after  the  age  of  60).  It  
operates  by  substituting  a  judgment  of  how  easily  an  example  of  the  class  or  event  comes  to  
mind  for  the  judgment  of  how  large  the  class  is  or  how  frequent  the  event  is.  The  heuristic  
works  in  one  or  both  of  two  ways.  Either  the  frequency  is  judged  by  how  many  examples  one  
can  think  of,  or  by  how  easy  it  is  to  think  of  an  example  (Kahneman,  2011,  Ch.  12).  In  a  semi-­‐‑
nal  study,  the  availability  heuristic  was  invoked  to  explain  observed  biases  in  the  judgment  
of  risks,  framed  in  terms  of  “the  frequency  of  lethal  events”  from  various  causes  (Liechten-­‐‑
stein  et  al.,  1978).  The  study  found  (i)  that  people  overestimated  low  frequency  events  and  
underestimated  high  frequency  events,  and  (ii)  that  the  judged  frequency  of  pairs  of  events  
with  the  same  actual  frequency  differed  substantially.  The  availability  heuristic  can  account  
for  both  biases.  The  overestimation/underestimation  bias  can  be  explained  by  the  fact   that  
differences   in   the  number  of   instances  one  can  recall  are  much  smaller   than  differences   in  
frequency.  The  pairwise  incongruities  was  explained  by  Liechtenstein  et  al.  by  the  fact  that  
events  that  were   judged  as  more  frequent  tended  to  be  highly  publicized  and  emotionally  
salient  ones,  such  as  accidents  or  cancer,  while  events  with  a  low  judged  frequency  tended  
to  be  “undramatic,  quiet  killers”,  such  as  diabetes.  However,  alternative  possible  explana-­‐‑
tions  for  the  biases  exist,  and  it   is   far  from  settled  what  drives  people’s  estimations  of  fre-­‐‑
quencies  (see  Hertwig,  Pachur  &  Kurzenhäuser,  2005).  
The  second  mechanism  is  really  a  set  of  mechanisms  of  social  transmission  of   infor-­‐‑
mation  (Sunstein,  2005,  Ch.  4).  One  such  mechanism  is  a  cascade.  In  a  cascade,  people  who  
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have  no  strong  basis  for  belief  in  either  direction  regarding  some  proposition  –  such  as  that  
a  certain  chemical  is  dangerous  –  use  other  peoples’  stated  beliefs  as  evidence.  Hence  A  may  
come  to  believe  that  the  chemical  is  dangerous  merely  because  B  believes  so.  This  effect  then  
expands  to  others,  and  is  amplified  by  the  fact  that  a  larger  number  of  people  now  (seem  to)  
believe  that  the  chemical  is  dangerous.  Another  mechanism  is  group  polarization,  the  phe-­‐‑
nomenon  that  people  tend  to  move  towards  more  extreme  positions  as  a  result  of  delibera-­‐‑
tion.  In  the  case  of  risk,  this  should  lead  to  the  formation  of  groups  that  greatly  overestimate  
some   specific   risk,   and   to   other   groups   that   greatly   underestimate   other   specific   risks.  A  
third  mechanism  is   the  distortion  of   information  when   it   is  passed  on   from  one  person   to  
another,   Chinese-­‐‑whispers-­‐‑style   (see  Moussaïd,   Brighton   &   Gaissmaier,   2015).   Generally,  
then,  social  dynamics  may  amplify  already  erroneous  beliefs  about  the  magnitude  of  vari-­‐‑
ous  risks.  
The   third   cause   of   systematically   false   beliefs   is   emotional   responses   to   risks   (Sun-­‐‑
stein  2002,  pp.  43-­‐‑47;  2005,  pp.  39-­‐‑41).  Sunstein  discusses  two  types  of  effect  that  result  from  
emotional   processing   of   information.   The   first   is   the   affect   heuristic.   Like   the   availability  
heuristic,  the  affect  heuristic  is  a  way  of  generating  a  judgment  by  consulting  a  related  but  
different  phenomenon  –   in   this   instance  one’s  general  affective  response.   In   the  context  of  
risk,  this  leads  people  to  judge  that  an  activity  that  they  believe  to  be  highly  beneficial  also  
carries   low  risk,  and  conversely   that  an  activity   that   they  believe   to  be   risky  also  has   low  
benefits  (Alhakami  &  Slovic,  1994).    
The   second  effect   of   emotional  processing   is  probability  distortion  and  neglect.  Ac-­‐‑
cording  to  Sunstein,  when  we  are  contemplating  a  high-­‐‑affect  outcome,  we  tend  to  neglect  
the   probability   altogether   and   focus   solely   on   the   outcome   itself.   This   accounts   both   for  
exaggerated   fear   of   low-­‐‑probability   bad   things   –   of   dying   in   a  plane   crash,   say   –   and   for  
exaggerated  hope  of  low-­‐‑probability  good  things  –  such  as  winning  the  lottery.  A  review  of  
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studies   on   emotions’   role   in   decision-­‐‑making   (Volz   &  Hertwig,   2016)   showed   that   affect  
increases  the  non-­‐‑linear  weighing  of  probabilities  in  decision  (increasing  the  importance  of  
low-­‐‑probability  events  and  decreasing  the  importance  of  high-­‐‑probability  events).  Interest-­‐‑
ingly,   the  evidence  also  suggests  that  affect  triggers  the  use  of  simple  heuristics,  such  as  a  
maximin   rule   (which  neglects  probability   as   Sunstein   suggests).  This   finding   is   consistent  
with  other  evidence  that  a  substantial  number  of  people  ignore  probabilities  when  making  
choices  involving  high-­‐‑affect  outcomes  (Suter,  Pachur  &  Hertwig,  2015).      
Sunstein   cites   two   further,   more   specialized   mechanisms   that   lead   to   false   beliefs  
about  risk  magnitudes.  The  first  is  the  general  belief  that  nature  is  benevolent.  As  a  result,  
people  tend  to  believe  that  risks  from  natural  entities  are  less  severe  than  risks  from  synthet-­‐‑
ic  or  man-­‐‑made  entities  (Sunstein,  2005,  pp.  44-­‐‑45).  The  second  is  what  Sunstein,  following  
Slovic   and   others   (Slovic,   2000,   Ch.   18),   calls   “intuitive   toxicology”.   Intuitive   toxicology  
consists  of  a  set  of  general  beliefs  about  how  toxic  agents  work,  including  that  a  chemical  is  
either  toxic  or  not,  regardless  of  the  dose  and  that  it  is  possible  to  achieve  zero  risk  exposure  
from  chemicals  (Sunstein,  2002,  pp.  35-­‐‑37).  Since  it  is  not  generally  the  case  that  natural  sub-­‐‑
stances  pose  less  risk  than  synthetic  ones,  or  that  toxicity  is  an  all-­‐‑or-­‐‑nothing  matter,  these  
two  mechanisms   lead   to   false  beliefs   about   the  magnitude  of   risks   caused  by  exposure   to  
various  chemicals  in  particular.  
The  general   effect   of   all   of   the  mechanisms  described   above   is   that  people’s   beliefs  
about  the  magnitude  of  risks  caused  by  different  activities  and  phenomena  are  likely  to  be  
systematically  wrong.   CBA   corrects   this   by   highlighting   the   actual  magnitude   of   various  




2.2.2 Neglecting and undervaluing the costs of regulation 
The   activities   that   produce   risks   typically   also   have   benefits   –   otherwise   human   beings  
would   likely  not  have  engaged   in   them  in   the   first  place.  According  to  Sunstein,  ordinary  
people  tend  to  neglect  these  benefits  when  they  evaluate  risky  activities.  Since  the  costs  and  
benefits  of  regulation  are  partly  the  mirror  image  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  regulated  
activity,  this  means  that  people  tend  to  neglect  some  costs  of  regulation.  One  important  rea-­‐‑
son   for   believing   that   people   neglect   costs   is   the   inverse   relationship   between   perceived  
benefit  and  perceived  risk  described  above  –  i.e.  the  tendency  for  people  to  view  activities  
that  are  risky  as  having  few  benefits  (and  vice  versa).  Apart  from  this  general  finding,  Sun-­‐‑
stein   puts   forward   two   examples  where   alerting   people   to   the   costs   of   a   policy   caused   a  
major  shift  in  attitude  towards  that  policy.  One  is  the  removal  of  asbestos  from  New  York  
City  public  schools.  Initially,  this  policy  was  supported  by  the  parents,  but  their  enthusiasm  
dropped  markedly  when  they  were  made  aware   that  schools  would  need  to  be  closed  for  
several  weeks,  which  was   inconvenient   to   them.  The  other  example   is   the  Kyoto  Protocol.  
According  to  a  survey,  59%  of  Americans  supported  the  Protocol,  with  21%  opposed.  At  the  
same   time,   however,   52%   said   they   opposed   the   Protocol   if   it   would   cost   the   average  
household  an  extra  $50  per  month  (Sunstein  2002,  p.  42;  2005,  p.  48).   In  Sunstein’s  phrase,  
the  costs  of  regulation  are  often  “off-­‐‑screen”  when  people  are  evaluating  policies  for  dealing  
with  risks.  
Sunstein  also   invokes   loss  aversion  to  explain  why  costs  of  regulation  are  neglected  
or  at   least  undervalued.  Loss  aversion  is   the  tendency  to  see  a   loss   from  the  status  quo  as  
more  undesirable  than  a  gain  from  the  status  quo  of   the  same  magnitude  is  desirable.  For  
example,  if  offered  a  bet  at  50/50  odds  (e.g.  a  coin  toss  where  you  win  $X  if  the  coin  comes  
up  heads  and   lose  $Y   if   the  coin  comes  up   tails),  people   tend   to  require   the  possible  win-­‐‑
nings  to  be  at  least  twice  as  high  as  the  possible  loss  before  they  accept  the  bet  (Fox,  Erner  &  
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Walters,  2015).  Sunstein  argues  that  loss  aversion  does  not  merely  lead  to  a  lower  valuation  
of  equivalent  gains  and  losses,  but  also  gives  rise  to  two  biases  in  people’s  attitude  to  risks:  
(i)   People   tend   to   focus   mostly   on   newly   introduced   risks   (and   aggravations   of   existing  
risks)   and   focus  much   less   on   the   benefits   that   are   foregone   as   a   result   of   regulation;   (ii)  
people  are  more  willing  to  tolerate  familiar  risks  than  new  ones  (Sunstein,  2005,  pp.  42-­‐‑43).  
All  in  all,  Sunstein  argues,  there  is  a  tendency  for  people  to  ignore  the  costs  of  regula-­‐‑
tory  policies  (and  to  ignore  the  benefits  of  engaging  in  a  risk-­‐‑producing  activity).  The  bene-­‐‑
fits  of   regulation  are  “on-­‐‑screen”  while   the  costs  are  “off-­‐‑screen”.  The  asbestos  and  Kyoto  
Protocol  examples  suggest   that  merely  putting  costs  on-­‐‑screen  can  alter  people’s  opinions  
about  policies.  CBA  corrects   cost  neglect  because  all   effects  of   regulation,   costs   as  well   as  
benefits,  are  present  on-­‐‑screen  in  a  CBA.  
  
2.2.3 Unintended systemic effects and risk-risk trade-offs 
Policy   interventions  do  not  occur   in  a  vacuum,  but  are  embedded   in  a   large  and  complex  
economic  and  (where  environmental  regulation  is  concerned)  natural  system.  Policies  may  
consequently  have  unintended  effects  elsewhere  in  the  system.  When  people  are  evaluating  
different  policies,  they  often  ignore  such  unintended  systemic  effects  and  focus  solely  on  the  
intended  effects  of  the  intervention.  Sunstein  cites  a  set  of  experiments  using  computer  sim-­‐‑
ulations  to  study  how  people  go  about  trying  to  solve  problems  that  some  people  face  –  e.g.  
the  problems  faced  by  semi-­‐‑nomadic  peoples  in  West  Africa  (Dörner,  1990).  In  these  simula-­‐‑
tions,   experimental   subjects   frequently   produced   new   and  worse   problems   than   the   ones  
they  were  meant   to  solve.  Among  the  reasons  for   these  failures   is   the  neglect  of  side-­‐‑  and  
long-­‐‑term  effects,  lack  of  appreciation  for  how  a  system  develops  over  time,  and  uncoordi-­‐‑
nated  implementation  of  policies  that  are  mutually  counterproductive.  
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In  the  case  of  risk  regulation,  an  especially  important  phenomenon  is  the  creation  of  
separate  substitute  risks  by  the  very  regulation  that  is  meant  to  reduce  risks,  thus  generat-­‐‑
ing  a     “risk-­‐‑risk  trade-­‐‑off”  (sometimes,   for  health  risks,  described  as  a  health-­‐‑health  trade-­‐‑
off).  Sunstein  provides  several  examples:  Fuel  economy  standards  may  lead  to  the  produc-­‐‑
tion  and  use  of  smaller  cars   that  are   less  safe   in  crashes;  banning  asbestos  necessitates   the  
use  of  other,   less   effective  materials   in   the  production  of   car  brakes,   rendering   the  brakes  
more  likely  to  fail;  banning  DDT  increases  malaria  risk;  and  lowering  the  level  of  ground-­‐‑
level  ozone  raises  the  risk  of  developing  skin  cancer  and  cataracts  from  sun  exposure  (Sun-­‐‑
stein,  2002,  p.  39;  2005,  p.  32).  He  adds  to   this  a  general  claim,  namely  that  any   regulation  
will   produce   substitute   risk   via   its   costs,   since   lower  wealth   is   generally   associated  with  
higher  mortality  risk  (Sunstein,  2002,  p.  40;  2005,  p.  33).  
According  to  Sunstein,  then,  people  neglect  unintended  systemic  effects.  And  to  the  
extent  that  these  effects  consist  in  the  creation  of  new  risks,  the  regulation  in  question  may  
in  fact  end  up  raising  overall  risk  rather  than  reducing  it.  CBA  is  a  corrective  to  neglect  of  
systemic  effects  since  it  takes  a  global  or  system-­‐‑wide  view  and  includes  all  effects  of  regu-­‐‑
lation  in  the  analysis.  
  
2.2.4 Incoherent valuation of risks 
All   of   the   above   phenomena   can   lead   to   incoherent   valuation   of   statistical   lives   –   i.e.   the  
assignment  of   (widely)  diverging  values  to  reducing  risks  that  are  statistically  expected  to  
claim  the  same  number  of  lives.  If  we  believe  we  are  saving  a  greater  (or  smaller)  number  of  
lives  than  we  are  in  fact,  the  value  of  each  actual  life  saved  is  likely  to  be  higher  (or  lower)  
than  it  otherwise  would  be.  If  we  ignore  some  of  the  actual  cost  of  saving  a  given  number  of  
lives,   costs   are   likely   to  be  higher.   If  we   are   loss   averse,  we  are   likely   to  devote  more   re-­‐‑
sources   to   avoiding   ‘new’   deaths   rather   than   to   saving   lives   already   projected   to   be   lost.  
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And  if  regulation  creates  substitute  risks,  we  may  even  find  that  we  have  paid  to  have  more  
people  die,  rather  than  less.    
Apart   from   these   causes,   Sunstein  adds   two   further  possible   reasons   for   incoherent  
valuations.  The  first   is  separate  evaluation  of  policies.  When  we  evaluate  a  policy  in  isola-­‐‑
tion,  we  cannot  anchor  our  judgments  in  anything  outside  that  policy.  Consequently,  sepa-­‐‑
rate  evaluation  of  two  different  policies  might  lead  to  valuations  that  seem  wrong  when  we  
look  at  both  policies   together.  For  example,  a  study  examined  people’s  willingness   to  pay  
for   two  public  causes:  Cleaning-­‐‑up  of  polluted  breeding  grounds   for  dolphins,  and  a  skin  
cancer  screening  program  for  workers  exposed  to   the  sun  for  many  hours  a  day.  Separate  
evaluation   generated   almost   identical   willingness   to   pay   for   the   two   causes,   while   joint  
evaluation  generated   a  much  higher  willingness   to  pay   for   the   cancer   screening  program  
(Sunstein,  Kahneman,  Shkade  &  Ritov,  2002,  pp.  1174-­‐‑1178).  
The  second  is  what  Sunstein  calls  “the  proportionality  effect”  (Sunstein,  2002,  pp.  47-­‐‑
48).  This  effect  consists  in  a  preference  for  saving  a  larger  proportion  of  people  in  the  refer-­‐‑
ence  class  rather  than  saving  a  larger  absolute  number.  Suppose  for  example  that  the  people  
living  in  a  village  of  100  face  a  1-­‐‑in-­‐‑20  risk  of  death,  and  that  the  people  living  in  a  city  of  
10,000,000   face   a   1-­‐‑in-­‐‑1,000,000   risk   of   death.  Many  would   be   deem   it  more   important   to  
avert  the  former  risk  than  the  latter,  although  by  doing  so  we  would  only  be  saving  half  the  
number  of  lives  (five  instead  of  ten).  In  an  early  study  (Jenni  &  Loewenstein,  1997),  the  pro-­‐‑
portionality  effect  was  found  to  be  the  best  explanation  of  the  so-­‐‑called  “identifiable  victim  
effect”,  i.e.  the  tendency  to  devote  much  greater  resources  to  rescuing  the  lives  of  identified  
persons  that  are  immediately  at  stake  (such  as  trapped  miners  or  a  critically  ill  person)  than  
to  elimination  of   risks   (such  as   increased  safety  measures   in   the  mine  or  preventive   inter-­‐‑
ventions   in  health).  The  upshot   is   that   the  amount  of   resources  devoted  per   statistical   life  
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saved   is   likely   to   be   higher   for   small   populations   facing   somewhat   higher   probability   of  
death  than  for  larger  populations  facing  somewhat  lower  probability  of  death.  
According  to  Sunstein,  CBA  provides  a  corrective   for   incoherent  evaluations   in   two  
ways.  First,   it  provides  information  about  how  many  lives  are  saved  and  at  what  cost.  Se-­‐‑
cond,  it  forces  policy  evaluation  that  refers  to  other  policies  as  well,  and  thus  prevents  iso-­‐‑
lated  evaluation.  Apart  from  this,  the  correction  that  CBA  provides  for  all  the  other  cogni-­‐‑
tive  biases  presumably  also  contribute  to  the  eradication  of  incoherence.  
  
3. Is cost-benefit analysis necessary for correcting the biases? 
Recall   that  cost  benefit  analysis  can  be  disaggregated  into  three  parts,  qualitative  analysis,  
commensuration  and  monetization.  Recall  also  that  Sunstein  advocates  two  concrete  institu-­‐‑
tional   implementations  of  CBA,  namely  a   legal  requirement  that  regulatory  agencies  must  
show   that   the   benefits   of   a   regulation   justifies   its   costs,   and   the   use   of   legally  mandated  
presumptive  floors  and  ceilings  for  the  value  of  a  statistical  life  (from  now  on  I  will  abbrevi-­‐‑
ate  this  VSL).  Which  aspects  of  CBA  are  necessary  for  correcting  the  various  cognitive  bias-­‐‑
es  described  above?  Or  in  other  words,  which  aspects  of  CBA  are  warranted  by  the  goal  of  
disciplining  risk  regulation  so  as  to  avoid  systematic  errors?    
Before  answering  these  questions,  it  might  be  instructive  to  consider  which  aspects  of  
CBA  Sunstein’s  two  institutional  suggestions  rely  on,  or  rather  what  aspects  of  CBA  would  
be  de  facto   implemented  if  the  institutional  suggestions  were  to  be  implemented.  Take  first  
the   requirement   that   benefits  must   be   shown   to   justify   costs.   In   order   to  make   any   such  
judgement,  it  is  necessary  to  commensurate  the  benefits  and  costs  at  least  to  a  minimal  de-­‐‑
gree.  Any  judgment  that  benefits  do  (or  do  not)  exceed  costs  in  a  given  instance  can  be  read  
backwards  to  imply  some  set  of  relative  values.  For  example,  the  judgment  that  the  benefits  
of  a  regulation  that  saves  10  statistical   lives   (and  has  no  other  benefits)  at   the  cost  of  $200  
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million  to  taxpayers   is   justified  implies  that,  at   least   in  this   instance,   the  10  statistical   lives  
are  worth  more  than  the  $200  million  –  we  are  behaving  as  if  we  take  the  VSL  to  be  at  least  
$20  million.  
This  minimal  or  as-­‐‑if   commensuration   falls   short  of   the   commensuration  envisaged  
by  CBA  in  two  ways.  First,  it  does  not  pass  judgment  on  the  relative  values  of  the  different  
constituent  costs  and  benefits  –  it  merely  requires  a  judgment  that  all  the  benefits,  taken  as  a  
whole,  are  larger  than  all  the  costs,  taken  as  a  whole.  Second,  the  relative  values  implied  by  
a   judgment   in  one  case  can   in  principle  be  wholly   independent  of   the   relative  values   that  
are  ‘used’  in  another  case.4  It  is  fairly  clear  that  what  Sunstein  has  in  mind  is  that  the  bene-­‐‑
fits  as  defined  by  CBA  must  justify  the  costs  as  defined  by  CBA  (with  the  caveat  that  this  is  only  
a  presumptive  demand,  of  undefined  strength,  for  ultimate  justification  of  a  regulation).  So  
commensuration  of  a  stronger  kind  –  using  valuations  of  constituent  costs  and  benefits  that  
are   the   same   across   cases   –   would   be   implemented   through   Sunstein’s   first   institutional  
suggestions.    
Presumptive  floors  and  ceilings  for  the  VSL  precisely  establish  such  a  set  of  relative  
values  of  constituent  costs  and  benefits  that  are  determined  prior  to  the  specific  cases,  and  
that  are  supposed  to  hold  generally  (again  with  the  caveat  that  the  presumption  can,  at  least  
in  principle,  be  overridden  by  ‘qualitative  factors’).  In  principle,  another  metric  than  money  
could  have  been  used  –  Sunstein  describes  monetization  as  a  mere  “pragmatic  tool”  (Sun-­‐‑
stein,  2002,  p.  111).  But  in  practice,  monetary  equivalents  are  the  only  commensuration  tool  
that   is   ever   seriously   considered   in  CBA,  by   Sunstein   as  well   as   by   any  other  proponent.  
Furthermore,   the   specific   floors   and   ceilings   that   Sunstein   suggests   are   derived   from  
                                                                                                                        
4  It  might   plausibly   be   argued   that   this   second   feature  means   that  minimal   commensuration   is   not  
useful   for   justifying   regulations.  At   the  very   least,   justifications   should  be   constrained  by   the  prece-­‐‑
dents  set  by  judgments  in  similar  cases.  
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WTP/WTA   (Sunstein,   2005,   Ch.   6).   So   Sunstein’s   two   policy   proposals   imply   the   use   of  
commensuration  in  the  sense  of  an  establishment  of  relative  values  for  the  constituent  bene-­‐‑
fits  and  costs  of  regulation,  and  in  practice  uses  monetization  and  some  form  of  WTP/WTA  
to  come  up  with  a   set  of   such   relative  values.   It  goes  beyond  mere  qualitative  analysis  of  
what  costs  and  benefits  a  policy  will  have.  
Return  now  to  the  question  of  whether  the  cognitive  biases  described  in  the  previous  
section  give  reason  to  implement  CBA,  in  particular  the  Sunstein’s  two  institutional  sugges-­‐‑
tions.   Consider   first   false   beliefs   about   the  magnitude   of   risks.   To   avoid   false   beliefs,  we  
need   only   an   analysis   that   shows   us   what   the   actual   magnitudes   of   risks   are.   In   other  
words,  we  only  need  qualitative  analysis.  Similarly  for  the  neglect  of  costs  and  the  neglect  
of  substitute  risks:    It  is  not  necessary  to  commensurate  these  with  the  benefits  of  regulation  
in  order  to  bring  them  onto  our  ‘viewscreen’.  So  the  desire  to  avoid  false  beliefs  and  to  en-­‐‑
sure  consideration  of  all  effects  of  regulation  does  not  in  itself  justify  the  use  of  CBA  as  Sun-­‐‑
stein  wants  it  used.  (For  example,  demand  that  we  use  floors  and  ceilings  for  the  VSL  does  
nothing   to   correct   the  underestimation  of   fatalities   from  undramatic,   quiet   killers   such   as  
diabetes).  A  large  part  of  Sunstein’s  cognitive  argument  thus  trades  on  a  false  dilemma  be-­‐‑
tween  CBA  and  what  Sunstein  himself  describes  as  “uninformed  stabs   in   the  dark”   (Sun-­‐‑
stein,  2002,  p.  6).  It  is  only  if  all  alternatives  to  CBA  neglect  or  refuse  to  even  consider  rele-­‐‑
vant   information   about   the  magnitude   of   risks   and   the   effects   of   regulation   that   CBA   is  
supported.   But   this   is   implausible.   Sunstein   implicitly   compares   CBA   only   with   relying  
more  or   less  directly  on   the  possibly  uninformed  views  of   the  public,  which  was  never   a  
serious  candidate  for  a  policy  of  risk  regulation.  
There   is  a  possible  reading  of  Sunstein’s  claims  that  does  put  him  into  conflict  with  
more  than  uniformed  stabs  in  the  dark.  On  this  reading,  Sunstein  argues  that  all  the  possi-­‐‑
ble  effects   that  may  be  neglected  –  regulatory  costs,  substitute  risks  and  systemic  effects  –  
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must  be  considered  in  each  instance  of  regulation.  This  goes  beyond  the  demand  that  we  do  
not  use  wrong  information  by  demanding  that  we  base  our  decision  on  correct  information  
about   all   effects.   This   seems   plausible   enough   initially.   But   it   ignores   the   fact   that   infor-­‐‑
mation  is  not  simply  available  to  be   looked  at  –   it   is   the  product  of  active   investigation  of  
the  word  by  scientific  or  other  means.  A  requirement  to  look  at  the  facts  may  therefore  easi-­‐‑
ly   slide   into  a   requirement   to  produce   facts.  This   is  where   the   rival   school  within   the  psy-­‐‑
chology  of  heuristics  have  a  point  against  Sunstein.  Drawing  especially  on  the  ideas  of  Her-­‐‑
bert  Simon,  proponents  of  this  school  argue  that  producing  further  information  is  often  not  
worth  the  effort,  since  the  value  it  adds  to  the  quality  of  the  decision  is  limited.  In  the  case  of  
risk   regulation,   demands   that   certain   types   of   effects   be   considered   can   lead   to   delays   in  
implementing  regulations  (for  example,  the  demand  that  substitute  cancer  risks  be  consid-­‐‑
ered  delayed  EPA  regulation  of  ground-­‐‑level  ozone  for  several  years).   It  may  therefore  be  
reasonable  to  ignore  some  (kinds  of)  information  when  deciding  whether  and  how  to  regu-­‐‑
late  some  risk.  When  it  is  reasonable  and  what  kinds  of  information  to  ignore  are  complicat-­‐‑
ed  questions  that  I  will  not  go  into  here.  
  
4. Incoherence and cognitive error 
The  cognitive  errors  that  manifest  themselves  in  false  beliefs  and  neglect  of  relevant  factors  
(especially  the  costs  of  regulation)  are  in  principle  avoided  simply  through  the  use  of  quali-­‐‑
tative   analysis.  Consequently   Sunstein’s   two   institutional   proposals   are   not  warranted   by  
the   desire   to   avoid   these   errors.   With   respect   to   coherence,   however,   the   two   proposals  
seem   prima   facie   warranted.   Requiring   that   regulations   can   be   shown   to   generate   higher  
benefits  than  costs  and  using  floors  and  ceilings  for  the  VSL  directly  generates  more  coher-­‐‑
ence,  since  it  limits  the  possible  variations  in  costs  per  statistical  life  saved  that  are  possible.  
However,  incoherence  is  less  obviously  irrational  than  basing  regulation  on  false  beliefs  or  
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neglecting   relevant   information.   There   are   three  possible   sets   of   reasons   for   thinking   that  
coherence   should  be  an  uncontroversial  goal  of  policy:  Methodological,   instrumental,   and  
moral  reasons.  In  this  section  I  will  examine  each  of  these  sets  of  reasons  and  argue  that  the  
coherence  that  is  warranted  by  each  set  of  reasons  is  not  the  coherence  that  CBA  offers.  
  
4.1 Methodological reasons  
Within  moral  epistemology,  the  view  that  coherence  is  necessary  for  our  normative  view  to  
be   justified   is   commonplace.   The   overarching   idea   is   that   we   should   compare   our   judg-­‐‑
ments   in  one  case  with  our   judgments   in  other  cases,  as  well  as  with  more  general  moral  
principles.  Coherentist  methods   include   the   case-­‐‑based  and  analogical   forms  of   reasoning  
that  are  very  common  in  applied  ethics  and  method  of  reflective  equilibrium  that  is  argua-­‐‑
bly  the  dominant  view  of  justification  within  ethics  generally.  Sunstein’s  discussion  of  sepa-­‐‑
rate  versus  joint  evaluation  illustrates  the  virtues  of  a  coherentist  view  of  justification.  Joint  
evaluation  clearly  increases  coherence  in  the  sense  of  ‘coherence’  used  by  moral  epistemol-­‐‑
ogists,  while  separate  evaluation  does  not.  As  Sunstein  shows,  separate  evaluation  can  lead  
to  judgments  that  are  reversed  after  joint  evaluation,  and  that  are  therefore  not  justified  on  a  
coherentist  view  of  justification.  However,  coherentist  justification  is  not  the  same  as  what  I  
have  described  as  coherence  above.  There,  coherence  denotes   the  use  of   the  same  VSL  (or  
rather,   the  use  of   floors  and  ceilings)  across  all  regulations.  We  cannot  assume  that  coher-­‐‑
ence   in   the  moral-­‐‑epistemological   sense  will   result   in   the  view   that   coherence   in   the  CBA  
sense  is  the  right  judgment.    
But  perhaps  the  practice  of  CBA  itself  constitutes  a  coherentists  method,  i.e.  is  a  type  
of   joint   evaluation  of   the  VSL.  Prima   facie,   it  might   seem   to,   since  CBA   tries   to  generate  a  
VSL   that   holds   across   all   policy   domains.   But   looking   at   the   standard  method  used,   it   is  
clear   that   no   joint   evaluation   is   happening.   Instead,   the  VSL   is   typically   extracted   from  a  
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single  (type  of)  case,  namely  the  wage  premiums  workers  receive  for  taking  jobs  with  mor-­‐‑
tality  risks.  The  comparison  between  wage  premium  cases  and  regulation  cases   is  entirely  
one  way  –  no  argument  is  ever  made  that  wage  premiums  are  too  high,  or  too  low,  based  on  
‘feedback’  from  the  regulation  case.  And  the  VSL  itself   is  not  adjusted  based  on  reasoning  
about  what  level  of  expenditure  is  reasonable  in  different  regulation  cases.  So  the  fact  that  a  
given  VSL   is  used   in  CBA  gives  us  no  evidence   that   joint   evaluation  would  produce   that  
VSL.  It  only  gives  us  evidence  that  extrapolating  from  a  single  separate  evaluation  gives  us  
that  VSL.  This  is  no  coherentist  method.    
A  different  attempt  to  justify  coherence  (in  the  sense  of  a  set  VSL)  on  methodological  
grounds   is   to  argue   that   the  valuation  of   lives  would  otherwise   likely  be   random  or  arbi-­‐‑
trary   (Sunstein,   2005,   p.   149).   But   the  mere   fact   that   the   implied   valuations   of   life   differ  
widely  between  regulations  does  not  imply  that  they  are  arbitrary;  they  may  instead  be  the  
result  of  a  regulatory  rationale  that  does  not  use  anything  like  a  VSL  as  input.  Consider,  in  
particular,  a  relatively  popular  alternative  approach  to  regulation,  namely  technology-­‐‑based  
regulation   (see  McGarity,   2002b,  p.   2343-­‐‑2344).   In   technology-­‐‑based   regulation,   regulators  
demand  that  risk  is  reduced  to  the  maximum  degree  that  is  technologically  feasible  (which  
normally  amounts   to   less   than  a  complete  elimination  of   the  risk),   regardless  of  cost.5  The  
implied  VSL  of  a  technology-­‐‑based  regulation  is  determined  by  the  cost  of  the  best  available  
technology  and  how  many  lives  that  technology  will  save.  There  is  no  particular  reason  to  
think  that  the  implied  VSLs  of  a  set  of  technology-­‐‑based  regulations  will  be  the  same,  or  will  
fall  within  some  range.  But  neither  are   the  VSLs  arbitrary  –   they  are   the  product  of  a  rea-­‐‑
soned  approach  to  risk  management.    
  
                                                                                                                        
5  Except   to   the   extent   that   cost   is   allowed   to  play   a   role   in  determining  what   is   and   is   not   feasible,  
which  it  likely  will.  
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4.2 Instrumental reasons 
Assume  that  all  we  care  about  really  is  saving  as  many  lives  as  possible.  Then  it  seems  that  
any  way  of  going  about  our  business   that  results   in   fewer   lives   than  possible  being  saved  
than   is   instrumentally   irrational.  Sunstein  argues   that   current   (or  perhaps   rather  pre-­‐‑CBA  
era)  regulatory  policy  suffers  from  exactly  that  instrumental   irrationality.  He  reproduces  a  
table  (which,  according  to  him,  “has  come  to  define  many  discussions  of  these  problems”)  
showing  that  the  cost  per  premature  death  averted  for  a  large  set  of  regulations  varied  from  
$0.1  million   to   $92   billion6  (Sunstein,   2002,   p.   30).   The   conclusion  he  draws   is   that   the   re-­‐‑
sources  the  United  States  government  spend  to  reduce  risks  are  poorly  allocated.  He  cites  a  
study  that  suggests  that  reallocating  resources  could  save  an  additional  60.000  lives  annual-­‐‑
ly,  holding  cost  constant,  or  save  $31  billion,  holding  lives  saved  constant  (Sunstein,  2002,  p.  
25;  the  study  cited  is  Tengs  &  Graham,  1996).  These  numbers  are  somewhat  old,  not  to  men-­‐‑
tion  highly  controversial  (for  critiques  see  Heinzerling,  1998;  Parker,  2003).  More  recent  are  
the  net  benefits  from  regulation  that  Sunstein  reports  was  achieved  during  his  three  years  as  
head  of  the  OIRA.  According  to  calculations  by  the  White  House  Office  of  Management  and  
Budget   (of  which  OIRA   is   a   part)   the   early  Obama   administration  managed,   through   the  
use  of  CBA,  to  increase  net  benefits  from  $3.4  billion  annually  (under  the  Bush  administra-­‐‑
tion)  to  $91.3  billion  (Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  2012,  p.  59;  Sunstein,  2013,  pp.  33-­‐‑
35).  
The  first  question  we  must  ask   is  whether   it   is   really   true   that  we  could  save  many  
more  lives  by  introducing  coherence,  and  that  regulatory  net  benefits  have  risen  dramatical-­‐‑
ly  after  the  use  of  CBA  was  increased.  With  respect  to  the  latter,  there  may  be  a  measure  of  
question  begging   involved,   since   the  calculations  made  by   the  Office  of  Management  and  
                                                                                                                        
6  The  $92  billion   figure   is  a  big  outlier;   the  2nd  most  expensive   regulation  spent  around  $4.2  billion  
and  the  3rd  most  expensive  ’only’  $653  million.  
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Budget  are  based  on  monetized  costs  and  benefits  as   recommended   in  CBA.   It   is  not   sur-­‐‑
prising   that  a  policy  aimed  at  maximizing  CBA-­‐‑defined  net  benefits   in   fact   increase  CBA-­‐‑
defined  net  benefits.  With  respect  to  the  former,  the  mere  fact  that  some  regulations  spend  
smaller  sums  per  statistical   life  saved  than  others   is  not  sufficient   to  show  that  more   lives  
could  be   saved.  First  of   all,  what  matters   is  not  actual   expenditure  per   life   saved,  but   the  
marginal  cost  of  saving  an  extra  life  for  each  regulation.  There  is  no  general  reason  to  think  
that  actual  expenditure   is  a  good   indicator  of   the  marginal  cost  of  an  extra   life  saved.  For  
one   thing   some   regulations  may   have   succeeded   in   eliminating  mortality   risk   altogether,  
leaving   no   extra   lives   available   to   be   saved.   For   another,   the   potential   of   one   relatively  
cheap  method  of  reducing  risk  may  have  been  reached,  and  any  alternative  method  may  be  
much  more  expensive.  This  would  be  the  case,  for  example,  when  there  is  no  further  way  of  
reducing  the  risk  from  some  activity  besides  banning  the  activity  altogether.7  Second  of  all,  
our  ability  to  save  more  lives  requires  that  the  savings  on  a  relatively  expensive  regulation  
can  be  reallocated   to  a  cheaper  regulation.  But   in  many  cases,   the  savings  associated  with  
not  regulating  (or  repealing  a  regulation)  accrue  to  various  private  actors,  be  they  business-­‐‑
es,  workers  or  consumers.  Such  savings  are  not   immediately  available   to   ‘spend’  on  other  
regulations  (although  they  could  perhaps  in  principle  be  made  available).  
Suppose  we  could,  in  fact,  save  more  lives  at  the  same  cost  (or  save  the  same  number  
of  lives  at  less  cost)  by  reallocating  our  regulatory  efforts.  This  fact  alone  still  does  not  war-­‐‑
rant  the  use  of  a  full  CBA  that  commensurates  and  monetizes  the  value  of  lives  saved.  Sup-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
7  The  study  by  Tengs  and  Graham  cited  by  Sunstein  does  take  the  marginal  cost  issue  into  account  by  
using  numbers  for  the  “level  of  implementation”  of  various  interventions  (so  we  can  assess  whether  
an   intervention  has  residual   life-­‐‑saving  potential).  However,   those  numbers  are  estimates  by  anony-­‐‑
mous   reviewers,   and   there   is  no  publically  available   information  about  what   their  basis   is.  Further-­‐‑
more,  more  that  two  thirds  of  the  potential  extra  lives  saved  could  be  found  in  just  two  medical  inter-­‐‑
ventions,  namely  providing  round-­‐‑the-­‐‑clock  oxygen  for  sufferers  of  hypoxemic  obstructive  lung  dis-­‐‑
ease  and  influenza  vaccines  for  everyone  (Parker  2003:  1362-­‐‑1363,  1377-­‐‑1381).  
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pose  we  were  to  hold  current  expenditure  fixed  and  then  go  about  saving  lives  in  the  most  
cost-­‐‑efficient  way.  In  that  case,  the  VSL  would  be  determined  by  what  the  cost  of  the  final  
life  we  could  afford  to  save  is.  There  would  be  no  need  to  determine  the  VSL  by  any  exter-­‐‑
nal  method,  such  as  WTP/WTA.  The  effect  of  using  an  externally  determined  VSL  is  to  im-­‐‑
plicitly   set   our   total   risk   reduction   ‘budget’   –   which   would   be   the   total   expenditure   we  
would  incur  by  saving  all  lives  that  could  be  saved  at  less  than  $X  each.  There  is  an  alloca-­‐‑
tion-­‐‑based  rationale  for  using  the  externally  determined  VSL,  but  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  
how  many  lives  we  could  save  at  a  given  cost.  Rather   it  has  to  with  what  other  goods  we  
can  get   instead  of  a  statistical   life  saved.   It  may  be   instrumentally   irrational   to  save   fewer  
lives  than  we  could  have  done  for  the  same  amount  of  money,  but  it   is  not  necessarily  in-­‐‑
strumentally  irrational  to  spend  any  particular  amount  of  money  on  saving  lives.  Only  if  the  
externally  determined  VSL  captures  the  correct  value  ratio  between  risk  reduction  and  eve-­‐‑
rything  else  will  it  be  instrumentally  irrational  to  spend  more  than  the  VSL  on  saving  a  sta-­‐‑
tistical  life  (since  we  are  getting  less  of  overall  good  than  we  could  have  gotten  via  an  alter-­‐‑
native  allocation  of  resources).    
  
4.3 Moral reasons 
Moral  reasons  for  coherence  would  show  that  using  a  set  VSL  is  required  by  morality.  Since  
Sunstein  wants   to  achieve  an   incompletely   theorized  agreement  on   the  use  of  CBA  across  
different   moral   theories,   the   moral   reasons   for   coherence   must   be   generally   accepted   as  
valid.  There  are  ways  of  making  it  sound  highly  intuitive  that  the  VSL  should  be  the  same  
in  all   cases.  Surely  all   lives  are  worth   the  same;  surely   it  would  be  unjust   to  be  willing   to  
spend  only  $1  million  to  save  a  life  in  one  domain  and  $20  million  to  save  a  life  in  another.  
The  underlying  assumption  seems  to  be  that  the  VSL  is  a  measure  of  how  important  the  life  
potentially  saved  is.  If  we  are  using  as  VSL  of  $1  million  in  the  domain  of  workplace  acci-­‐‑
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dents  and  a  VSL  of  $20  million  in  the  domain  of  air  traffic,  then  we  are  implicitly  saying  that  
the  life  of  a  worker  is  only  worth  one  twentieth  of  the  life  of  an  air  traveller.  However,  as  I  
have   argued   above,   the  VSL  need  not   be   a  direct   input   into  decision-­‐‑making,   but   can   in-­‐‑
stead  be  viewed  as  an  unintended  consequence  of  some  other  rationale  for  decision  (such  as  
technology-­‐‑based  regulation).  Below,  I  offer  four  types  of  rationale  that  are  part  of  plausible  
moral  theories,  that  do  not  use  VSL  as  a  decision  input,  and  that  leads  to  predictable  inco-­‐‑
herence  in  the  VSL.    
  
4.3.1  Ex ante and ex post 
The  aim  of  coherence  in  the  VSL  assumes  that  the  morally  important  phenomenon  is  saving  
statistical  lives  (or  avoiding  statistical  deaths).  This  is  the  ex  post  perspective  in  the  ethics  of  
risk.   The   ex   post   perspective   evaluates   risk-­‐‑involving   social   decisions   on   the   basis   of   the  
distribution  of  burdens  and  benefits   that  will  arise  after  the  uncertainty  has  been  resolved  
(e.g.  because  a  chance  process  has  taken  its  course).  But  there  is  an  alternative  view,  namely  
that  it  is  the  risk  that  people  face  ex  ante  that  should  be  the  focus  of  our  attention.  The  ex  ante  
perspective   evaluates   risky   social   choices   on   the  basis   of   the  distributions  of   benefits   and  
burdens   before   the   uncertainty   has   been   resolved.   For   those  moral   theories   that   place   im-­‐‑
portance  on  the  distribution  of  burdens  and  benefits,  the  ex  ante  view  implies  that  it  is  mor-­‐‑
ally  worse  if  1,000  people  bear  a  1-­‐‑in-­‐‑1,000  risk  of  death  than  if  1,000,000  people  bear  a  1-­‐‑in-­‐‑
100,000   risk   of  death,   even   though   the  number   of   statistical   lives   lost   is   the   same   in   both  
cases  (see  e.g.  Frick,  2015;  Lenman,  2000).    
The  ex  ante  view  would  (for  distribution-­‐‑sensitive  theories)  therefore  lead  to  the  same  
incoherences   in   the  VSL   that   Sunstein   attributes   to   the  proportionality   effect   (i.e.   the   ten-­‐‑
dency  to  want  to  save  the  larger  proportion  of  the  reference  groups  to  which  different  po-­‐‑
tential  victims  belong).  So  if  the  ex  ante  view  is  correct,  we  should  perhaps  welcome  at  least  
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this  form  of   incoherence.  Sunstein  seems  to  acknowledge  this  fact;   the  only  cognitive  error  
that   Sunstein   finds  with   regard   to   the   proportionality   effect   is   that   it   is   “operative   as   an  
automatic,  unreflective  intuition”  (Sunstein,  2002,  p.  48).  But  avoiding  such  unreflective  use  
is  arguably  solved  by  qualitative  analysis  alone,  at  least  insofar  as  such  an  analysis  includes  
a  tally  of  statistically  expected  lives  saved  as  well  as  the  magnitude  of  risk  imposed  on  each  
risk   bearer.   The   further   aspects   of  CBA,   and   in   particular   the   use   of   a   set  VSL   range,   do  
nothing  to  answer  the  question  of  whether,  why,  and  to  what  extent  there  should  be  a  non-­‐‑
proportional   difference   in   the   value   of   imposing   a   1/10   risk   of   death   per   year   and   a  
1/100,000  risk  of  death  per  year.    
The  debate  between  ex  ante  and  ex  post  views  is  far  from  settled  within  the  ethics  of  
risk  (see  Cohen,  Daniel  &  Eyal,  2015).  No  matter  how  that  debate  is  eventually  settled  (if  it  
is),  proponents  of  CBA  face  a  troubling  dilemma.  A  common  criticism  of  CBA  is  that  it  puts  
a   price   on   a   human   life,   and   thus   implies   that   lives   may   be   ‘sold’   for   a   certain   dollar  
amount.  The  idea  that  (for  example)  an  industry  can  legitimately  kill  5  people  as  long  as  it  
generates   savings   to   consumers   and   extra   profits   of   at   least   $45   million8  seems   plainly  
wrong.   In  order   to  answer   this  objection,  Sunstein  and  other  CBA  proponents  often  stress  
that  using  a  VSL  does  not  place  a  dollar  value  on  a  life  per  se  but  rather  on  a  mortality  risk  
(Sunstein,  2005,  p.  137).  This  suggests  that  CBA  is  an  ex  ante  view,  and  hence  should  not  be  
especially  concerned  with  the  simple  number  of  statistical  lives  saved,  nor  with  using  a  set  
VSL  (but  rather  a  set  value  for  a  1/10,000  mortality  risk,  and  another  set  value  for  a  1/100,000  
risk).  
So  it  seems  that  CBA  proponents  can  either  hold  on  to  the  demand  for  coherence  in  
the  VSL  and  accept  that  lives,  rather  than  risks,  have  a  dollar  value,  or  give  up  the  focus  on  
coherence  in  the  VSL  and  hold  on  to  the  idea  that  it  is  mortality  risks  that  have  a  dollar  val-­‐‑
                                                                                                                        
8  Using  the  VSL  of  $9  million  currently  used  by  several  US  government  agencies.  
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ue.  Arguing  that  the  VSL  coherence  is  important  and  that  mortality  risks  are  priced  is  not  an  
available  option  –  at  least  not  as  long  as  we  want  a  distributionally  sensitive  theory.  In  my  
view,  the  more  attractive  alternative  is  to  give  up  coherence  as  an  ideal.  At  any  rate,  it  is  not  
at  all  obvious  that  lack  of  coherence  represents  a  moral  failing.  
  
4.3.2 Distribution of costs and benefits 
Different  regulations  exhibit  different  distributions  of  costs  and  benefits.  There  are  two  very  
simple  kinds  of   case   (and  a   range  of  unsimple  ones   in  between).  The   first   simple  kind  of  
case  is  one  where  the  beneficiaries  of  regulation  also  bear  the  entire  cost.  The  second  simple  
kind  of  case  is  the  opposite,  where  the  beneficiaries  and  the  cost  bearers  are  wholly  distinct  
groups.  In  between  are  combinations  of  the  two,  where  different  persons  incur  some  of  the  
cost  and/or  some  of  the  benefit  of  a  regulation.  Let  cases  where  the  cost  is  entirely  borne  by  
the  beneficiaries  be  called   type  A  cases,  and  cases  where  beneficiaries  and  cost  bearers  are  
entirely  distinct  type  B  cases.  The  standard  rationale  given  by  proponents  of  CBA,  including  
Sunstein,  for  declining  to  regulate  in  cases  of  type  A  where  the  cost  exceeds  each  person’s  
WTP  is  that  it  would  amount  to  a  “forced  exchange”  that  the  so-­‐‑called  beneficiaries  would  
rather  have  avoided  (Sunstein,  2005,  pp.  150-­‐‑153).  This  rationale  does  not  require  the  regula-­‐‑
tor   to   take  any  stance  on  how  much  people’s   lives  are  worth  –   the  VSL   is  an  artefact  of  a  
rationale  –  respecting  people’s  right  to  choose  for  themselves  –  that  does  not  consider  VSL.    
In  cases  of  type  B,  the  forced-­‐‑exchange  rationale  is  not  applicable,   least  not  directly.  
The  beneficiaries  are  here  forced  to  buy  risk  reduction,  but  rather  given  a  ‘gift’  of  reduced  
risk.  If   the  costs  of  this  gift  exceed  the  beneficiaries’  combined  WTP,  all   that  means  is  that  
there   is   another   gift   that   the   beneficiaries   would   rather   have   had   (namely   an   amount   of  
money   that   strictly   exceeds   their  WTP   to   remove   the   relevant   risk).   This   indirect   forced-­‐‑
exchange  rationale  can  only  be  used  to  block  regulation  if  one  at  the  same  time  supports  a  
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transfer  of  money   to  would-­‐‑be  beneficiaries  of   the  regulation.  But   in  most  cases,   that  pro-­‐‑
posal   is  not  on   the   table  –  only  regulating  or  not   regulating   is.  Denying  regulation  on   the  
basis  of  the  indirect  forced-­‐‑exchange  rationale  would  be  analogous  to  not  giving  your  wife  
flowers  because  she  would  rather  have  chocolate  –  but  then  not  giving  her  chocolate  either.  
So   the   rationale   for   using  WTP   in   a   type   B   case  must   be   something   else   than   the  
forced-­‐‑exchange   rationale  used   in   type  A  cases.  Consequently,  using  a  different  VSL   than  
the  one  implied  by  WTP  in  type  B  cases  does  not  amount  to  treating  the  lives  saved  in  type-­‐‑
B  cases  differently  from  the  lives  saved  in  type-­‐‑A  cases.  The  different  rationales  mean  that  
the  VSLs  implied  express  qualitatively  different  judgments.  In  type  A  cases,  the  judgment  is  
mainly  about  respecting   individuals’  right   to  choose  and  their  own   judgments  of   the  rela-­‐‑
tive  value  of   risk   reduction  and  money.   In   type  B  cases,   the   judgment  may  be  about  how  
much  money  we,  as  a  society,  should  be  willing  to  spend  to  reduce  risks  (if  costs  are  borne  
by  taxpayers)  or  it  may  be  about  what  burdens  we  may  legitimately  place  on  others  in  order  
to   reduce   risks   (if   costs   are   borne   by   other   private   actors,   e.g.   businesses   or   consumers).  
There   is  no   reason   to   think   that   all   of   these   judgments  must  yield   the   same  number,   and  
hence  no  reason  to  expect  VSL  coherence  across  the  cases.  More  problematically  (for  CBA),  
it   seems   that   there   is   no   reason   for   using   the  WTP   number,  which   reflects   a   respect-­‐‑for-­‐‑
individuals  judgment,  in  type  B  cases,  which  do  not  concern  respect  for  individuals.  Conse-­‐‑
quently  we   are   left  without   any   basis   for   setting   the  VSL   at   any   particular   level   in   these  
types  of  case.  
     
4.3.3 Qualitative factors 
One   kind   of   rationale   straightforwardly   leads   to  VSL   incoherence,   namely   a   rationale   ac-­‐‑
cording  to  which  it  is  not  true  that  every  saving  of  a  statistical  life  has  the  same  moral  im-­‐‑
portance.  Sunstein  acknowledges  that  there  are  differences  between  cases  that  warrant  us-­‐‑
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ing  different  VSLs.  In  particular,  he  argues  that  deaths  that  are  especially  dreaded,  such  as  
cancer   deaths,   should   be   assigned   a   higher  VSL;   that   involuntarily   borne   risks   should   be  
assigned   a   higher   VSL   than   voluntarily   borne   ones;   that   large-­‐‑scale   catastrophes  may   be  
worse  than  the  mere  number  of  lives  lost  indicate;  and  that  risks  to  especially  vulnerable  or  
underprivileged  groups,   such  as  children  or   the  poor,  may  be  given  higher  weight.  These  
are   the   ‘qualitative   factors’   mentioned   above.   Taking   the   qualitative   factors   into   account  
does  not  amount  to  treating  different  people’s  lives  as  having  different  moral  worth.    
The  qualitative   factors  hide  a  number  of   rationales   for   risk   regulation   that  goes  be-­‐‑
yond  merely  saving  lives.  The  idea  that  we  should  care  more  about  dreaded  deaths  reflect  
the  fact  that  there  is  more  to  dying  than  death  itself,  e.g.  that  many  ways  of  dying  involve  
large   amounts   of   suffering.  Adjusting   the  VSL   is   an   adequate  way   of   taking   this   into   ac-­‐‑
count,   since   the   rationale   is   basically   consequentialist   –   it   suggests   that   one   consequence,  
e.g.   death   from   cancer,   is  worse   than   another,   e.g.   death   from   a  workplace   accident.   The  
rationales  behind  other  factors  are  less  obviously  honoured  by  adjusting  the  VSL.  The  idea  
that   voluntariness  matters   reflects   the   importance   of   a   number   of   phenomena,   including  
freedom,  consent,  compensation  and  personal  responsibility.  The  proper  moral  role  of  these  
factors   is   complex   and   disputed   (for   brief   discussions   of   some   of   the   complications   see  
Thomson,  1986,  pp.  169-­‐‑172  &  188-­‐‑191).  But  whatever  the  role  of   these  factors   is  precisely,  
the  value  of  a  statistical   life   is  not   likely   to  be  part  of   the  description  of  what  difference   it  
makes  whether   someone   consents   to  bearing  a   risk  or  not,   is   compensated   for   the   risk  or  
not,  or  bears  personal  responsibility  for  being  subjected  to  the  risk  or  not.  The  cost  of  avoid-­‐‑
ing  the  risk  may  not  even  be  part  of  that  description  at  all.  Thus  we  should  not  even  expect  
coherence-­‐‑with-­‐‑adjustments  for  the  VSL  if  these  qualitative  factors  play  the  role  they  should  
in  setting  policy  on  risks.    
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It  is  also  worth  noting  that  qualitative  factors  do  not  only  matter  for  the  evaluation  of  
the  risk  reduction  –   i.e.   the  benefits  of  a   regulation  –  but  also   for   the  costs.  Once   the  rele-­‐‑
vance  of  factors  beyond  purely  descriptive  consequences  has  been  admitted,  it  seems  much  
less  obvious  that  various  systemic  effects  and  substitute  risks  count  against  regulations.  For  
example,  the  increased  risk  of  skin  cancer  and  cataracts  from  sun  exposure  that  is  caused  by  
remove  ground-­‐‑level  ozone  pollution  is  easily  avoidable  by  wearing  sunscreen,  sunglasses  
or  suitable  clothes.  It  thus  seems  to  be  voluntarily  borne,  and  it  is  therefore  questionable  if  is  
should  matter   (much)   in  policy-­‐‑making.  The   relevance  of   the  general   association  between  
regulatory  costs  and   increased  mortality  will  similarly  depend  on  the  details  of  how  costs  
cause  increased  mortality,  and  on  what  other  things  (besides  not  regulating)  can  be  done  to  
avoid  it.  Recognizing  the  relevance  of  qualitative  factors  thus  blurs  the  line  between  neglect-­‐‑
ing  certain  costs  of  regulation  and  rightly  treating  them  as  morally  irrelevant.  
  
4.3.4 Counting costs 
Suppose  we  accept   the   idea   that  each  saving  of  a   statistical   life   should  be  given   the   same  
moral  importance.  The  ideal  of  a  coherent  VSL  does  not  follow  from  this  principle.  The  rea-­‐‑
son  is  that  assigning  equal  moral  importance  to  each  saving  of  a  statistical  life  is  interpreted  
in  CBA  as  letting  every  statistical  life   justify  the  same  regulatory  costs.  In  other  worth,  the  
VSL  measures  moral  importance  in  terms  of  the  costs  of  regulation.  If  it  is  not  the  case  that  
every   regulatory   cost   has   the   same  moral   importance,   CBAs   ideal   of   coherence   does   not  
coincide  with  assigning  equal  moral  importance  to  all  lives.  And  it  is  highly  plausible  that  
not  all  costs  are  equally  morally  important.  Most  basically,  the  imposition  of  a  cost  may  in  
some  cases  amount  to  a  seizure  of  illegitimate  gains.  This  is  especially  true  when  those  who  
suffer  the  costs  of  regulation  are  also  causally  responsible  for  the  existence  of  the  risk  and  
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do  not   (mainly)  bear   the  risk   themselves  –   that   is,  when  they   impose   the  risk  on  others   for  
their  own  benefit.  In  many  such  cases,  the  costs  arguably  should  not  matter  at  all.    
But  suppose  both  the  beneficiaries  of  regulation  and  those  who  bear  the  cost  have  an  
equal  prima  facie  claim  to  be  helped.  Even  in  such  cases,  plausible  moral  theories  hold  that  
we   should   make   distinctions   between   different   costs.   Many   non-­‐‑consequentialists   argue  
that  aggregation  is  not  permitted  in  cases  where  the  members  of  one  group  stand  to  get  a  
minor  benefit  while  the  members  of  the  other  group  stand  to  get  a  major  benefit.  For  exam-­‐‑
ple,  if  we  can  either  save  one  person  from  severe  pain  or  save  one  billion  people  from  suf-­‐‑
fering  a  inconvenience  of  not  being  able  to  watch  the  World  Cup  final,  we  should  save  the  
one,   even   if   the   aggregated   benefit   to   the   one   billion  would   be   larger   (Scanlon,   1998,   pp.  
235-­‐‑236).  This  has  implications  with  respect  to  the  regulation  of  risk.  Suppose  group  A  will  
bear  the  costs  of  a  regulation  while  group  B  will  benefit  (by  being  relieved  of  bearing  a  risk).  
If  the  cost  to  each  member  of  A  is  trivial  compared  with  the  risk  that  the  members  of  B  will  
otherwise  bear,  then  on  a  non-­‐‑consequentialist  view  we  should  help  B  –  that  is,  implement  
the   regulation   –   even   if   the   aggregate   benefits   to   group  A   are   larger   (see   Lenman,   2000;  
James,  2012;  Frick,  2015).  There  are  many  open  questions  here,  such  as  how  ex  ante  and  ex  
post  claims  or  burdens  should  be  incorporated.  But  no  matter  how  these  are  resolved,  con-­‐‑
tractualism   denies   that   all   costs   should   be   taken   into   account   (in   the   sense   that   they   are  
made  to  carry  weight  in  favour  of  one  policy  or  another).  For  example,  minor  price  increas-­‐‑
es  that  hit  a  large  number  of  A-­‐‑people  should  not  be  counted  when  the  B-­‐‑people  would  face  
a   sizeable   risk   of   death.   If   risks   are   regulated   in   a   way   consistent   with   the   non-­‐‑
consequentialist  view,  then  we  should  expect  different   life  savings  to  have  different  aggre-­‐‑
gated  costs,  i.e.  different  VSLs.  
There   is   a  more   general   problem  with   the  way   costs   are   treated   in   CBA   than   that  
plausible  moral  theories  disagree  with  it.  Those  who  argue  for  and  practice  CBA  are  much  
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less  attentive  to  differences  on  the  cost  side  than  to  differences  on  the  benefits  side.  Consid-­‐‑
er,   for   example,   Sunstein’s  description  of   how  36   ideal-­‐‑type   cases   of   regulation  would  be  
(and  presumably  were)  scrutinized  using  CBA  during  the  process  of  regulatory  review  that  
he  administrated  (Sunstein,  2014,  Ch.  2).  The  number  of  questions  posed  to  the  cost  side  is  
precisely  zero  –  in  every  case  the  cost  is  merely  stated  as  a  total  aggregate  dollar  amount.  At  
least  one  reason  why  CBA’s  critics  are  often  especially  averse  to  the  monetization  aspect  of  
CBA  is  exactly  that  it  makes  the  analysis  blind  to  morally  important  differences  on  the  cost  
side,  and  cannot  account  for  morally  relevant  differences  in  the  trade-­‐‑offs  made  in  different  
instances  of  setting  a  VSL  at  $X.  Proponents  of  CBA  (including  Sunstein)  frequently  argue  
that   monetization   is   merely   one   pragmatic   way   of   commensurating   values.   I   suppose   it  
could  be,  but  not  as  long  as  values  that  are  ‘naturally’  in  a  money  format  are  not  subjected  
to  any  rational  scrutiny.  If  CBA  is  to  be  justified  on  cognitive  grounds,  the  fact  that  it  fails  to  
rationally  scrutinize  one  side  of  the  cost-­‐‑benefit  equation  seems  to  be  especially  troubling.  
  
5. Conclusion 
I  have  argued  above  that  CBA,  and  in  particular  Sunstein’s  two  institutional  proposals,  goes  
beyond  what  is  necessary  for  correcting  cognitive  biases.  The  commensuration  and  moneti-­‐‑
zation  aspects  of  CBA  are  not  necessary  for  getting  rid  of  false  beliefs  about  the  magnitude  
of  risks,  or  for  making  sure  that  all  costs  of  regulation  are  on-­‐‑screen;  and  the  coherence  for  
which  commensuration  and  monetization   is  not   justified  either  on  methodological,   instru-­‐‑
mental  or  moral  grounds.  The  cognitive  argument   for  CBA   thus  does  not   justify  CBA  be-­‐‑
yond  qualitative  analysis,  which   is  a   feature   that  more  or   less  any  decision  procedure  can  
incorporate.       
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Afhandlingen   diskuterer   de   etiske   problemstillinger   som   rejses   af   syntesebiologi   –   en   ny  
bioteknologi,  hvor  forskerne  kan  designe  og  bygge  organismer  der  har  gavnlige  egenskaber.  
  
I  indledningen  giver  jeg  et  kort  overblik  over  forskningen  indenfor  syntesebiologien  og  de  
samfundsmæssige  reaktioner  der  har  været  på  den.  Fokus  er  på  de  dele  af  teknologien  der  
er  mest  interessant  fra  et  etisk  perspektiv,  og  som  har  været  mest  diskuteret  i  akademiske,  
politiske  og  samfundsmæssige  kredse.  Indledningen  giver  en  introduktion  til  de  fire  artikler  
som  udgør  afhandlingens  hoveddel.  Den  består  desuden  af  en  mere  dybdegående  diskussi-­‐‑
on   af   en   væsentlig   klasse   af   indvendinger   mod   syntesebiologi,   nemlig   indvendinger   der  
baseres  på  det  menneskelige  forhold  til  andre  levende  væsener  og  naturen  
  
I  Artikel   1   og   2   diskuterer   jeg   en   række   problemer   i   den  måde   etiske   problemstillinger   i  
syntesebiologi   (og  nye   teknologier  generelt)  vinkles  på.   I   artikel   1  argumenterer   jeg   for  at  
det  at   skabe  kunstigt   liv  er  en  moralsk  væsentlig  handling.   Jeg  kritiserer  den   forståelse  af  
’kunstigt  liv’  og  ’moralsk  væsentlighed’  som  anvendes  af  Douglas,  Powell  og  Savulescu,  for  
at  være  for  snævre  og  for  at  lede  til  blindhed  overfor  visse  indvendinger.  I  artikel  2  kritise-­‐‑
rer  jeg  et  udbredt  forsvar  for  syntesebiologi,  baseret  på  relevante  ligheder  mellem  syntese-­‐‑
biologi  og  etablerede  teknologier,  og  viser  at  visse  indvendinger  kan  undvige  dette  ligheds-­‐‑
argument.  
  
I  artikel  3  og  4  diskuterer  jeg  måder  at  håndtere  usikkerhed  og  risiko  på.  Artikel  3  forsvarer  
forsigtighedsprincippet  fra  kritikere  der  hævder,  at  princippet  er  irrationelt.  Artikel  4  kriti-­‐‑
serer   Sunstein’s   argument   for   cost-­‐‑benefit   analyse   som  en  korrektion  af  kognitive   fejl.   Jeg  
viser  at  kun  ikke-­‐‑centrale  dele  af  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysen  kan  forsvares  på  denne  måde     
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Summary 
The  dissertation  explores  ethical  issues  concerning  synthetic  biology,  an  emerging  biotech-­‐‑
nology  whereby  researchers  design  and  construct  organisms  that  are  useful  for  human  be-­‐‑
ings.    
  
The  introduction  gives  a  brief  overview  of  the  field  of  synthetic  biology  and  of  societal  reac-­‐‑
tions  to  it.  The  focus  is  on  those  lines  of  research  that  raise  the  most  interesting  ethical  ques-­‐‑
tions   and   that   have   (therefore)   generated   responses   from   academics,   regulators   and   civil  
society.  It  introduces  the  four  articles  that  constitute  the  main  body  of  the  dissertation,  and  
provides  a  more  in-­‐‑depth  discussion  of  objections  concerning  the  human  relationship  to  life  
and  nature  (which  I  only  touch  relatively  briefly  on  in  the  articles).  
  
Articles  1  and  2  discuss  what  I  argue  are  shortcomings  in  the  typical  framing  of  the  ethical  
questions  that  synthetic  biology  raises.  In  article  1,  I  argue  that  the  creation  of  artificial  life  –  
which  is  one  description  of  what  synthetic  biologist  are  doing  –  is  morally  significant.  I  do  
so  in  opposition  to  Douglas,  Powell  and  Savulescu.  I  argue  that  their  conceptions  of  ‘artifi-­‐‑
cial   life’   and   ‘moral   significance’   are   unduly   narrow,   and   lead   to   blindness   to   important  
objections.   In  article  2   I  discuss  arguments   that  defend  synthetic  biology  and  similar   tech-­‐‑
nologies  on  the  basis  of  its  similarity  with  established  technologies,  and  show  that  there  are  
ways  to  avoid  them.  
  
In  article  3  and  4,   I  discuss  aspects  of   risk   regulation.  Article  3  defends   the  precautionary  
principle   from  objections  based  on   its  supposed   irrationality.  Article  4  criticises  Sunstein’s  
argument  for  cost-­‐‑benefit  analysis  as  a  correction  for  cognitive  biases.  I  argue  that  the  goal  
of   avoiding   cognitive   error   does   not   warrant   core   aspects   of   cost-­‐‑benefit   analysis.  
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